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Many years ago the philosopher Friedrich Hayek wrote that 
it took him a decade to acknowledge that there is no such 
thing as social justice. It is just a mirage (Hayek 1978: 57). 
Nonetheless, almost forty years later social justice is one 
of the ‘buzz words’ in the human rights arena. This does 
not mean that by now it is a neatly defined, uncontested 
concept. Actually, social justice means different things even 
to people with relatively similar backgrounds, including the 
contributors to this essay volume. Nonetheless, often the term 
covers “the relative distribution of rights, opportunities and 
resources within a given society, and whether it deserves to 
be regarded as fair and just” (Cramme & Diamond 2009: 3). 
Generally, that’s how we have used the term in this volume 
of essays. 
Human rights isn’t an uncontested concept either. 
Sometimes the concept refers to legal rights under 
national or international law, sometimes to moral rights. 
When human rights are seen as legal rights they have 
the authority of the law which then also reflects on the 
activists, organizations and movements claiming to protect 
and promote them. The human rights activists defend the 
law, a higher international law if necessary, not just their 
own moral or political preferences. (This, of course, does not 
mean that the content and scope of human rights as legal 
rights are completely fixed. It does mean, however, that 
there are agreed methods of interpretation to determine 
content and scope.) 
If, on the other hand, human rights are conceptualized 
as moral rights, their content and scope become more 
flexible. The move towards or, as David Petrasek writes in 
his reflection on the other contributions to this volume, 
the move back to a moral understanding of human rights 
seems to fit well with a simultaneous instrumentalization 
of human rights. For a long time the realization of human 
rights was not just the mission but also the vision 
(the desired end-state) for organizations like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. In other words, 
human rights were their goal, their instrument and their 
language, whether they focused on civil and political 
rights or on the realization of the full spectrum of human 
rights. Nowadays human rights are (again) more and more 
considered to be instruments for attaining other goals, 
such as dignity, equality, or social justice. 
It were exactly these goals that came under pressure 
when in 2008 the world was hit by a financial crisis which 
was soon followed by an economic one. Unexpectedly, the 
world economy was full of bailouts and other government 
interventions followed by austerity measures and citizens’ 
protests against and resistance to such measures under 
the banners of justice, democracy and dignity. The Occupy 
movement, the Greek and Spanish Indignados – what did 
human rights have to offer to their resistance to austerity 
measures in times of economic stagnation? The Arab 
uprisings – what did human rights have to offer those 
calling for “bread, freedom, social justice, and dignity”, 
apart from defending the public space for peaceful protest 
and political dissent? A lot, according to some; almost 
nothing, according to others. Both the human rights 
movement and the social justice movement have been 
deeply divided about the value of human rights in the fight 
against economic injustice. 
Issues of distributive justice, especially in times of austerity, 
and a growing or resurgent understanding of human rights 
as a moral or political concept and not merely or mainly a 
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legal one, also seem to have led some to call for rethinking 
the concept – or was it a strategy? – of political and economic 
impartiality of human rights and human rights organizations. 
These interrelated issues led the Strategic Studies team at 
Amnesty International’s Dutch section to invite academics 
and practitioners in the field of human rights and social 
justice to reflect on conceptual and strategic issues related 
to the link between these two agenda’s. This collection 
of twelve essays does not aim to re-enact earlier debates 
about the differences and similarities of rights categories or 
generations of rights. Whether economic, social and cultural 
rights are really human rights is not the issue. That question 
has been answered long ago. What do human rights actually 
have to offer in the struggle for social justice? That’s the 
issue we try to address in this volume. The views expressed 
in the contributions that follow are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect positions of Amnesty International, 
its Dutch section or Strategic Studies. 
Almost all authors in this volume agree that both pursuits 
are different but that there is conceptual and strategic 
overlap between them. At the most basic level, as Sara 
Burke argues, social justice and human rights activists 
both aspire to a better world based upon peace, justice 
and other moral values like equality. Both consider poverty, 
hunger and marginalization as an affront to human dignity 
and, when it is the result of unwillingness, negligence or 
discrimination on the part of the state, as a violation of 
human rights too. Both would agree that the state has 
a responsibility to provide social welfare, at least to the 
most marginalized and vulnerable in society, and to offer 
an adequate remedy when inequality impedes people’s 
livelihood. For Dan Chong and many other contributors, 
therefore, social justice issues, such as access to food, 
adequate housing, and health care, are part of the canon of 
‘core’ human rights. 
However, sometimes even the most human rights-friendly 
government in the world will be unable to prevent hunger 
or homelessness. If it cannot be shown that deprivation is 
the result of the (in)action of the state, as Rolf Künnemann 
of FIAN explains in his contribution, one cannot speak 
of a human rights violation in the legal sense of the 
word. Consequently, for organizations like FIAN that use 
arguments that find support in human rights treaties, it can 
be difficult to cooperate with the social justice movement. 
The alternative, delegalizing human rights, might be a trap 
to avoid, because, according to Künnemann, it leads to the 
trivialization of human rights and “plays in the hands of 
socially oppressive elites” who can shun away from their 
legal obligations if these become moral duties only.
Moreover, Samuel Moyn and Aryeh Neier contend that 
social justice often articulates a vision that goes beyond 
the obligations of states to protect the poor, with activists 
fighting for the equal or equitable distribution of resources 
and wealth. Human rights are not that ambitious in theory, 
offering a minimal floor of protection at best. Although 
there is divergence on Moyn’s (and Neier’s even more) 
minimalist interpretation, most contributors agree that 
human rights, even if understood more progressively, may 
not satisfy the more radical social justice activist. 
The potential of human rights to 
deliver social justice 
Authors are more divergent on the question whether the 
law-based understanding of human rights is, or can be, 
effective to deliver social justice. This divergence is partly 
related to their different understandings of social justice, 
as discussed by David Petrasek. 
Many argue that human rights advocacy can help improve 
the fate of the poor and marginalized. Ashfaq Khalfan and 
Iain Byrne, for example, argue that Amnesty International 
has indirectly helped advancing and promoting social 
justice by focusing its economic and social rights work on 
the most marginalized and disadvantaged groups. But, 
Khalfan and Byrne concede, in order ‘to shift the needle’, 
Amnesty must devote more attention to redistribution of 
resources – including through tax policies – to help realize 
the full enjoyment of human rights by all.
For them and other authors, the work of human rights 
organizations can and should become complementary to 
that of social justice groups. Dan Chong, for instance, 
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argues that “advocating for human rights can help 
overcome the narrow identity politics and selective outrage 
that often inflicts social movements” while “at the same 
time excluding methods of achieving social justice that fail 
to meet human rights standards [e.g. violent revolutions]”. 
Sara Burke too argues in favour of enhanced cooperation 
between the two groups, but warns that this requires 
a deeper shift of discourse as well as the creation of 
platforms for activists to speak for themselves.
But many authors also point at the limitations of human 
rights to pursue social justice, at least when conceived 
as purely legal instruments. Eduardo Catalán, Koldo 
Casla, Dan Chong, and others believe that, although some 
measure of social justice can be achieved, ultimately 
a legal rights approach to social justice is too limited 
for fighting deeper forms of economic inequality. Apart 
from the vagueness and indeterminacy of international 
law with regard to specific (economic) policy solutions, 
and the inherent shortcomings of court-based methods 
like litigation (expensive, technical, relatively narrow in 
scope), the legal rights approach is seen as falling short 
to address systemic government failings and structural 
factors underlying violations and abuse. According to 
Eduardo Catalán, who sees global capitalism as the main 
cause for today’s social rights degradation, a legal rights 
approach fails to grant any serious protection and has “in 
some cases [even] become instrumental to legitimizing and 
guaranteeing capitalist expansion”.
From here, authors reach different conclusions. In order 
to become effective in the social and economic realm, 
a first group of authors suggests that human rights 
advocates must (re-)enter the political arena. They cannot 
afford to provide only ideologically neutral, technocratic 
solutions to politically-charged problems but must take 
these head-on. Dan Chong, for instance, writes that “the 
only way forward for human rights is to engage directly in 
political, economic, and cultural debates”. Widney Brown 
too, writes, that human rights organizations or advocates 
“must address deeper structural causes of human rights 
violations by revising their notion of impartiality” and 
challenge economic systems and actors. Koldo Casla, 
pleads for an explicitly ‘political’ approach to human 
rights, i.e. constructing human rights politically “as a 
set of guidelines for political action” and by “playing the 
game of politics”. For him and other authors, such political 
advocacy can improve upon some of the limitations to 
achieve social justice that are inherent in strictly legal 
approaches to human rights. 
A second group of authors disagrees that human rights 
can be effective tools to reduce or eliminate inequality and 
oppose the politicization of human rights in this way. Jacob 
Mchangama’s research suggests that the introduction and 
judicialization of social rights do not have any positive 
effects on people’s long-term social development and 
can even have negative consequences. Like Aryeh Neier, 
he believes that social justice issues require a balancing 
of different interests and that subjecting human rights 
issues to such a balancing act is not the right way to 
go. Samuel Moyn situates the problem in human rights 
norms themselves, which are in his view “compatible with 
inequality, even radical inequality”, because they don’t 
place any limits on the accumulation of wealth. 
Paradoxically, the latter three authors seem to agree with 
the first group that, ultimately, social justice requires 
political mobilization but they believe that political 
parties and other social movements, not human rights 
organizations, must fulfil this task. Human rights groups 
are seen as ill-suited to resolve the inevitable trade-
offs and priorities involved in matters of economic and 
social policy, which ought to be part of the democratic 
political process. There is the risk of human rights 
inflation and trivialization if human rights law is stretched 
or delegalized to circumvent the indeterminism of 
international human rights law in providing clear-cut policy 
directions. There is also the probability that human rights 
organizations which defend the rights of all, including 
of unpopular groups, will find it difficult to mobilize the 
required large constituencies. For Samuel Moyn, the human 
rights movement simply “has neither the tools nor really 
the desire to bring the egalitarian task to the globe or 
even specific nations” and may not be “fearful enough to 
provoke redistribution”.
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What role for human rights groups in 
the pursuit for social justice?
So what role is there for human rights organizations like 
Amnesty International? In their essay Doutje Lettinga and 
Lars van Troost suggest that there are four approaches: 
Justice over rights; Justice through rights; Rights over 
justice; and Justice for rights.
Those authors who reject the moralization and potential 
politicization of human rights to pursue social justice believe 
that human rights organizations must do their utmost to be 
(seen as) politically impartial in order to remain effective. 
One author concludes from there that these organizations 
must thus work on civil and political rights only, including 
the rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of speech and 
fair trials. Any suggestion that human rights organizations 
are involved in the political process of (re)distributing 
society’s resources, as an ostensible means of protecting 
social and economic rights, will undermine their political 
neutrality, and thereby their credibility to criticize oppressive 
governments that fare well on economic development. 
Others too believe that human rights organizations can play 
an effective role without necessarily taking on social justice 
causes. By defending civil and political rights of activists, 
they can help securing the space to mobilize public support 
for social justice causes, which may ultimately crystallize 
into the necessary political power to build a (global) 
welfare state. But they believe that this line of work can 
be accompanied with limited work on economic and social 
rights, although this will be of limited use for more radical 
social justice agendas. 
Still others believe that time is long overdue for human 
rights organizations and advocates to deepen their 
engagement with social justice. They suggest that 
organizations like Amnesty International must start 
analysing the economic and political structures underlying 
rights violations and addressing these with political 
solutions that are system-oriented. Although these 
authors differ in the extent to which they believe that 
such organizations must conduct advocacy regarding 
allocation of resources or take positions that are only 
weakly supported in international law, they seem to agree 
that human rights groups can and should engage in 
advocacy on social and economic policies. According to 
some, identifying from a human rights law point of view 
which policies are best suited to achieve social justice 
is possible, compatible with impartiality, and helpful if 
accompanied with an investment in the required expertise, 
use of new methods (including quantitative methods) 
and partnerships. Such work is seen as contributing to 
making human rights more effective and locally relevant, 
by providing real solutions to denials of rights that are 
grounded in the lived experience, needs and wishes of 
marginalized groups rather than simply dealing with 
violations of human rights law.
With this essay volume we hope to contribute to the 
thinking on the relationship between human rights and 
social justice, two agendas that seem to converge while 
at least the first one may also be changing itself in that 
convergence.
      
Doutje Lettinga and Lars van Troost
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Human rights and the age of inequality
Given how difficult it is for the regimes and movements that 
have been established around human rights to protect basic 
values – including now economic and social rights  – what 
are the prospects that they might also respond to widening 
inequality of income and wealth locally and globally?
Introduction
Start with a parable: Imagine that one man owned 
everything. Call him Croesus, after the king of ancient 
lore who, Herodotus says, was so “wonderfully rich” that 
he “thought himself the happiest of mortals”. Impossibly 
elevated above his fellow men and women though he 
is, however, this modern Croesus is also remarkably 
magnanimous. With his global realm, the modern Croesus 
outstrips the already fabulous wealth of his predecessor by 
a long shot. But he does not want everyone else to starve, 
and not only because he needs some of them for the upkeep 
of his global estate. Instead, Croesus insists on a floor of 
protection, so that everyone living under his benevolent but 
total ascendancy can escape utter destitution. Health, food, 
water, even paid vacations – Croesus funds them all.
In comparison to the world in which we live today, where 
few enjoy these benefits, Croesus offers a kind of utopia. 
It is the utopia foreseen in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948)1, whose goal is to provide a list of 
the most basic entitlements that humans deserve thanks 
to being human itself. This utopia is one that, though 
little known in its own time, has become our own, with the 
rise in the last half century of the international human 
1  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (1948), 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December, UNGA 
Res 217 A(III).
rights movement – especially now that this movement has 
belatedly turned to mobilization for the economic and social 
rights that the Universal Declaration promised from the 
start. 
We increasingly live in Croesus’s world. It now goes without 
saying that any enlightened regime respects basic civil 
liberties, though the struggle to provide them is compelling 
and unending. Croesus hates repression and not merely 
indigence. He would never consent to a police state; he 
views the atrocities of war and occupation with horror; he 
glows with outrage when the word ‘torture’ is mentioned; 
he agrees cruelty is the worst thing we can do. But he also 
considers it outrageous, even as the sole inhabitant of 
the top, to live in a world of socioeconomic destitution at 
the bottom. So-called ‘social rights’ matter deeply to him. 
Croesus’s generosity, then, is as unprecedented as his 
wealth is. How could anyone trivialize what Croesus has to 
offer? 
Let me try. For the value of distributive equality – any 
ceiling on the wealth gap between rich and poor – is as 
absent from the Universal Declaration, as well as from 
the legal regimes and social movements that take it as 
their polestar, as it is far from Croesus’s mind. True, the 
founding document of human rights announced status 
equality: according to its first article, all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. It may be 
true that, in a world devastated by the evils of racism and 
genocide, the assertion of bare status equality was itself 
a revolutionary act. Yet this same status equality implies 
nothing more. Nothing in the scheme of human rights rules 
out Croesus’s world, with its absolute overlordship, so long 
as it features that floor of protection.
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In itself, Croesus’ willing provision of a floor of protection 
seems deeply flawed – immoral even – if it comes together 
with the most massive inequality ever seen. This is the 
point of the thought experiment: to remind us that human 
rights, even perfectly realized human rights, are compatible 
with inequality, even radical inequality. Staggeringly, we 
could live in a situation of absolute hierarchy like Croesus’s 
world, with human rights norms as they have been 
canonically formulated perfectly respected. Our question is 
whether we should continue to idealize Croesus’s world as 
we continue to make our world more like it every day.
Human rights in the age of national 
welfare
Writing the history of human rights in relation to that of 
political economy would involve two big stages – with a 
possible missed opportunity in between. The first, clearly, 
was the heroic age of the national welfare states after World 
War II. At that time, human rights reflected a small part of 
a larger and universal welfarist consensus that united the 
otherwise bitter enemies of the new cold war in 1948 and 
for two decades after. Contrary to stereotype, the ‘West’ for a 
long moment agreed about the importance of socioeconomic 
rights. Indeed, it was in part out of their own experience 
of socioeconomic misery, and not only the threatening 
communist insistence on an absolute ceiling on inequality, 
that the capitalist nations signed on so enthusiastically to 
welfarism. Of course, America never got as far in answering 
the welfarist imperative as those European nations that 
chose Christian Democracy, social democracy, or (in the 
east) communist egalitarianism. But the reigning consensus 
even in the capitalist nations in that lost age went far 
beyond a basic floor of protection to include its own exacting 
ideal of a ceiling on inequality, which to a remarkable extent 
they succeeded (like the communist nations) in building 
to accompany their new floor of entitlements. Indeed, it is 
perhaps because human rights offered a modest first step 
rather than a grand final hope that they were broadly ignored 
or rejected in the 1940s as the ultimate formulation of the 
good life.
The assertion of human rights in the 1940s, in other 
words, is best understood as one version of the update to 
the entitlements of citizenship on whose desirability and 
necessity almost everyone agreed after depression and war. 
Franklin Roosevelt issued his famous call for a “second 
Bill of Rights” that included socioeconomic protections in 
his State of the Union address the year before his death, 
but the most important three facts about that call have 
been almost entirely missed. One is that it marked a 
characteristically provincial America’s late and ginger entry 
into an already foreordained North Atlantic consensus. 
A second is that in promising “freedom from want” and 
envisioning it “everywhere in the world”, Roosevelt in fact 
understated the actually egalitarian aspirations that every 
version of welfarism proclaimed, which went far beyond 
a low bar against indigence so as to guarantee a more 
equal society than before (or since). His highest promise, 
in his speech, was not a floor of protection for the masses 
but the end of “special privileges for the few” – a ceiling 
on inequality. The last is that though Roosevelt certainly 
hoped it would span the globe, it was to be nationally 
rather than internationally organized – in stark contrast 
to the assumptions of both political economy and human 
rights as they have prevailed in our time.
The most interesting truth about human rights in the 
1940s, indeed, is not that they were an optional and 
normally ignored synonym for a consensus welfarism 
but that they still portended a fully national project of 
reconstruction – just like all other reigning versions of 
welfarism. Everywhere in the world, and not least in 
Roosevelt’s America itself, welfarism was both announced 
and achieved on a national basis. The minor exception 
of the International Labour Organization to one side, 
in the 1940s, neither socioeconomic rights nor a more 
ambitious welfarism were international projects, except 
insofar as modular nation-states experimenting with their 
own arrangements were supposed to answer to higher 
values of morality. Of course the Universal Declaration 
is international in source and form, but essentially as a 
template for nations – “a high standard of achievement for 
all peoples and nations”, as its own preamble tells us.
This ought to be unsurprising. Welfarism had been national 
ever since the crisis between the world wars prompted 
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state-led reconstruction. If ‘national socialism’ did not 
triumph as a slogan or a programme after World War II, 
it was in part because the name was taken but mainly 
because a more ecumenical national welfarism – my 
label – structured a debate about how far (not whether) 
the state would intervene into economic affairs to plan 
and manage growth, with a range of options from tweaked 
capitalism to full-blown communism. Indeed, a once more 
internationalist socialism had been reduced to the scale of 
the nation. Having never ascended above it, ‘welfarism in 
one country’ was the rule where full-blown socialism did 
not obtain, like various places in Western and everywhere in 
Eastern Europe.
Political economy ascended beyond the nation in the 1940s 
only for the sake of avoiding catastrophe if individual states 
failed in their obligation of countercyclical management of 
their own economies, never for the sake of either a global 
floor of protection, let alone a global ceiling on inequality. 
As economist and Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal explained 
laconically, looking back at this consensus about the 
geographical limits but relative generosity of post-war 
distributive justice, “the welfare state is nationalistic” 
(Myrdal 1960). The original relation of the Universal 
Declaration to political economy was thus the lowest set 
of guarantees for which the national welfarist experiment 
should strive, when conducted in the modular boxes 
provided – and divided – by political borders.
The harmony of ideals between the campaign against 
abjection and the demand for equality succeeded only 
nationally, and in mostly North Atlantic states, and then 
only partially. Whatever success occurred on both fronts 
thus came with sharp limitations – and especially the 
geographical modesty that the human rights idiom has 
successfully transcended. It is, indeed, as if globalization of 
the norms of basic protection were a kind of reward for the 
relinquishment of the imperative of local equality. 
Even the decolonization of the world, though unforeseen at 
the time of the Universal Declaration that accommodated 
itself to the empires of the day, hardly changed this 
relationship, since the new states themselves adopted the 
national welfarist resolve. The burning question was what 
would happen after, especially in the face of the inability of 
the Global South to transplant national welfarism and the 
wealth gap that endures to this day between two sorts of 
countries: rich and poor.
From national welfare to neoliberal 
globalization
There was, some hoped, the possibility of globalizing 
welfarism, so as to seek the floor of protection and 
ceiling on inequality globally that some nations achieved 
internally. The aforementioned Myrdal, for example, held out 
this possibility. But his aspirations, like those of the Global 
South’s ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO) that 
followed, did not survive. (The neglected NIEO was a set of 
proposals from the Global South that focused on income 
and wealth inequality among nations rather than aversive 
economic and social rights protection for individuals.2) 
Instead what historian Mark Mazower has mordantly 
dubbed “the real new international economic order” 
of global market fundamentalism did. In the ultimate 
compromise vote, the Nobel prize for economics for 1974 
was won together by Myrdal and his ideological opponent 
Friedrich Hayek – but where one of them was forgotten, 
the other saw his fondest wishes come true. In the 1970s, 
starting in the United Kingdom and the United States – 
and in the Latin American southern cone just before and 
in authoritarian form – states retrenched from social 
provision, and politicians were elected (or, in Latin America, 
took power) who set out to destroy the national welfarist 
consensus for which human rights had offered a modest 
and optional synonym three decades earlier.
Why the practical victory of that ‘neoliberalism’ occurred 
when and how it did is currently a topic of heated debate. 
After the 1970s, Croesus’s world came closer and closer to 
being a reality, for his dreams became ours. To the extent 
that a utopia of justice survived, it was global but minimal, 
2  See ‘Towards a history of the New International 
Economic Order’ (2015), special issue of Humanity: An 
International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and 
Development 6(1).
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allowing for the worst state abuses to be decried, while in 
the socioeconomic domain it pictured a floor of protection 
without a ceiling on inequality.
Whatever its potential in theory, the human rights regime 
and movement adapted in practice to the new ambiance. 
For one thing, the idea of human rights in its heroic age 
followed the transformation of political economy in its 
scalar leap beyond the nation and towards the globe. 
Further, it prioritized not the agency of states to launch and 
manage national welfare but the rights of individuals to be 
free from harm and to enjoy a rudimentary government that 
at best averted disaster and abjection, especially in the 
socioeconomic realm, where a measure of social equality 
was simultaneously forsaken by faltering welfare states 
as an ideal. The basis in national and frequently ethnic 
solidarity that had allowed for higher levels of redistribution 
within national settings had admittedly come along with 
built-in exclusions. But in exchange for its inclusion and 
even cosmopolitanism, the rise of human rights abandoned 
any egalitarian pressure in theory and practice.
Consider the parallels between market fundamentalism 
and international human rights, to see if they go beyond 
their bare simultaneity. Both have some relationship to 
earlier liberalism that they intentionally revived in the 
face of twentieth century threats, both totalitarian and 
merely socialistic. Both contemplated an individualistic 
and globalizing remedy to what they regarded as the 
pathologies of a national welfarism too committed to the 
values of collectivity and sovereignty, and not least when it 
came to the postcolonial developmentalist state. Both fell 
on deaf ears in the 1940s – with the refugees of economic 
liberalism seeking asylum in the altitudes of Mont Pèlerin 
to ride out the storm of national welfarist victory, and a tiny 
band of international lawyers interested in activating the 
role of human rights across borders postponing their plans 
to a later era. Then both, in a remarkable and unexpected 
reversal of fortune, experienced a moment of breakthrough 
in the mid-1970s: Milton Friedman – Hayek’s successor as 
worldwide champion of free markets and small government 
– was given the Nobel prize for economics in 1976, while 
Amnesty International won the Nobel prize for peace in 
1977. Both, finally, have defined the decades since in 
their respective domains of international economics and 
international ethics.
In spite of the obvious objection that the Universal 
Declaration – like our generous Croesus – offers a floor of 
protection against the worst miseries of free markets, the 
apparently tight chronological relationship between the 
twinned rise of human rights and of ‘neoliberalism’ is so 
tantalizing that it has provoked a range of responses. Could 
the rise of human rights really have nothing to do with the 
rise of market fundamentalism – or at least the decline of 
national welfarism? This question drives the third stage of 
the history of human rights told in connection with political 
economy. The answer I would give – others are available – 
takes a middle way between those who claim that human 
rights escape scot-free from the charge that they abet 
market fundamentalism, and those Marxists who reply 
that they are nothing but an apology for it. Attention to this 
problem has generally remained stuck at the threshold: 
broad chronological and substantive parallels between 
human rights and market fundamentalism. Naomi Klein’s 
folkloristic history of the ‘shock doctrine’ rightly dates the 
possible connection to the 1970s, but wrongly focuses 
on authoritarian violence as the most important thing to 
consider, in the laboratory that Augusto Pinochet’s Chile 
provided to free market experiments, before Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher even came to power.
In my view, the real trouble about human rights when 
historically correlated with market fundamentalism is 
not that they promote it but that they are unambitious 
in theory and ineffectual in practice in the face of its 
success.3 Against more conspiratorial accounts that 
view human rights as a dastardly accomplice of shifts in 
global political economy, I would emphasize the simple 
failures of human rights regimes and movements in the 
socioeconomic domain. For there is this extraordinary 
difference that divides the otherwise companionable 
3  For helpful guides to debates about the effects of 
economic and social rights protection, see Bjørnskov & 
Mchangama (2013) and Landau (2012).
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pair of market fundamentalism and human rights: the 
one has massively transformed the world, whereas the 
other has been condemned merely to watch. In a vulgar 
formula, neoliberalism, not human rights, is to blame 
for neoliberalism. The real trouble is that those systems 
of law and programmes of action that have so far been 
established around socioeconomic rights have made of 
them neither an enabling tool, nor a threatening enemy, 
but a helpless bystander of market fundamentalism. At 
most, their tragedy is that they have occupied the global 
imagination among those committed to genuine reform, but 
have so far contributed little of note, merely nipping at the 
heels of a giant whose path goes unaltered and unresisted.
In the end, the biggest reason that human rights have 
been a powerless companion of market fundamentalism 
is that they simply have nothing to say about inequality, 
which we now know to be the central achievement, locally 
and globally, of the new political economy. The chief worry 
about the established idealism of our age is not that it 
destroys the very socioeconomic floors it wants to build, 
let alone abets “disaster capitalism” (in Klein’s phrase) 
whose primary form is repression or violence. In too many 
places, those floors never existed in the first place, and 
global capitalism is hardly the only or even the main 
source of state abuses. Indeed, there is no denying that 
after 1970s, mainly thanks to Chinese marketization, more 
humans were brought out of poverty – and thus above 
a basic threshold of socioeconomic protection – than by 
any prior force in history. Rather, the problem is the one 
Croesus’s example is supposed to illustrate: even were 
all the dreams of international human rights movements 
to be fulfilled, it is as much low ambitions as failures to 
realize them that made human rights companions of market 
fundamentalism.
In short, the chief connection between human rights and 
market fundamentalism is a missed connection: precisely 
because the human rights revolution that has focused so 
intently on state abuses and has at its most ambitious 
dedicated itself to establishing a normative and actual 
floor for protection in the socioeconomic domain, it has 
failed to respond to – or even allowed for recognizing – 
neoliberalism’s obliteration of the ceiling on distributional 
inequality. Our world has come to resemble Croesus’s world 
more and more, since humanity has so far only found a way 
to embed the demand for a modicum of social equality in 
the form of a national welfarism now superannuated and 
irretrievable, while the human rights movement has neither 
the tools, nor really the desire, to bring the egalitarian task 
to the globe, or even specific nations. 
Another human rights movement?
Could a different form of human rights than the regimes 
and movements spawned so far correct this mistake? I 
doubt it. To be absolutely clear, this is not to contradict the 
moral significance and possibly even historical success 
of human rights when it comes to their core uses in 
combating political repression and restraining excessive 
violence. But when inequality has been contained in human 
affairs, it was never on the sort of individualistic, and often 
antistatist, basis that human rights do indeed share with 
their market fundamentalist Doppelgänger.
And when it comes to the necessary mobilizational 
complement to any programme, the chief tools of the 
human rights movements in its most renowned and 
possibly successful campaigns – the critique of state 
repression and the melioration of disasters of war – are 
simply not fit for use in the socioeconomic domain. It is 
in part because the human rights movement is not up 
to the challenge when it comes to each and every of its 
self-assigned tasks that it has been condemned to offer 
no meaningful alternative, and certainly no serious threat, 
to market fundamentalism. The success and prestige 
of human rights in our day – and the absence of other 
political approaches – has bred the mistake of the man 
who, lacking anything but a hammer, then treats everything 
like a nail. Croesus’s world is safe from the drastic 
mismatch between need and remedy as human rights 
regimes and movements so far can present it.
In Herodotus’s Histories, Solon’s shaming of Croesus 
merely took him down a peg. It was only Persian armies 
that toppled him. The truth is that global socioeconomic 
justice, like local socioeconomic justice, would require 
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redistribution under pressure from the rich to the poor, 
something naming and shaming is never likely to achieve, 
even when supplemented by novel forms of legal activism. 
Thinking historically, it can be no accident that the era of 
the moderation of inequality in the mid-twentieth century 
was also the age of both totalitarian regimes and a cold 
war that exacted an appalling toll on the world, including 
at the hands of the ultimate victor. At the zenith of national 
welfare, a floor of protection came linked to a ceiling on 
inequality, and both were built together, only in the presence 
of frightening internal and external threats – a workers’ 
movement and a communist menace. In response to those 
dangers, change came thanks to a ‘reformism of fear’ – the 
working class was placated and untold violence was brought 
against enemies, often at home and always abroad.
Yet if the human rights movement at its most inspiring 
has stigmatized such repression and violence, it has never 
offered a functional replacement for the sense of fear that 
led to both protection and redistribution for those who were 
left alive by twentieth century horror. If a global welfarism 
is ever to be brought out the realm of the ideal where it is 
currently exiled, it will need to be championed not only as a 
programme but also by a movement. But it will not look like 
our human rights movement, which has become prominent 
as our world has become more like Croesus’s world each day.
None of this is to say that human rights activism, to which 
Amnesty International made such an epoch-making and 
defining contribution in the last century, is irrelevant. 
The stigmatization of states and communities that fail to 
protect basic values is – so long as it is not selective and 
a smokescreen for great power politics – a tremendous 
contribution. But human rights advocates in their current 
guises do not know how to stigmatize inequality, and 
not principles but a new political economy would have to 
be invented to actually moderate it. Most of all, history 
suggests that they are the wrong kind of agent: not fearful 
enough to provoke redistribution. Could a new form of 
human rights mount such a challenge? Possibly, but it 
would need to be so different as to be unrecognizable, and 
threaten the power to stigmatize in the face of the violation 
of basic values that activists have carefully and with much 
hard work learned to achieve. If this is correct, human 
rights movements face a deeply strategic choice about 
whether to try to reinvent themselves – or whether to stand 
aside on the assumption that as inequality grows, someday 
its opponent will arise. Until then, Croesus’s world is our 
common fate.
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While human rights do not provide any magic bullet to 
solving social and economic injustices, the framework of 
human rights can channel social justice activism in ways 
that are beneficial to alleviating unnecessary suffering. 
Economic and social rights can guide efforts to reform 
international, state, and corporate actors in ways that 
remedy but do not necessarily end social inequality.
Introduction
By now, we should all be familiar with statistics describing 
the extent of global economic inequality. According to 
Oxfam International, the wealthiest 85 people on the planet 
own as much as the poorest 3.5 billion people, or 50 per 
cent of humanity (Hardoon 2015). By 2016, the richest 1 per 
cent of the world’s population will likely own more than the 
other 99 per cent combined. 
Some people actually applaud these facts. For example, 
multimillionaire Kevin O’Leary (2015), a panellist on the 
popular US television show Shark Tank, stated that “this is 
fantastic news… because it inspires everybody, gives them 
motivation to look up to the 1 per cent and say, ‘I want to 
become one of those people’”. However, many others believe 
that this is an absurd level of inequality that represents a 
profound injustice.
How does the global human rights movement respond to 
this sense of injustice? Do human rights laws and norms 
provide concrete guidance in dealing with socioeconomic 
inequalities? Do human rights NGOs have the tools and 
capabilities to contribute meaningfully to efforts to achieve 
social justice? I believe that they do. While human rights 
do not provide any magic bullet to solving social and 
economic injustices, the framework of human rights can 
channel social justice activism in ways that are beneficial 
to alleviating unnecessary suffering.
Defining terms
When considering the intersection between human rights 
and social justice, it is important at the outset to define our 
terms. Different people have somewhat different definitions 
and approaches in mind when they use the terms ‘human 
rights’ and ‘social justice’. There is no monolithic set of 
ideas, institutions, or methods that encapsulates either 
the project of human rights or that of social justice. As 
evidenced by the debates in a recent essay volume of 
Strategic Studies (Lettinga & Van Troost 2014), ‘human 
rights’ can variously refer to the international laws and 
norms arising from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, or the activities of national and international 
institutions designed to uphold those norms, or the myriad 
local struggles that communities around the world wage 
for their livelihoods. Although local efforts may not be 
explicitly connected to national and international laws 
and norms, it is clear that in some sense, ‘human rights’ 
refers to all of these things. There are diverse methods to 
advocating, enforcing, and achieving human rights, from 
international courts to national policy making to local 
cultural change, and everything in between. Despite the 
diversity in definitions and approaches, at its core, the idea 
of human rights represents the claim that all people, based 
on universally shared qualities, deserve a certain threshold 
of equitable treatment that upholds their human dignity.
Likewise, ‘social justice’ advocacy does not lend itself to 
a single approach. As global health advocate Paul Farmer 
(2005: 157) explains, “People who work for social justice, 
regardless of their own station in life, tend to see the world 
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as deeply flawed. They see the conditions of the poor not 
only as unacceptable but as the result of structural violence 
that is human-made.” Thus, social justice work involves 
addressing economic inequality and social marginalization 
as if they were – in some sense – human rights violations, 
rather than unfortunate or inevitable consequences of 
history. However, beyond that core definition, approaches to 
social justice can vary widely. At one end of the spectrum, 
liberals seek to achieve social justice by having marginalized 
groups gain access to the institutions (e.g., corporations, 
the military, government, etc.) that have excluded or 
discriminated against them. At the other end of the spectrum, 
radical or Marxist activists seek to remedy social inequalities 
by overturning or revolutionizing those very institutions that 
they deem unjust. As a result, social justice work could range 
from promoting female CEOs, to fighting against the very 
corporations that those CEOs may lead.
Given these broad definitions, there is clearly some overlap in 
goals and methods between human rights and social justice 
work, but there is also some divergence. At the most basic 
level, when poverty and social marginalization are the result 
of a discrete act of discrimination, it is clearly identifiable as 
a human rights violation. Today, human rights activists also 
tend to address many other instances of economic inequality 
through the language of economic and social rights. But we 
should remember that this was not always the case. I will 
discuss some of the divergences between human rights and 
social justice later, but first it is important to establish the 
compatibility of these two approaches through the framework 
of economic and social rights.
The legitimacy of economic and    
social rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
unambiguously spelled out a list of economic and social 
rights that included basic livelihood needs such as 
adequate food, housing, health care, and education. 
However, it took another half-century before human rights 
organizations in the West – who proclaimed themselves as 
global human rights advocates – actually began to fight for 
these rights (Chong 2010; Nelson & Dorsey 2008). 
Some prominent figures in the field of human rights 
continue to question the legitimacy of economic and social 
rights. For example, a founding father of Western human 
rights activism, Aryeh Neier (2006) stated:
“From my standpoint, if one is to talk meaningfully 
of rights, one has to discuss what can be enforced 
through the judicial process. The concern I have about 
economic and social rights is when there are broad 
assertions which broadly speak of the right to shelter, 
education, social security, jobs, health care... then 
I think we get into territory that is unmanageable 
through the rights process or the judicial process...
So I think it’s dangerous to the idea of civil and 
political rights to allow this idea of economic and 
social rights to flourish.”
Under this formulation, human rights are primarily legal 
instruments, and because advocacy for food, health 
care, and education often requires non-judicial methods 
and positive governmental duties, these are not valid 
human rights. This has been the official position of the 
US government since at least 1948. Similarly, leaders like 
Kenneth Roth (2004a), director of Human Rights Watch, 
have argued that economic and social rights do not fit 
the ‘naming and shaming’ methodologies that human 
rights NGOs have long mastered. The implementation 
of economic and social rights requires the delicate 
balancing of government budgets, rather than absolute 
claims to non-negotiable rights. According to Roth, 
NGOs would be better off limiting their work to those 
cases in which inequality results from a concrete act 
of discrimination, rather than a systemic injustice. Due 
to objections like these, when NGOs such as Amnesty 
International began to work on a range of social justice 
issues through the framework of economic and social 
rights, the move was met with much controversy. 
Are economic and social rights truly legitimate human 
rights, and are they appropriate instruments for NGO work? 
Recent experience has proven that the answer to both 
questions is yes, for two reasons.
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First, there is nothing inherent about civil and political 
rights that makes their judicial enforcement uniquely 
effective in a way that is different from economic and 
social rights. As a recent Lettinga and Van Troost (2014) 
volume makes clear, the global human rights regime has 
suffered some setbacks in enforcing civil and political 
rights in recent years. Whether it is the failure of the R2P 
doctrine to result in a meaningful response to the Syrian 
civil war, or the questions about the ICC as a legitimate 
and effective global court, it is clear that global legal and 
political institutions are not especially reliable mechanisms 
to enforce civil and political rights. The so-called war on 
terrorism has also shown that Western societies have been 
willing to scrap even the most well-established rights, such 
as the prohibition against torture and illegal detention, 
when they perceive that their security is threatened. The 
lack of any effective judicial remedy for the most flagrant 
cases of rendition and torture by the United States – the 
self-proclaimed global leader in human rights – should 
demonstrate that even courts in liberal democracies provide 
no guarantee for the protection of civil and political rights.
Second, contrary to Neier’s concerns above, campaigners 
for economic and social rights have been able to achieve 
a measure of social justice through the process of judicial 
enforcement in recent years. They have successfully 
litigated economic and social rights around the world, when 
national governments have been able to craft and interpret 
these rights as justiciable instruments (ESCR-Net 2015). 
National courts have even reviewed some notable cases 
that involve the positive duty of the state to redistribute 
scarce resources. For example, in the landmark Grootboom 
case,1 a community of landless squatters without access 
to basic public services sued the South African government 
for violating their right to housing. The Constitutional 
Court of South Africa found in favour of the claimants, 
stating that the government must implement a reasonable 
policy to allocate housing resources toward the neediest 
1  South African Constitutional Court (2000), Government 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and 
Others, Ruling of 4 October.Available at: http://www.escr-net.
org/docs/i/401409.
populations, with a view toward progressively achieving 
universal access to housing. Similarly, in the Treatment 
Action Campaign case,2 the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa interpreted their right to health care as requiring 
that the government provide anti-retroviral drugs to all 
HIV-infected pregnant women, and to take reasonable 
measures to improve the public health system to prevent 
HIV transmission. This lawsuit, and the public pressure 
that built around it, led to a dramatic increase in the 
distribution of HIV-Aids medication in South Africa in 
the ensuing years, which has saved literally hundreds of 
thousands of lives (AVERT 2015). 
So it is clear that food, housing, and health care can be 
valid human rights, even when human rights are conceived 
narrowly as legal instruments. When a state makes a 
commitment to embedding these rights in its constitution, 
and progressive courts are willing to review the 
reasonableness of government policies in upholding these 
rights, then economic and social rights are potentially just 
as enforceable through the judicial system as civil and 
political rights. Social justice issues that involve material 
livelihood and economic redistribution are part of the 
canon of ‘core’ human rights, despite what some prominent 
human rights activists have proclaimed (Neier 2013).
The effectiveness of economic and 
social rights
However, the question remains: Are economic and social 
rights particularly effective mechanisms for fighting 
economic inequality and achieving broad-based social 
justice? Efforts to achieve the implementation of economic 
and social rights in legal and judicial arenas face some 
significant limitations (Chong 2010). First, international 
law on economic and social rights is underdeveloped. In 
particular, the language of Article 2.1 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which 
requires states to “take steps… to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
2  South African Constitutional Court (2002), Minister of 
Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, Ruling of 5 July. Available 
at: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/16.pdf.
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the full realization” of these rights, opens itself to a wide 
range of interpretations. 
At the national level, many states do not have as progressive 
a constitution as South Africa, and many national courts 
are unwilling to review social and economic policy (Piovesan 
2002). This is particularly true in the United States, the world’s 
largest economy, which remains opposed to legal protections 
against poverty at both the national and international levels. 
The United States justifies its position based on libertarian 
notions of democratic capitalism, arguing that the best way 
to progressively realize an end to poverty is for the government 
to shift responsibility for social welfare onto private actors. 
Under this laissez-faire economic ideology, any attempt by 
government to enforce legal rights to food, housing, and health 
care calls up the dreaded labels of socialism and tyranny. 
Inequality is therefore a natural and benign consequence of 
capitalist economic growth, as Mr. O’Leary claimed above. 
Given the vagueness of international law and the ideological 
controversies surrounding economic policy, it can be difficult 
to come to a consensus on what constitutes a violation of 
economic and social rights. Policy makers can make the see-
mingly reasonable – even if inaccurate – claim that signing 
free trade agreements, passing tax cuts for the wealthy, and 
eliminating labour and environmental regulations will lead to 
economic growth, thereby eliminating poverty and achieving 
social justice. Holding such a government legally accountable 
for social justice obligations is a major challenge.
Another limitation in judicial approaches to economic 
and social rights is the fact that litigation is typically 
an expensive and relatively inaccessible form of social 
activism. Defending legal rights requires a level of legal 
expertise that the vast majority of poor and marginalized 
people cannot easily obtain. Even when cases are litigated 
successfully, as in the examples from South Africa, court 
rulings can be limited in scope to a particular population in 
unique circumstances, and can be difficult to enforce upon 
intransigent governments.
Therefore, it is not sufficient merely to demonstrate that 
social justice concerns are legitimate targets of human 
rights activism. The human rights community must 
continue to develop effective methods for advancing these 
concerns, and a purely legalistic approach to social justice 
is inherently limited. 
But economic and social rights are not unique in this 
respect. Many of these same challenges – inaccessible 
legal processes, ideological resistance, and ineffective 
institutions – are also found in approaches to civil and 
political rights. From torture in the United States, to war 
crimes in Syria, to female circumcision in Egypt, the law 
has not adequately protected some of the most basic civil 
and political rights. The major international human rights 
organizations, predominantly staffed by legal experts, have 
often hoped that the technical language of the law and 
the routinized processes of judicial systems would allow 
them to advance human rights in a non-ideological and 
politically neutral manner. However, human rights have 
always been politically controversial, and an orientation 
toward a narrow set of legally enforceable civil and political 
rights has never fully protected human rights NGOs 
from criticisms of partiality or bias. When NGOs identify 
violations by their own governments, they are accused of 
political partisanship; when they criticize the practices 
of other states, they are accused of foreign interference 
and Western bias. As long as human rights organizations 
consistently apply international standards, an embrace of 
social justice issues should not substantially change this 
calculus. Whether it is social justice or criminal justice, the 
only way forward for human rights is to engage directly in 
political, economic, and cultural debates.
What human rights bring to social 
justice work
Social and political activism, from demonstrating outside 
a World Bank meeting, to boycotting a fast food restaurant, 
to organizing a social media campaign for a living wage, is 
the bread and butter of social justice work. Social justice 
organizations, from the global to the local, are renowned 
for addressing the systemic causes of social inequality 
and confronting directly the institutions and ideologies 
that perpetuate this inequality. The opportunity for synergy 
between human rights and social justice work is significant 
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here. When defined sufficiently broadly, both human 
rights and social justice advocacy involve empowering 
disenfranchised people to achieve an adequate livelihood,  
a sense of personal dignity, and a level of social equality. 
Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International 
can continue to partner with and support myriad social 
justice organizations around the world that are working to 
uphold human dignity. Many of the methods they employ 
will be the same ones they have used for decades to defend 
civil and political rights – documenting and publicizing 
abuses, comparing state practices to international laws and 
norms, and using mechanisms at the national, regional, 
and global levels to change behaviour. Some NGO methods 
may need to be adapted to social justice concerns, as when 
human rights organizations target shaming campaigns 
and shareholder actions directly at corporations rather than 
states. Some new methods may need to be employed, such 
as creating quantitative indicators to measure performance, 
or expanding tools for analysing national budgets, or 
developing enforceable international standards for corporate 
accountability (Corkery 2012). But as Saiz and Ely Yamin 
(2013) argue, methods of advocacy should adapt to meet an 
organization’s mission, and not vice versa.
This kind of advocacy often involves legal and judicial 
methods, but “the most durable and transformative change 
comes about when judicial challenges and policy advocacy 
aimed at decision-making elites has been part of a broader 
strategy enabling social justice movements to deploy the 
tools of human rights advocacy in ways adapted to their 
particular context” (Saiz & Ely Yamin 2013). This pairing of 
legal strategies and mass mobilization is what made the 
Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa so successful a 
decade ago (Young 2012: 251).
In doing so, human rights organizations do not have any 
kind of magic formula that would make social justice 
work more effective. However, I do believe that the human 
rights movement can channel social justice work in useful 
ways, to ensure maximum convergence between the two 
approaches. As I mentioned above, while there is significant 
overlap in how human rights and social justice groups work 
for dignity and equality, there is also some divergence. 
Social justice activism can involve a wide range of methods 
and ideological commitments, from lobbying for equal 
pay in the workplace, to fomenting a violent revolution. 
Not all of these methods and commitments are consistent 
with human rights. A human rights framework therefore 
has the potential to unify diverse movements around a 
single theme, while at the same time excluding methods 
of achieving social justice that fail to meet human rights 
standards.
One of the defining characteristics of the human rights 
framework is its inherent universalism. Human rights 
applies to all humans equally, regardless of membership 
in any gender, ethnic, religious, or economic group. In 
this way, advocating for human rights can help overcome 
the narrow identity politics and selective outrage that 
often inflicts social movements. Social justice work is 
often identity-specific: Christians are concerned about 
the persecution of Christians, workers fight against the 
outsourcing of their own jobs to foreign countries, and 
racial minorities struggle against discrimination and 
prejudice. Group identity can be a strong motivator to 
mobilize social justice activists, but it is also inherently 
limited insofar as it excludes other like-minded allies. 
Indeed, group identity has often become the basis by which 
self-proclaimed social justice movements violate the 
rights of others in pursuing their goals. One group that has 
endured discrimination ends up attacking or competing 
against another group that has experienced its own share 
of discrimination. 
In response, the human rights framework argues in 
favour of social justice for people qua humans, which can 
build the politics of solidarity rather than identity. This 
universalism is what has helped make human rights the 
“lingua franca of global moral thought”, imbuing it with a 
sense of global legitimacy (Ignatieff 2001: 53). Rather than 
resorting to identity politics, the human rights framework 
identifies areas of principled overlap between the claims 
of various marginalized groups. It holds the potential to 
create alliances within social movements, whose success 
often depends upon mass mobilization. The added value of 
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human rights to social justice movements is not only in the 
new tools and mechanisms that activists might access, but 
in the unifying framework that adds voices, numbers, and 
leverage to the movement.
The human rights framework also requires that actions to 
remedy injustice are consistent with respecting the rights of 
others. Many so-called social justice movements in history 
have resulted in bloody civil wars, violent revolutions, or 
oppression by the formerly oppressed (Neier 2013). In these 
cases, efforts to achieve social justice can clearly diverge from 
human rights. Human rights do not call for the radical equality 
of social and economic outcomes that must be achieved 
through violent revolution and imposed by an authoritarian 
government. Instead, human rights arise from a “morality of 
the depths”, requiring states to ensure that all people receive 
at least minimally adequate treatment that respects their 
basic dignity (Shue 1996). Human rights do not advocate for 
an end to all economic inequality, but for an adequate remedy 
when inequality impedes the livelihood of the poorest and 
most marginalized. This minimalist focus on state institutions 
following the rule of law makes human rights activists tend 
to support non-violent reformist solutions rather than violent 
revolutionary ones. The reformist ethos of human rights may 
not satisfy more radical social justice activists, but moderate 
activists should embrace this approach. History has shown 
that violent revolutions in the name of social equality have 
often failed to achieve either peace or justice, whereas non-
violent movements have been found to accomplish their goals 
more effectively (Chenoweth & Stephan 2012). Reformist 
approaches also have a better chance of attracting public 
support in ideologically conservative nations like the United 
States, where more radical approaches to social justice are 
considered anti-democratic.
Thus, in its universalist and minimalist incarnation, human 
rights proclaim that states have legal and moral obligations 
to implement reasonable policies that would create solutions 
to extreme forms of economic and social inequality. When 
applied to social justice work, economic and social rights 
define poverty and marginalization as human-made 
institutional failures that require a remedy, rather than 
accidents of history or unfortunate circumstances. 
Limitations and ways forward
Due to the reformist nature of the current human rights 
framework, it should also be clear what it cannot 
accomplish for social justice activists. Although it demands 
remedies for radical inequalities, it cannot justify a Marxist 
revolution or a state that seeks to achieve an equality of 
economic outcomes through oppressive means. Although it 
can condemn certain state practices, it cannot prescribe a 
single appropriate set of political institutions and economic 
policies. Although it can remain impartial with respect 
to any government affiliation or political party, it cannot 
provide ideologically neutral, technocratic solutions to 
politically-charged problems. And although it can provide 
remedies for the worst effects of neoliberal globalization, 
it has not yet created enforceable standards that would 
regulate the global marketplace or reverse the spread of 
corporate power.
Given these limitations, the international norms of human 
rights still provide some minimal policy guidelines for 
states and other actors to achieve social justice. This 
would involve, first, doing no harm. States, international 
organizations, and corporate actors must implement 
development policies that do not discriminate against 
disenfranchised groups, displace local communities, or 
deny people a right to a basic livelihood. Second, when 
economic policies create trade-offs or result in loss and 
displacement, poor communities must receive adequate 
compensation. States must administer at least a minimally 
adequate and progressively improving social safety net for 
people who cannot fend for themselves. This includes basic 
income, nutrition, shelter, access to health care, and other 
public goods that are required for maintaining personal 
dignity. As such, the human rights framework explicitly 
rejects libertarian arguments for trickle-down economics 
that absolve the government from responsibility for social 
welfare. Third, human rights assume that states’ social 
justice obligations do not end at their national borders. 
International cooperation and assistance is required to 
achieve social and economic justice, whether it be in the 
form of humanitarian aid, preferential trade policies, 
support for migrants, or help with conflict prevention.
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These obligations are obviously difficult to enforce through 
national judiciaries and international institutions, but that 
is not the main goal. A major advantage in connecting 
human rights and social justice work is in the political 
advocacy and cultural change that can result from the 
overlap between these two movements. This advocacy can 
improve upon some of the limitations that are inherent 
in judicial approaches to human rights. When judicial 
remedies are not available or accessible to marginalized 
communities, human rights and social justice activists can 
build social movements that pressure governments to enact 
effective policies, and pressure courts to reinterpret the law 
(Balkin 2005). Social movements in many countries have 
achieved widespread cultural acceptance of LGBT rights 
many years before any legal or policy changes were enacted. 
Working together, human rights and social justice groups 
have pressured multinational corporations to adopt social 
responsibility codes and join the UN Global Compact in 
order to voluntarily regulate their practices.
Ultimately, a human rights organization’s decision about 
which campaigns to pursue, which partners to join, and 
which methods to employ are dependent upon its local 
context as much as upon global trends. But we should 
be clear that the global human rights movement would 
be woefully inadequate and incomplete if it failed to 
incorporate social justice concerns.
Human rights and social justice organizations have the 
opportunity to build effective social movements in areas 
where their values, goals, and methods converge. This 
does not guarantee success, but it does take advantage 
of the philosophical and strategic overlap between these 
two arenas of activism. It does not promise an end to 
all economic and social inequality, but it does hold the 
potential to mitigate the most pernicious effects of extreme 
inequality.
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Widney Brown
Seeking socioeconomic justice
The divide between civil and political rights and economic, 
social and cultural rights has undermined the realization of 
all human rights by effectively giving cover to governments 
that want to ignore their human rights obligations. The 
international human rights movement must challenge 
economic actors and systems and recognize that it has to 
rethink its Western construct of impartiality.
Introduction
The long-running debate within the human rights 
movement on the differences between civil and political 
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights has too 
often led to an assumption that the traditional tools of 
human rights activists, such as documentation, naming 
and shaming, standard setting, and litigation, are 
unhelpful in campaigning for the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights.
Inherent in this assumption is the belief that realization of 
these rights is primarily related to resources. How a state 
allocates its resources is seen as primarily a political not 
a human rights question. Complicating this debate has 
been the deliberate conflation by many developed countries 
of democracy with capitalism and open markets. States 
are pressured not just to respect civil and political rights 
but also to dismantle protective economic policies such as 
trade tariffs, and to allow the market to determine the price 
of food, health care, school fees, and housing rather than to 
provide subsidies that ensure people can enjoy the rights to 
food, health, education, and shelter.
In a long-running debate between Leonard Rubenstein and 
Kenneth Roth published in the Human Rights Quarterly 
(Roth 2004b), Roth said that human rights organizations 
can only do effective work on violations when there is a 
clear violation, a clear violator, and a clear remedy. This 
model, Roth argues, is effective in addressing violations of 
civil and political rights, and is applicable to violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights only when they can be 
forced into this analytic framework.
Many violations of economic, social, and cultural rights 
do fit within this framework. Both de jure and de facto 
discrimination by states is one of the largest drivers 
of violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
Similarly, failure to prevent or at a minimum ensure an 
effective remedy for discrimination by non-state actors also 
drives these violations.
I would like to explore the assumptions behind the 
violation, violator, and remedy model as it applies to 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, and 
explore how the persistent treatment of economic, social 
and cultural rights as significantly different from civil and 
political rights undermines fulfilment of all rights. I want 
to then examine how the assessment that economic, social 
and cultural rights being primarily a resource question 
raises the issue of the human rights system’s silence on 
political, economic or religious structures. I will argue 
that although human rights organizations or advocates 
should not be conducting advocacy regarding allocation 
of resources except in some specific circumstances, they 
must address deeper structural causes of human rights 
violations by revising their notion of impartiality.
Let’s explore China and the US. Although the famous ‘iron 
rice bowl’ which supposedly provided cradle to grave 
economic security for the people of China has long been 
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broken, the Chinese government proclaims that it respects 
economic, social and cultural rights. China produces 
approximately one-third of the global annual output of coal, 
but it accounts for more than two-thirds of the world’s 
mining-related deaths (Mining Technology 2014). Miners 
in China do not have the right to organize. This makes it 
impossible for people working in the mines to collectively 
demand safer working conditions. 
The US claims to be a leader in its respect for civil and 
political rights. The government leaves realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights to the market. 
According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, the 
leading causes of homelessness in the US are lack of 
affordable health care, mental illness, drug addiction, and 
domestic violence.1
Many homeless people are disenfranchised. Homelessness 
is criminalized in the US (Cantú 2014) and homeless people 
face incarceration because they violate laws which prohibit 
things such as ‘urban camping’ or public urination. If 
homeless people cannot vote, they cannot influence policy 
makers to implement programmes for housing for all. Civil 
and political rights fail to protect economically and socially 
marginalized people in the US.
Violator or system?
When documenting human rights violations, it is easy to 
focus on the individual actor – the bad cop, the corrupt 
bureaucrat, the brutal predatory military commander. 
Individuals, acting under the colour of state law, are 
relatively easy to identify, to get evidence against, and 
to demand accountability of. But sometimes it is easier 
to focus on the individual while ignoring the ways that 
systems either allow for these individual ‘bad actors’ or 
actually create them. Additionally, focusing on individual 
violators allows the state to claim that the bad cop was 
‘rogue’, the corrupt bureaucrat an ‘exception’, or the brutal 
military commander was acting beyond his authority.
1  See: http://nationalhomeless.org/about-homelessness/. 
Sometimes the failure of the system is relatively easy to 
analyse and to fix. Human rights activists know how to 
prevent torture. Torture must be clearly defined as a crime 
within the penal code. Rules of evidence must ensure that 
the testimony of a person claiming that s/he has been 
tortured is not weighted as inherently less credible than 
that of the person accused of committing torture. Police and 
prison guards must all be trained about their obligation to 
refrain from committing or tolerating acts of torture. They 
should understand additionally that any ‘confession’ or 
evidence obtained through torture cannot be used in a court 
of law except as evidence that torture occurred.
Most safeguards against torture are procedural. A 
person must only be detained after the authorities haves 
established probable cause; the detainee must be informed 
of why s/he is being detained, be apprised of where s/he 
will be held, have immediate access to a lawyer, and be 
brought before a judge within a reasonable time to hear the 
charges. Should a detainee report torture, either to judicial 
or police authorities, an independent investigation should 
be undertaken – including an assessment of the detainee 
by trained clinicians to document evidence of torture. 
Finally, any individual found to have committed torture 
should be held accountable for the crime of torture.
Governments can and should prevent torture by putting 
clearly defined systems in place and monitor the 
effectiveness of such systems. Documenting individual 
incidents of violations and identifying violators are 
primarily effective in exposing the problems and failures 
with the systems. Preventing torture requires the state to 
invest in its criminal justice and policing systems. It is an 
ongoing investment.
The need for that ongoing investment becomes apparent 
when addressing discriminatory application of the criminal 
law and the impact on marginalized communities. The 
fastest way to understand the political and social fault 
lines in any society is to visit its prisons. Not only can one 
see who gets caught up in the criminal justice system 
but also what laws are used to drive marginalization of 
disempowered communities through that system.
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In Afghanistan, the only women’s prison houses women 
and girls, many of whom are facing charges of committing 
“moral crimes”, i.e., having sexual relations outside 
of marriage (Khamoosh 2014). Others are being held 
without charge because their ‘crime’ is fleeing an abusive 
relationship. That women are charged with moral crimes 
based on pseudo-scientific ‘virginity tests’ demonstrates 
the systematic bias against women that permeates the 
criminal justice system and the larger society. Reforming 
the criminal justice system to bring it into compliance 
with international standards would require significant 
investment in reform effort but also in gender equality and 
women’s rights.
Afghanistan is not unique. Roma in Europe, African-
Americans in the US, Indigenous Peoples in Australia, 
immigrants in South Africa, Palestinians in Israel… The 
list goes on. The scourge of discrimination and disparate 
treatment is a powerful lens in understanding how all 
human rights are inextricably linked. 
Of the rights enumerated in the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), education is the most 
well-articulated. State parties are required to ensure that: 
“Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to 
all…” While all the rights in the ICESCR must be progressively 
realized, the right to universal primary education must be 
implemented pursuant to a plan within two years. 
As with the criminal justice system, documenting violations 
of the right to education can focus on individuals: the 
administrator who demands bribes from parents, the 
teacher who demands sexual favours from his students, 
a school governing board that excludes girls from the 
classroom. But an exclusive focus on individual bad actors 
can obscure the failure of the government to put in place 
the systems needed to realize the right to education.
The criminal justice system and an education system may 
seem worlds apart. However, both must be established in 
law because they must be established and administered 
consistent with the obligations of international human 
rights laws. Both must be regulated to ensure that the 
people who work within these systems are qualified and 
overseen. Both must be accessible to all. The content that 
drives their work is different – but as police must work with 
a well-articulated penal code, so teachers must work with 
well-developed and comprehensive curricula. Once the two 
systems are subject to comparison, it is obvious that both 
require significant resources. 
Resource allocation and human rights
That being acknowledged, what is a subject of great debate 
is who makes the decisions about allocation of resources 
– either within the criminal justice or education systems 
or between these and many other systems? And does the 
human rights framework provide guidance or principles 
that inform how those resource decisions are made?
Roth argues that international human rights actors are 
ill-placed to make these decisions and therefore cannot 
work on issues of resource allocation. While it is true that 
human rights organizations or advocates working at the 
global or regional level should not advocate on allocation 
of resources except in some specific circumstances, it does 
not mean that human rights advocates cannot engage in 
meaningful advocacy about decision-making.
Which brings us to the role of democratic societies in 
the human rights framework and the role of the justice 
system: many human rights organizations avoid the 
question of political systems, preferring to focus on 
whether a government respects rights. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) tries to avoid 
calling explicitly for specific political or legal systems as 
fundamental to the realization of human rights, yet it is 
implied within the Covenant that the system is democratic 
(“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those that are imposed in conformity with the law and 
which are necessary in a democratic society” (emphasis 
added)).2 Article 26 of the ICCPR further assumes the 
existence of a justice system that ensures equal protection 
2  ICCPR, Article 21. See also Article 22.
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of the law (“All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection 
of the law”). This article is broader than Article 2, which 
prohibits discrimination with regard to the laws enumerated 
within the ICCPR because equal protection of the law would 
cover all laws.
The question of democracy and the role of the justice 
system were highlighted during the uprisings in the Middle 
East and North Africa and the subsequent protests that 
swept around the world. Starting in Tunisia, these protests 
were a cry for “bread, freedom, social justice, and dignity” 
(“aysh, hurriya, adala ijtima’ia, karama”). There was no 
attempt to separate out the desire for economic security 
and opportunity from an end to repression and access to 
justice. People living at the intersection of repression and 
corruption know full well that the two go hand in hand.
Thus the debate is not how civil and political rights are 
different from economic, social and cultural rights but 
rather how to build a participatory system of government 
and a justice system that are designed to ensure respect for 
all human rights for all people.
Illusion of impartiality
Human rights activists who have maintained impartiality 
with regard to political or economic systems must ask 
themselves some hard questions in the wake of the popular 
uprisings that were born in the Middle East and North Africa. 
For example: “Did refraining from calling Zine el-Abidine Ben 
Ali a dictator protect the rights of people living in Tunisia?” 
“Does remaining agnostic on the free flow of capital while 
restricting the flow of labour provide protection for migrant 
labourers in Abu Dhabi?” “Does remaining silent on issues 
of trade barriers support the rights of farmers in Senegal 
and food security for people living there?”
And perhaps the most painful question is: “Does impartiality 
fail people in developing countries who see the silence not 
as a core value but rather as a betrayal of their rights?” 
Behind this assessment is the perception that human 
rights advocates working at the global level have largely 
been privileged, and that this privilege has flowed directly 
from their citizenship of countries with long histories of 
exploitation of the people and resources in developing 
countries. The impartiality, when analysed through this lens, 
seems more self-interested than principled.
Which brings us to the issue of democracy and human 
rights. It is widely accepted that resource decisions have 
a huge impact on all human rights. Underpaid police 
often rely on bribes to feed their families and in doing so 
undermine the integrity of the justice system and people’s 
trust in the police. Marginalized communities, even in the 
wealthiest countries, are often underserved because their 
voice is stifled with regard to the allocation of resources.
So democracy is a necessary, though not sufficient 
element of a rights respecting society. How does / should 
this work? In democracies, people regularly vote either 
directly on propositions related to resources or for people to 
represent their interests in these debates. For a democracy 
to be functional within a state, arguably all those who 
are subject to the government must have the right to 
participate in the democratic processes. This includes all 
people. Some, such as infants and young children, may 
be represented through their families – but their interests 
must be represented. Others who have traditionally been 
excluded should be represented, e.g., residents who are not 
citizens as well as migrants and their families in irregular 
situations. I will address the latter in the context of the 
open markets issue.
I am focusing less on elections and more on being able 
to engage in the political debate, whether it is about if 
drugs laws should be reformed to end criminalization or 
whether drugs should be made available for the purposes 
of palliative care. I use this example specifically because 
the issue of a state’s drug policy may be about the criminal 
justice system or the right to health, demonstrating that 
the silos governments have attempted to build around 
different rights simply cannot withstand interrogation.
This is not to say that elections of representatives are 
not important. But voting every few years for members of 
parliament without the ability to both demand political 
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debate and participate in it, means that democracy is largely 
constructed as a single act every few years, not a participatory 
process. In addition to electing representatives, people should 
be able to directly influence government policies. Doing 
so effectively implicates the exercise of myriad rights. For 
example, for an indigenous family in rural Guatemala, the 
ability to participate in debates about access to education 
for children is critical. But to be able to participate in a 
meaningful way, that family needs to have information in a 
timely and accessible form, and a seat at the table. The right 
to information must be buttressed by freedom of expression 
and assembly and the equal protection of the law. 
A true democracy thrives on transparency. A government 
may argue that it is too expensive to build schools for 
children in rural areas where indigenous peoples primarily 
live – a classic defence that progressive realization requires 
resources. But what is cast as a resource issue can only 
be properly analysed if the government discloses how its 
education system is designed, accessed, and funded. 
Analysis of the allocation of resources may reveal that the 
state either directly distributes more resources to those 
who are powerful or indirectly subsidizes education for the 
privileged – not those with the greatest need. Global human 
rights organizations should advocate for the conditions of 
meaningful participation in democratic processes and can 
do so without having to advocate for any specific position.
Limitations of democratic systems and 
the subversion of democracy 
While a democratic system as referenced in the ICCPR is 
arguably necessary for the realization of the full array of hu-
man rights, it is not sufficient. The risk of a purely democratic 
system is that majoritarian rule will lead to the deprivation 
or under-resourcing of rights of those who are politically or 
economically marginalized. An independent judiciary working 
within the human rights framework is a counterbalance to 
such majoritarian impulses. If domestic legal systems fail to 
provide this counterbalance to protect those who are either 
marginalized or outnumbered from the tyranny of the majority 
or the self-serving policies of the privileged, regional and 
international human rights mechanisms come into play. With 
access to information and understanding of their rights and 
the human rights system, those whose rights are under fire 
by majoritarian or discriminatory systems can turn to region-
al and global mechanisms. 
We have seen persistent undermining of both democracy 
and decisions regarding equitable allocation of resources 
by international financial institutions and private economic 
actors. The structural adjustment policies imposed by 
international and regional financial institutions and other 
governments on many developing countries in the 1980s 
have been resurrected most recently to address economic 
turmoil in the Eurozone. 
These policies are based on an assumption that austerely 
focusing on cutting the provision of services by the state 
is the answer. In many cases it means that people will be 
deprived of health care, education, etc. These completely 
foreseeable consequences are not analysed as violations 
of the right to health and education. Human rights are 
dismissed as an expensive externality. These policies are 
not just undermining human rights, but they have long-
term consequences as under-educated children grow up to 
have limited opportunities and therefore may become just 
single individuals in the vast pool of cheap labour.
Besides international financial institutions, other key 
actors that may subvert democracy and undermine 
rights in a country are private economic actors. Some 
powerful corporations have revenue that exceeds the GDP 
of the majority of countries in the world (Trivett 2011). 
Corporations are accountable to their shareholders and the 
fiduciary duty of the Board is to maximize profits. Although 
the Ruggie principles3 proclaim that corporations and other 
economic actors have a responsibility to “at a minimum, 
3  The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (also ‘Ruggie Principles’) are non-binding 
requirements for companies to respect human rights, and 
proactively take steps to prevent, mitigate and, where 
appropriate, remediate, their adverse human rights impacts. 
The Principles were developed by John Ruggie as the UN 
Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, who 




32Changing perspectives on human rights
Can human rights bring social justice? Twelve essays 
respect human rights”, this respect is subjugated to the 
profit motive. Despite attempts to prevent corruption, many 
companies see corruption as the price of doing business 
and have little regard for how it undermines human rights 
and destroys any system of accountability.
This dynamic of corporations undermining democracy 
and human rights is most apparent in the arena of trade. 
Developed countries and corporations are the champions of 
‘free trade’ and ‘open markets’ which are often touted as a 
silver bullet to cure poverty. Scant attention is paid to either 
the historical reality of how developed economies were 
able to build sustainability through protectionist practices. 
Instead, developing countries are effectively corralled 
into opening their markets and dismantling any trade 
tariff even when such action will destroy a sector such as 
domestic agriculture. These policies put people within these 
countries at risks when fluctuations in the market mean 
that instead of dumping cheap food into these markets, 
trade is restricted and there is no ability to support food 
sustainability at the domestic level. 
For example, investment in bio-fuels led to shortages 
of food staples, spikes in the prices of food staples, 
and unrest in many countries in the mid to late 2000s 
(Chakrabortty 2008). If developing countries had the space 
to put in place even temporary trade tariffs on foods, they 
could support the growth of domestic agriculture and 
ensure food sustainability for the people they govern. As the 
US Supreme Court decision in Citizens United demonstrates, 
the subversion of democracy by corporate interests is not 
limited to developing countries.4 
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not note that religious 
4  Supreme Court of the United States (2010) Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, Appeal from the United States 
district court for the district of Columbia, 21 January, No. 08-
205, 558 U.S. 310. The court held that the First Amendment 
prohibited the government from restricting corporations 
(including non-profit corporations) from making independent 
expenditures, e.i. political campaign communications. The 
decision was criticized for giving private interests even more 
influence on American election campaigns.
institutions also often undermine both human rights 
and democracy. Besides the obvious examples of many 
religions in their fundamentalist form disempowering 
women in order to ‘protect’ them, religious intolerance often 
expresses itself in the discrimination and persecution of 
other religious groups. The systematic persecution of the 
Rohingya both by the Burmese government and by groups 
of radical Buddhists has driven them into IDP camps where 
they have suffered immense deprivation and exploitation 
and into an apparently hopeless quest to see refuge in 
Southeast Asia. 
Looking forward
The dashed hopes and aspirations of the protestors who 
took to the streets starting in Tunisia and sweeping first 
through the Middle East and North Africa as part of what 
was dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’ and which then caught on 
in protests in many developed countries in the ‘Occupy 
Movements’, are evidence of how far we are from having 
rights-respecting societies across the world. 
These failures point to the need for the human rights move-
ment – in all of its diversity – to rethink how to make change. 
While legal standards, like democracy, are necessary, they 
are not sufficient. The challenge is meaningful implemen-
tation of those standards and dismantling the rampant 
inequalities that drive human rights violations.
Human rights abuses are a function of abuse of power. 
While traditionally human rights organizations have tended 
to focus on abuse of power by agents of the state in the 
exercise of their policing and security powers, in fact, it is 
abuse of all types of power – the power of male privilege, of 
the gun, of hetero-normativity, of the dollar – that deserve 
our attention. 
In short, both human rights and democracy are under 
attack on myriad fronts. The human rights movement 
cannot retain legitimacy and credibility if it does not take 
a lesson from its history and document, expose, name and 
shame those actors and sectors that are denying people 
dignity and equality. The most effective mode of exposing 
may be to find the case of the individual ‘bad actor’ but 
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the solutions must be systems-oriented. For human rights 
to work, the political and economic systems must be 
scrutinized for how they undermine the full array of civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights.
Some thoughts on implementation and 
conclusion
There are two fundamental principles that inform the 
implementation of human rights standards. The first is that 
a state may not choose which people enjoy their rights. All 
people are born free and equal in dignity and rights. There 
are no allowances for exclusion of people because they are 
‘different’. The other principle is that a state may not decide 
which rights to fulfil. A state may not legitimately claim, for 
example, that it recognizes the right to work,5 but not the 
right to freedom of association.6 
It is only when states adhere to the principle of the 
universality of rights and the interdependences of rights 
that the promise of human rights will be fulfilled.
5  IESCR, Article 6.
6  ICCPR, Article 22.
Human rights activists and organizations must proactively 
demand that governments recognize the interdependence 
of all human rights and campaign to end the ways that 
governments set up rights in opposition to each other as 
opposed to treating them as mutually reinforcing.
But the human rights movement must also challenge 
actors and systems beyond the control of a single state 
and recognize that the concept of impartiality – the 
basis for not taking on these actors and systems – is 
indefensible in light of how they are destroying people’s 
rights. While human rights organizations may focus on 
building expertise on specific rights, all organizations can 
make the case that the rights-respecting world envisioned 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was built on 
the understanding that all people deserve to live free from 
want and free from fear. 
Seeking socioeconomic justice
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For decades, the global human rights community has seen 
human rights as a matter of law, mostly international law. 
Economic, social and cultural rights, however, are meant 
to be progressively realized making use of all available 
resources. The violations approach and the work on their 
justiciability do not address the structural factors that 
constrain the enjoyment of these rights. Human rights are 
about policy and politics as much as about law. There is 
room for human rights advocacy outside and beyond the 
limits of the law.
Introduction
“It is politically important that human rights have been 
codified in international and national law, but it is a 
mistake to believe that the legalization of human rights 
takes the concept out of politics” (Freeman 2002:10).
In 2013, I attended a book launch: Failing to protect: 
The UN and the politicisation of human rights, by Rosa 
Freedman. The book is based on a series of interviews 
with UN officials and, according to the author, it gives 
explanations about how and why the UN is unable or 
unwilling to protect human rights. In her view, this is the 
result of the “politicization” of the international human 
rights machinery. I remember thinking that human rights 
institutions must be political by definition, insofar as they 
are the outcome of difficult political dialogues, lobbying 
and diplomatic tension. Why are we surprised? What is 
so wrong about the idea that human rights are a political 
notion subject to political negotiation, just like anything 
1 I am indebted to Doutje Lettinga, Lars van Troost and 
Angelos Kontogiannis-Mandros for their valuable comments. 
Opinions and mistakes are only my own.
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else in international affairs? Unfortunately, I did not get 
the chance to ask my question. Luckily, I have now been 
given the opportunity to reflect on it in this paper. 
Human rights are often conceived as moral claims written 
in legal terms. In this sense, they would be somewhere 
prior and above the political discourse. Against this 
assumption, I hereby argue that defending human rights 
effectively requires understanding and working with policy 
and politics, not only law. International human rights are 
essentially what human rights advocates make of the 
pledges taken by states when endorsing human rights 
documents and ratifying treaties. The framing, allocation 
and construction of meaning is a political process that 
transcends the limits of the law. This paper builds the 
argument in relation to economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESCR) in opposition to the violations approach and the 
work limited to making the case of their justiciability.
Beyond the violations approach 
to ESCR
Nearly three decades ago, in one of the earliest attempts to 
conceptualize the meaning of ESCR in international law, 
Philip Alston (1987: 372) wrote that “for a variety of histor-
ical, ideological, pragmatic, and other reasons, there re-
mains a considerable reluctance on the part of many, if not 
most, human rights NGOs to become involved in the field of 
ESCR”. A few years later, Alston (1990: 9) criticized Amnes-
ty International for its then reductionist conception of 
rights, one which “mirror(s) more closely values associated 
with the Western liberal tradition”, namely, civil and politi-
cal rights. Since the mid-1990s and principally during the 
decade of the 2000s, however, the power of human rights 
has extended to an area that had remained unexplored 
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thus far. Human rights organizations have finally integrated 
ESCR in their mission statements and strategic and opera-
tional plans.  
 
In 1996, Human Rights Watch adopted an interim policy on 
ESCR (Mutua 1996: 619), and in 2001, Amnesty Interna-
tional incorporated these rights into its mission, launching 
a global campaign in May 2008 that linked poverty and 
human rights: ‘Demand Dignity’. It is fair to say that, while 
the largest human rights organizations struggled with the 
challenge of ESCR, a number of smaller groups (Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions, COHRE; the Center for Eco-
nomic and Social Rights, CESR; FoodFirst Information and 
Action Network, FIAN; the International Commission of Ju-
rists, ICJ) had already started making important contribu-
tions to the interdependency of all human rights.   
 
At the same time, some groups outside the traditional 
sphere of human rights, such as indigenous peoples, femi-
nist organizations, trade unions and development NGOs, 
have also started to speak the language of human rights. 
This form of rapprochement opened the door to what Nelson 
and Dorsey (2008) call “new rights advocacy”, that looks at 
issues traditionally perceived as belonging to the realm of 
social justice (housing, health, work, education, minimum 
standards of living etc.) from the perspective of human 
rights and human rights law. Nelson and Dorsey rightly   
observe that the ‘newness’ of the “new rights advocacy” 
refers to the ‘advocacy’ and not to the word ‘rights’,         
because, in fact, standards themselves are far from new.    
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines  
several ESCR, and the 1966 International Covenant on 
ESCR entered into force in 1976. In other words, law and 
international law do not explain why it took so long for     
human rights organizations to accept the challenge of     
defending ESCR. 
 
While it is true that the number of human rights groups 
working on ESCR has mushroomed in the last two decades, 
there is still a great deal of confusion about the implica-
tions of working for these rights, and I believe that the very 
legalistic violations approach adopted by most NGOs does 
not sufficiently address the challenges posed by the recog-
nition of ESCR as human rights. 
 
The “violations approach”, initially formulated by Audrey 
Chapman (1996) and subsequently endorsed in the 1997 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of ESCR, is broadly 
based on the identification of laws, policies and actions 
that have a direct causal relationship with infringement of 
the principle of non-discrimination and the minimum core 
content of the ESCR recognized in the relevant treaties. 
More recently, Chapman (2007: 156) wrote that the viola-
tions approach was meant to be “a supplementary and not 
a sole strategy for monitoring” ESCR and that her motiva-
tion “was to overcome some of the limitations of the pro-
gressive realization formula and to deal more meaningfully 
with the most flagrant abuses of these rights”. Nonethe-
less, the violations approach had already received a lot of 
attention among human rights practitioners, very much 
accustomed to the victim-aggressor juridical lens of civil 
and political rights. For example, Kenneth Roth (2004a), 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, famously argued 
that international human rights organizations are best at 
“naming and shaming”, and that they can effectively do so 
only when there is relative clarity about violation, violator 
and remedy.2 Therefore, they should restrict their work on 
ESCR to cases where governments are guilty of arbitrary or 
discriminatory conduct. Roth’s article hardly went unno-
ticed and received critiques (Rubenstein 2004; Robinson 
2004; Nelson & Dorsey 2008) arguing that human rights 
organizations must devise additional strategies to the con-
ventional “naming and shaming”, and try to influence poli-
cy and social services, making proposals for the most ef-
fective allocation of resources. 
 
Chapman’s “violations approach” and Roth’s “naming and 
shaming” attempt to operationalize the meaning of ESCR, 
but they do so at the expense of the progressive realization 
of ESCR, proclaimed in Article 2(1) of the International  
2  It is important to note that the minimum core content of 
rights is deemed to cover also the obligation to fulfil, which 
is missing in Roth’s framework. This would be an important 
distinction between Chapman and Roth.
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Covenant on ESCR.3 This sacrifice is probably made in the 
name of causality and responsibility, because it is too     
difficult to find out the direct cause of hunger, maternal 
mortality or poor housing, and therefore it is also too       
difficult to determine who must be held responsible.      
However, we must remember, as Deborah Stone (1989: 292) 
does, that “complex cause is sometimes used as a strategy 
to avoid blame and the burdens of reform”. 
 
Attempting to understand the complex causal relationships 
behind the lack of satisfaction of human rights is an ambi-
tious project that would require working with tools in budget 
analysis, socioeconomic policy and taxation. Yet, human 
rights groups often feel more comfortable working with tra-
ditional legal tools, particularly the demand for the justicia-
bility of ESCR.4 Generally, there are fewer accountability 
mechanisms for ESCR than for civil and political rights. In 
order to erase this gap, human rights practitioners have 
advocated the recognition of these rights into domestic and 
international legal texts and the creation of independent 
monitoring mechanisms to examine violations on a case-
by-case basis. To this end, the International Network for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights hosts a very extensive 
database of domestic and international case-law,5 the In-
ternational Commission of Jurists (2008 and 2014) has 
issued two wide-ranging analyses of comparative experi-
ences of justiciability of ESCR in different countries, and 
researchers have studied with remarkable interest the op-
3  Article 2(1) ICESCR, surely one of the most widely 
vivisected clauses in international human rights law, says 
that “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures” (italics are 
mine).
4  “The term ‘justiciability’ refers to the ability to claim 
a remedy before an independent and impartial body when 
a violation of a right has occurred or is likely to occur. 
Justiciability implies access to mechanisms that guarantee 
recognized rights. Justiciable rights grant right-holders a legal 
course of action to enforce them, whenever the duty-bearer 
does not comply with his or her duties” (ICJ 2008: 6).
5  See: http://www.escr-net.org/caselaw. 
portunities offered by regional systems of protection of hu-
man rights in the Inter-American (Feria-Tinta 2007), Euro-
pean (Leijten 2014) and African systems (Ssenyonjo 2011). 
 
At first, the placement of the law at the centre of the dis-
cussion makes sense, bearing in mind that ESCR have his-
torically been neglected in the conventional legal discourse. 
The open question, though, is whether the judicial recogni-
tion of ESCR is the most effective way to improve people’s 
enjoyment of these rights. The dataset of the Toronto Initia-
tive for Economic and Social Rights tells us that more than 
90 per cent of the Constitutions in the world recognize at 
least one socioeconomic right, and 75 per cent of them 
make at least one of them justiciable.6 However, no clear 
correlation has been identified between an increase in 
terms of social justice and the recognition of ESCR as justi-
ciable rights. “Litigation necessarily resolves relatively nar-
row issues; underlying structural factors are generally left 
unaddressed” (Yamin 2005: 1220). I believe it is time to 
accept that these factors can only be understood by policy 
analysis and tackled by political means. 
 
The excessive focus on justiciability is one of the reasons why 
the element of the progressive realization has been insuffi-
ciently attended thus far. Too many human rights practi-
tioners still see human rights as a matter of contention but 
only in court. In the name of impartiality and the alleged su-
pra-political nature of the law, they do not want to be seen as 
entering uninvited into the political arena, which in their view 
belongs to political institutions and perhaps also to other 
organizations and social movements, but not to human rights 
groups, which must stay away from politics. 
 
Human rights practitioners and organizations are spot on 
when they defend the justiciability of ESCR as a matter of 
principles, because this is probably the longest degree of sep-
aration between these rights and the traditional civil and po-
litical ones. However, they (we) should remain alert because, 
by focusing too much on the violations approach and the need 
for judicial or quasi-judicial accountability mechanisms,      
6  See: http://www.tiesr.org 
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we may be missing important political opportunities to strive 
for the progressive realization of ESCR. Doing so effectively 
will definitely require us to play the game of politics, and we 
need to assess whether we are ready for that.7
Playing the politics of human rights   
One of the first measures adopted by the new Greek 
government after Syriza’s victory in January 2015 was 
to prohibit mortgage evictions of first homes up to 
€ 300,000, and to prevent banks from reselling the 
mortgages to third parties.8 A similar but more moderate 
measure had been in place before with a right-wing party 
in power. International legal standards on the right to 
housing do not impose a measure of this kind. Based on 
General Comment No. 7 of the UN Committee on ESCR 
(1997),9 we can argue that Greek authorities must ensure 
that evictions are the last resort, and when domestic 
law does not provide legal remedies or procedures to 
challenge them, evictions are considered to infringe the 
right to housing.      
      
Going a bit further, we may recall that it is the standing 
position of the European Court of Human Rights that, given 
the extent of the interference with the right to respect 
for the home and private and family life, an independent 
tribunal must be allowed to examine the proportionality 
of the eviction on a case-by-case basis.10 However, these 
are very important but essentially procedural points. In 
principle, as long as there are independent mechanisms 
7  Find a very thought-provoking discussion about 
the limits and opportunities of legal mechanisms 
for the enforcement of ESCR at openGlobalRights on 
openDemocracy. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.
net/openglobalrights/debating-economic-and-social-rights. 
8  The suspension of evictions will have to be lifted as a 
result of the third economic adjustment program between 
the EU and Greece (July 2015). 
9  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) (1997), General Comment No. 7: The right 
to adequate housing: forced eviction (Art. 11, Para.1, of the 
Covenant), 20 May, E/1998/22. 
10  European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (2012), 
Buckland v. UK, 18 September (App. No. 40060/08), para. 65, 
and the case law mentioned therein.
to assess the particularities of the case, it is not possible 
to say that Greece has violated the right to housing by 
conducting or allowing mortgage evictions.
This would be the conclusion, of course, unless we accepted 
the challenge of the progressive realization of ESCR and the 
resulting general principle of the prohibition of deliberate 
retrogressive measures. If we accept this challenge, we 
will have to explore to what extent Greek public authorities 
have been allocating the necessary resources to achieve 
progressively the full satisfaction of the right to housing. 
Furthermore, just like the UN Independent Expert on Foreign 
Debt and Human Rights (UNHRC 2014), we will have to pay 
attention to the multiple layers of responsibility, considering 
the pressure exercised over Greece by the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank, the IMF and other European 
countries, and taking into account the large sums of money 
received by banks from European taxpayers under the as-
sumption that this would prevent the system from collapse.
The measure adopted by the Greek Syriza government may 
not technically be required by international human rights 
law, in the sense that not doing so would not constitute an 
infringement of international legal standards. Nonetheless, 
preventing the eviction of families who cannot make 
their mortgage payments as a result of unemployment 
derived from the economic crisis may be a very reasonable 
measure that takes the Greek people just a bit closer to 
the full satisfaction of the right to housing. Note that the 
government bears the burden to prove that this is the right 
policy to that end. The policy may very well be ill-founded 
and disoriented, but taking human rights seriously means 
that we must address this dilemma from the starting point 
that all public policy ought to be inspired by the ultimate 
goal of making human rights real. And human rights 
organizations have a contribution to make in this regard.
Human rights advocates must dare to overcome the 
traditional liberal notion that sees human rights only as 
the shield with which individuals protect themselves from 
Leviathan. Human rights are indeed shields, but they can 
also be constructed politically as a set of guidelines for 
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political action. This is the reason why advocates must 
move on from the very limited violations approach and 
learn and apply the rules of the political game to get the 
most out of the principle of the progressive realization 
of ESCR. The power of human rights is not so much 
their moral superiority, but their political force and their 
ultimate transformative potential for society.
Even within the limits of legal acceptability of state 
behaviour, some policies are better placed than others to 
maximize the resources to fulfil ESCR. The identification of 
the actual policies that are best suited to achieve this goal 
is a technical issue as much as it is political. Governments 
bear the burden of proof and the role of opposition groups 
and civil society organizations is to hold them to account 
and also to propose alternative ways of achieving the 
progressive realization of all human rights. The time of 
ESCR will come not when policy A trumps the alternative 
policy B, but when both A and B are set out with the goal of 
achieving these rights progressively. Then it is up to politics 
to choose between them. 
Not exempt of risks: implications for 
human rights organizations
I have argued that taking ESCR seriously requires moving 
beyond the limits of the law and accepting the political 
nature of these rights. In fact, I would extend this claim to 
all human rights, not only the socioeconomic ones, but I will 
leave this discussion for another paper.
I guess human rights advocates could pretend that human 
rights belong to the realm of law and morality, not politics, 
but this would not only be a strategic mistake, it would also 
be a fallacy. International human rights are recognized in 
international treaties, but the actual meaning of each right 
very much depends on the framing and constructive work of 
human rights groups and defenders. 
The politicization of human rights is of course not exempt of 
risks. Firstly, by stretching the limits of human rights, we may 
be accused of human rights inflation, that is, of expanding 
the idea of human rights to an ill-defined and potentially 
unlimited number of policy areas. It was Giovanni Sartori 
(1970: 1035) who taught us that the net result of conceptual 
stretching can be that “our gains in extensional coverage tend 
to be matched by losses in connotative precision”. Secondly, 
extending human rights beyond more or less manageable legal 
limits may give the impression that human rights advocates 
are promising more than they can actually deliver, which is 
one of the reasons why Kennedy (2002) wondered if the human 
rights movement itself is not “part of the problem”. And thirdly 
and perhaps more pressingly, human rights groups could also 
be blamed for lack of impartiality, inasmuch as accepting 
and embracing the politicization of ESCR may force them to 
reject the traditional “agnosticism” (Saiz 2009: 287) about the 
compatibility between human rights and different economic 
and political systems.
These are risks that we should not take lightly. Yet, accepting 
the political nature of human rights, apart from being a 
more accurate description of their real nature, offers some 
important lessons and political opportunities as well. 
If human rights in general and ESCR in particular are 
about politics, this means that by definition they cannot 
be totally satisfied. The full realization Article 2(1) ICESCR 
speaks about is an unattainable goal. Therefore, if a given 
human rights organization decides not to work on ESCR 
in one country or region, this cannot be because ESCR 
are fully realized there but because the organization has 
made the strategic decision to focus elsewhere, a strategic 
decision that can only be justified in political terms, not in 
legal or moral ones.
Sceptics have historically dismissed human rights 
because they were either “too abstract to be real or too 
concrete to be universal” (Douzinas 2000: 200). Yet, a 
political approach to human rights like the one suggested 
in this paper may help us “localize human rights” 
(Acharya 2004; De Feyter 2007), that is, adopting a 
bottom-up approach to the construction of the idea(s) of 
human rights. Localizing rights means taking the needs 
and wishes of local people as the starting point for the 
interpretation of existing norms and for the construction 
and consolidation of new ones, while respecting the 
universal reach of human rights.
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The violations approach does not take us very far, or at the 
very least there is room for human rights action beyond 
the language of this approach. Human rights scholars 
and practitioners must explore other areas, such as fiscal 
policy.11 That said, this does not mean that strategic 
litigation and the violations approach must be struck 
down completely. The world needs judges that are willing 
and able to apply the rights recognized in the law. The 
world also needs human rights groups that focus on this 
particular area of work. In other words, this is not an 
attempt to find fault with Audrey Chapman or Kenneth 
Roth or even to suggest that Amnesty International must 
either change or perish. To the contrary, I believe the global 
human rights community must be open and diverse enough 
to embrace different approaches and strategies. 
11  See ‘Human Rights in Tax Policy’ at the website of the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights. Available at:  
http://www.cesr.org/article.php?id=1622.
The politicization of human rights in general and of ESCR 
in particular is not exempt of risks but it also offers 
opportunities that can make human rights advocates more 
effective and more locally relevant in improving people’s 
lives. Taking ESCR seriously and responding adequately to 
some of the key challenges of our time demand audacious 
strategic decisions. Just like with other ideas before, the 
time of human rights may pass and new utopias may 
replace them. If that were the case, I would personally 
prefer to believe that we did our best to extract all the 
juices out of it while we could rather than regretting than 
we did not go far enough.
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This essay recognizes human rights as something 
more profound than legal rights. In the context of the 
rise of global capitalism, being faithful to human 
rights’ intrinsic counter-hegemonic nature requires 
contemplating a picture larger than rights litigation. 
This involves reassessing the efficacy of human rights 
instruments in order to address the structural causes 
impairing human rights.
Introduction
This essay critically assesses the assumption that a so-
called ‘rights-based’ approach should be the primary way 
of pursuing justice through the law. While not sceptical 
about the fact that human rights have an emancipatory 
dimension, in this essay I argue that resorting to an approach 
exclusively or mostly based on legal rights is not likely to 
unfold it. Human rights make a meaningful contribution to 
emancipation whenever they recouple with their counter-
hegemonic nature. The structural sources of exclusion, 
indignity and environmental damage – today’s hegemony – 
are connected to one phenomenon: the rise of global 
capitalism. Hence, the question of whether human rights are 
tools at the service of human emancipation requires asking if 
human rights are meaningfully engaging in the enterprise of 
domesticating the global capitalist economy.
This short essay deals with that question. It does so on 
the one hand by taking the view that the rights approach 
fails to seriously confront the human rights encroachments 
deriving from global capitalism. On the other, the essay 
explores avenues that could restore human rights’ 
counterhegemonic nature. This plan could be summarized 
in the following points. Due to space constraints I will deal 
only with the first two of them. a) At the conceptual level I 
suggest restructuring the interplay between human rights 
and democracy, so that people reappropriate human rights. 
b) With respect to social rights, I propose reorienting both 
its normative content and redress mechanisms. These 
should shift back from their present individual-centred 
focus towards their truly social and more duty-oriented 
nature. c) Internationally, and in line with the opinion of 
the Independent Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic 
and Equitable Order (OHCHR 2015), ‘the human rights 
regime’, should more actively prevent the harmful effects 
derived from free trade agreements (such as the TRIPS 
Agreement, or the still in negotiation TPP and TTIP) from 
limiting or in any way conditioning international human 
rights law. d) Regionally – in a proposal directed primarily 
at the governments and human rights movements of the 
Global South – I suggest strengthening peoples’ right to 
self-determination in the economic domain by supporting 
human rights grassroots organizations reclaiming concepts 
such as ‘food sovereignty’ (De Schutter 2015), notion that 
involves breaking up with fundamental aspects of the 
heterodoxy of global capitalism.
The rights approach
Why a vast majority of peoples are deprived of development 
dynamics in the 21st century has a number of reasons. 
Human rights’ inability to influence the global economy 
is a crucial one. Linked to this phenomenon, the relative 
indifference that the human rights academia pays to 
this interaction should be noted. That sophisticated 
jurisprudential developments are more frequently discussed 
than the interplay between global capitalism and human 
rights is not due to a circumstantial predilection from legal 
agents. It obeys to a more fundamental canon: the idea 
that addressing those interactions would entail mixing law 
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and politics, thus going beyond the scope of what human 
rights are or what they do.
By a ‘rights-based’ or ‘rights’ approach, I mean something 
that has both substantive and procedural implications. 
Content-wise a rights approach is individualistic. So 
prevalent is this emphasis that even in the case of social 
rights the receptor of a legal case is either an individual or 
a group of individuals, but not the community as a whole. 
This is problematic because the core aspect of social rights 
does not consist in granting entitlements to those capable of 
articulating them in legally sound ways (Ferraz 2011: 1660). 
As I shall further explain, the distinctive element of social 
rights lies in its communitarian and democratic normative 
dimension. With respect to procedure, a rights approach 
is, as a matter of principle, alien to political contestation 
(Petrova 2004: 188; Waldron 1999: 12). The problem here 
is that disjointing human rights from democracy impedes 
people from modulating human rights in line with their 
reality. A shift in this respect could be significant in 
articulating a whole spectrum of alternatives capable of 
opposing capitalist practices impairing human rights.
Three other features characterize the rights approach: 
trivialization, technicality and elitism. Trivialization is 
linked to the point of departure of the rights approach – the 
correct premise that human rights are important. However, 
from such a premise often follows the less convincing 
assumption that whatever the issue at stake (health, 
mining activities, the Internet, climate change) it should 
be looked at primarily under the purview of legal rights. 
This over-abundance trivializes human rights’ importance 
(Petrova 2004: 203).
Moreover, as rights emerge from a specific place and 
have their specific techniques, they involve a great deal of 
technicality and elitism. Technicality is connected to the 
necessary legal expertise required for rights problems, what 
normally leads to their bureaucratization. With regard to 
elitism, this problem relates both to its Western origins, 
and to the fact that rights have become the well-paid job of 
expert lawyers and international bureaucracies. These two 
phenomena have led to a dismissive attitude towards the 
voice of indigenous communities, student organizations, 
workers unions, grassroots movements of farmers, and 
human rights activists gathered at the World Social Forum. 
In this context, the counter-hegemonic nature of human 
rights unsurprisingly fades away. 
The critical tenor of this essay does not seek to demerit the 
valuable contributions of the rights approach with respect 
to, for example, governmental accountability. However, as 
today’s human rights challenges are located far beyond 
those infringements, the scope of that accountability 
should be re-examined.
Adapting the approach of P. Jha (2006: 15), I think that the 
emancipatory goal of human rights I mentioned must be 
carried out with deliberate intent. This does not mean getting 
rid of the rights approach but it requires supplementing it 
with a reappropriation of human rights by human rights 
movements. This reappropriation requires, firstly, the 
recoupling of human rights to democracy. Secondly, to 
shift towards a truly social - and not merely a legal rights 
oriented - definition of social rights. Naomi Klein’s (2007: 
119) criticism of Amnesty International illustrates the 
first point. Klein criticized Amnesty’s aseptic approach in 
relation to the human rights violations that occurred in Chile 
during the dictatorship. She stated that the violations were 
only quantified, devoid of any analysis of “why” they had 
occurred. No mention was made of the fact that the junta 
was remaking the country “along radically capitalist lines”. 
The omission produces the effect of presenting the violations 
as “random” violence. Nonetheless, it is only by examining 
the junta’s “revolutionary economic project” that one can 
make sense of why, how and against whom such extreme 
repression was used.
While the accountability aim of the rights approach 
should be welcomed, I do not think that the context should 
have been underemphasized. Moreover, it is incorrect 
to exclusively identify human rights with combatting 
impunity. Crucially, human rights have also to do with the 
very content of the struggles of those attempting to build 
alternatives to capitalism.
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Yet, the question remains: can human rights law embrace 
this perspective?
The forgotten radical mandate of 
human rights
I shall begin with the critical book by Stephen Hopgood, 
The endtimes of human rights (2013), and the publication 
that the Dutch section of Amnesty International devoted 
to the discussion of Hopgood’s contribution: Debating The 
endtimes of human rights (Lettinga & Van Troost 2014). 
In this latter publication, Frank Johansson (2014: 53) 
stated: “[T]he big issues of social and economic justice 
cannot be solved through the human rights paradigm, as 
it doesn’t confront economic power.” Although I think that 
the challenges faced by human rights are not limited to 
distributive justice, I agree with Johansson’s statement. 
Actually, I think Hopgood’s critique fails capturing these 
challenges. I believe that what should really create concern 
about ‘the human rights regime’ is how ill-equipped it is 
to contribute to domesticating the capitalism that impairs 
human rights. About that, Hopgood does not say much.
Today, global capitalism challenges all human rights 
dimensions including the very conditions of life on the 
planet, at least the way we know it. At the same time, in its 
fast economic makeover of the world, capitalism impacted 
both the political structure of the nation state (Jha 2006: 
82) as well as human rights’ substantive meaning and 
redress mechanisms. Worse, as I will show later on, 
legal rights have in some cases become instrumental 
to legitimizing and guaranteeing capitalist expansion. 
Furthermore, ‘the human rights regime’ lacks the capacity 
to hold to account the transnational compound of political 
and economic elites steering these negative shifts.
Climate change impacts the Earth’s limited and fragile 
macrosystem. Scientists speak of “defaunation” in order to 
signify the acute loss of biodiversity as a result of human 
behaviour (Dirzo et al. 2014: 401). While our ecosystem 
has already been reacting to the rise of CO2 emissions, 
estimates of the rise in temperature by 2100 are around 4 
degrees Celsius. The consequential rise in sea levels that 
would follow threatens with inundating “many coastal 
areas from Ecuador and Brazil to the Netherlands to much 
of California and the northeastern United States, as well 
as huge swaths of South and Southeast Asia” (Klein 
2014: 13). A threat against life at this level leaves the 
conceptualization of the right to life falling short. This is 
an example of why human rights advocates should not only 
think of human rights violations; they should also reflect 
on the ability of human rights instruments to target the 
structural causes of those problems.
Slavoj Žižek (2011: 363), in a predicament that we could 
describe as apocalyptically pragmatic, states that “the 
true utopia is the belief that the existing global system can 
reproduce itself indefinitely”. Are human rights embedded 
in the utopia Žižek reproaches? Interestingly, both the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), core instruments of our discipline, did not. What 
lay at their core was a radical and comprehensive view to 
which both great powers and small countries committed 
themselves after World War Two. Both instruments 
legitimized themselves because after Hiroshima and the 
sobering realization of the possibility of the extinction of 
humankind in a nuclear holocaust, the victorious central 
powers accepted that the world could simply not do without 
a platform for international dialogue in the fields of 
security, cooperation, and human rights.
Moreover, the central powers’ attitude with respect to the 
UN Charter and the UDHR was shared by non-industrialized 
nations. These smaller countries believed that peaceful 
dialogue and cooperation would give them an opportunity 
to attain social and economic development. Later on, 
great powers would often instrumentalize human rights 
by scornfully addressing small countries’ claims of 
respect for their sovereignty and self-determination. Yet, 
small countries never understood human rights as a top-
down, externally imposed process. The relentless claims 
from organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement 
exemplifies this (Prashad 2014: 26-27).
All the previous shows that the UDHR is incorrectly 
interpreted under the narrative of the rights approach 
advocated by organizations such as the International 
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Commission of Jurists where, apparently, all it takes for 
the splendorous realization of human rights consists in 
improving access to justice and rights protection in court 
(ICJ 2008). If, as I believe, the challenges faced by human 
rights today are taking place at a more structural scale, the 
bad news is that the greatest challenge to human rights 
lies not in becoming more effective, but exactly its opposite 
– the human rights movement must become self-aware of 
the inefficacy of its mechanisms (human rights litigation 
in the first place) as a pre-requisite to its reinvention. The 
encouraging news is that if in 1948 the world accepted that 
business-as-usual would not do the job in the international 
arena, we may well accept that once again.
In the coming sections I will do the following: Firstly I shall 
illustrate a normative shift derived from the rights approach 
in the field of social rights. Second, I shall get back to the 
point of recoupling human rights with democracy.
Capitalism’s erosion of social rights
Processes of privatization, marketization and liberalization 
contracted the extension and quality of social services. 
This has happened because of another, more important 
shift. Capitalism has changed our understanding of what 
rights are and of how to guarantee them. When William 
Henry Beveridge (1870-1963) in 1942 delivered the report 
that served to establish the National Health Service (NHS) 
in the United Kingdom, he did so on the understanding 
that social rights consisted in granting access to health 
care to everyone irrespective of their ability to pay. That 
understanding is reflected in the NHS’ founding principles 
of comprehensiveness, universality and equity (Pollock 
2005: 83). Some of us still think that it is this perspective 
of social citizenship that informs social rights such as the 
right of access to health.
But it was when capitalism in its perpetual hunt for 
niche markets (Crouch 2004: 83) expanded to health care 
that our understanding of social citizenship - which in 
the words of T.H. Marshall (1950: 28) had to be directed 
“towards a fuller measure of equality” - found itself in need 
of adjustment. From a focus on affordability we shifted 
towards choice protection (Lister 2013: 31). Choices in 
health care attract consumerist sympathy, but in doing 
so they legitimized the appropriation of health care by 
business and with that, the loss of the ideas of citizenship 
and solidarity informing social rights.
This change of paradigm had an institutional parallel. 
From single-tiered health care systems we moved towards 
the complex structure of insurance companies, regulators, 
private, and semi-private providers. So strong has been the 
pressure to extend capitalist appropriation in the profitable 
domain of health care (health-related needs are both 
perpetual and urgent) that not even ideological consistency 
has been respected – allegedly neoliberal principles such 
as efficiency have been ignored. 
Take Canada, as an example. In spite of the fact that “in 
terms of ratio of productivity to administrative costs” the 
Canadian single-tiered health care system was regarded by 
a series of legislative reports “as one of the most efficient 
[…] in the world”,1 Canada began a path towards the 
gradual commercialization of its health care. Interestingly, 
the decisive blow to Quebec’s noble egalitarian tradition 
came not from the political arena but from human rights’ 
alleged allies – rights and courts. The 2005 Chaoulli ruling 
(ibid 2005: 860), struck down acts of parliament impeding 
health care commercialization under a reasoning based 
on the rights to life, liberty and security. As a perceptive 
analysis has revealed (Hirschl 2007: 60-65, 77, 83, 92), 
court activism, far from the elevated reasons often pled 
in its favour, contributes decisively to the entrenchment 
of a legal and institutional setting favourable to the 
perpetuation of capitalism.
In the developing world, excessive emphasis on a legal 
rights approach has brought health care systems not only 
not to focus on the most vulnerable (Mchangama: 2014), 
but also to be run in an economically unsustainable way 
(Gouvêa 2013: 466). In the case of Brazil for example, since 
middle and upper classes are more likely to have their 
voice heard in court, their more exclusive and expensive 
1  The Supreme Court of Canada (2005) Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(AG), SCC 35, Ruling of 9 June.
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health care needs have been prioritized to the detriment 
of the vast majority of impoverished people in one of the 
most unequal countries in the world (Gouvêa 2013: 463; 
Ferraz 2011: 1660; Wang & Ferraz 2013: 165). And focusing 
scarce resources on less cost-effective interventions is 
an approach that has been advised against by the World 
Health Organization (2014: xi).
Purposeful action in line with the 1978 Alma-Ata 
Declaration needs to be adopted. This would allow 
to emphasize the importance of health planning, 
comprehensiveness, affordability, and universality, in line 
with the World Health Organization’s goal of “health for all” 
(WHO 1978: paras. 6, 7.8, 8). Critically, it is this approach 
too that would have been vital in addressing contemporary 
crises, such as the Ebola crisis (Brown 2014; Kieny 2014; 
Zinzombe 2014). 
This analysis explains why under the rights approach social 
rights have been inhibited to reconnect with its genuinely 
social origins. It is imperative to shift back towards the 
historical and teleological routes of social rights. Namely, 
to re-emphasize the importance of the duties necessary 
to guaranteeing them. Paraphrasing García Manrique 
(2013: 34) social rights denote the democratic standards a 
community gives to itself in order to specify the distribution 
of wealth and opportunities necessary to satisfy everyone’s 
needs of assistance, education and labour. Hence, as 
much as the challenge for the right to vote demanded 
the political defeat of census suffrage, we must come 
to terms with the idea that what social rights primarily 
demand is the de-commodification of key areas such as 
the provision of healthcare, education and other essential 
social services. Also – as some human rights NGOs have 
started to acknowledge – tax systems must be restructured 
with a view of redistribution (CESR 2015). It is this trend, 
and not the privatization of social rights’ legal nature, what 
truly reflects commitment towards the challenge posed by 
the 1993 Human Rights Vienna Conference (OHCHR, 1993: 
para. 5). It is in the acceptation of a plural legal response 
that the goal (not the means) of universality, indivisibility, 
interdependency and interrelatedness of all human rights 
will be attained.
Recoupling human rights and 
democracy
Shifting back towards new visions of human rights such 
as the abovementioned, as well as others promoted by 
human rights grassroots organizations such as the claim 
for ‘food sovereignty’, demands a different interrelation 
between law and politics. One, that opens the door to see in 
human rights something more than legal rights, along with 
re-emphasizing the importance of duties and collective 
instruments such as the right to development.2 This would 
upscale human rights from a friendly conscious reminder, 
into an irritating stone in the shoes of capitalism.
These issues involve a number of practical shifts. Yet, this 
transformation also requires a review of the theoretical 
framework of human rights. Reappropriating human rights 
requires altering the predominant understanding of the 
relation between constitutionalism and democracy. Against 
Dworkin, who thought that if the majority and not judges 
set the standard of restraint with respect to individual 
rights “the majority [would be] judge in its own cause” 
(1977: 142), it must be highlighted how such a mistrust for 
self-government is based on a naive thought: the idea that 
“the minority is no longer synonymous with the oppressor” 
(Rosanvallon 2008: 116). To be sure, democracy is precisely 
about making the majority a judge in its own cause (Atria 
2006: 85; Waldron 1999: 265, 297) and, unless we shift 
towards a government of enlightened despots, human 
rights advancements should be mainly conceived as 
advancements that a majority supports.3 This does not 
mean that I consider law and politics the same thing. On 
the contrary, following Fernando Atria (2004: 150), I believe 
that legal reasoning should be able to claim a position of 
relative autonomy with respect to the political. Judicializing 
2  This is in spite of some influential Northern countries’ 
attempt of disjointing the right from its collective dimension 
and reduce it to another individual legal right (Bunn 
2012: 109). Bunn, I. (2012) The Right to Development and 
International Economic Law. Legal and Moral Dimensions, 
Oxford: Hart
3  This is without prejudice of admitting the intrinsic 
fallibility and precariousness of democratic arrangements, as 
Chantal Mouffe has theorized (Mouffe 2009: 11).
46Changing perspectives on human rights
Can human rights bring social justice? Twelve essays 
Back to the future: human rights protection beyond the rights approach
politics in contrast, not only denies any legal autonomy, 
it also threatens de-legitimizing the legal expertise of the 
judiciary, arguably, one of its mayor social capitals.
Moreover, tactically speaking, I think that well-inspired-
left-wing-legal-scholars have overestimated the counter-
hegemonic potential of judicializing politics (Langford 2008: 
42; Uprimny & García Villegas 2005: 255). Can pro-bono or 
NGO litigation be equated to the power of corporate law firms 
expending their immense resources in articulating every 
possible legal avenue to defending the interests of capital 
against state’s social budget (Eberhardt & Olivet 2012)?
The points raised so far are not to deny the soundness 
of many judicial rulings. But even good rulings can be 
counterproductive if their effect is to persuade us of the 
idea that human rights are the stuff of expert lawyers and 
that ordinary citizens should not have much of a say in that 
process. Pushed forward by global capitalism, the great 
enterprise of human rights has entered a critical stage. One 
where what is at stake is nothing less than the extinction of 
human rights. Not because an authoritarian leader will ban 
them – sooner or later human rights find their way through 
that. The real challenge lies in seriously addressing the 
structural sources of human rights degradation by carefully 
evaluating the effectiveness of our legal response. In this 
sense, as Jeremy Waldron (1999: 304) critically reminds us, 
we must overcome our fear of shaping the architecture of 
human rights, purely on the basis of the contempt towards 
legislative politics.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued against the arrogance toward 
politics and the business-as-usual-attitude of many 
human rights advocates who, in contrast to the founders 
of the UN system, believe that human rights are not more 
than individual legal rights. I believe that we require 
both a sense of urgency, and an acknowledgment of the 
limitations of our legal instruments in confronting the 
challenges posed by global capitalism. Moving beyond the 
rights approach does not mean leaving legal rights behind. 
The accountability aim is still valuable albeit too limited 
in scope for coping with transnational dimensions and 
conceptual paradigm shifts catalysed by global capitalism. 
Moving beyond the rights approach entails asking what 
human rights could do to influence the global economy, 
especially how to address the structural causes of abuse 
and injustice derived from it. In doing so, I have suggested 
a strategy that requires peoples to reappropriate human 
rights through democracy, while restoring a truly social 
comprehension of social rights.
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Promoting social justice is different from protecting 
human rights and should be separate. Social justice 
requires economic trade-offs through the political process. 
Human rights organizations are ill-suited to be effective 
in promoting social justice and would damage their own 
legitimacy by the politicization needed to be effective.
 
Introduction
The protection of human rights and the promotion of social 
justice are both important causes. They are also different. 
Though the effort to promote social justice can encompass 
the protection of human rights, the reverse does not seem 
to be true. Organized efforts to protect human rights are 
most likely to be effective when the focus is limited and 
does not embrace other important concerns such as social 
justice, or protection of the environment or the promotion of 
international peace. 
A couple of definitions are in order. It is useful to think 
of the protection of human rights as the imposition of 
restraints on the exercise of state power or on the power of 
other institutions that have taken over the powers of the 
state. Restraint on power is required because each human 
being is entitled to certain rights that are embraced by the 
concepts of liberty, dignity, equality and justice. The state 
should not use its power to interfere with freedom of inquiry 
or expression. It should not deprive anyone of due process 
of law, or of fairness, in any proceeding that may lead to 
significant harm. No one should be deprived of the equal 
protection of the laws on the basis of race, religion, gender, 
or other aspects of status. The state may not engage in 
cruelty. It should respect a zone of privacy for all persons. 
In circumstances of armed conflict, the state must take 
all feasible measures to avoid harm to non-combatants 
and those who are hors de combat. Certain affirmative 
measures – such as providing free legal representation to 
defendants in criminal cases who cannot afford the cost 
of counsel – may be needed to meet the state’s obligations 
to place restraints on the exercise of its power. Yet 
carrying out such measures does not require a substantial 
redistribution of the resources of a society. 
A characteristic of these requirements is that they take 
precedence over contrary concerns. Even if a speaker voices 
a dangerous idea or opinion, the state should be restrained 
from interfering. Even a person who seems obviously 
culpable for an horrendous crime should have the benefit of 
a fair proceeding to determine actual guilt. Even if it seems 
likely that torture would succeed in extracting crucial 
information, such practices should be prohibited. And so 
on. Human rights are not bargaining chips to be traded 
away when they clash with other social interests. Each 
person is entitled to assert her or his human rights in all 
circumstances and to insist that they should be honoured.
Social justice may be defined primarily as distributive 
justice. That is, it embraces the concept of social and 
economic rights but carries it to a different level. It is a 
vision that goes beyond assurance for every person of the 
minimum benefits that are required to sustain life. It is 
a concern that the benefits of society, such as education 
or health care, or the burdens of society, such as taxes, 
should be distributed equitably or equally. Though income 
inequality on a worldwide basis has declined in recent 
years because of the emergence from poverty of hundreds 
of millions of persons in such giant countries as China 
and India, it is growing in many Western countries. 
Also, the persistence of widespread extreme poverty in 
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many countries in other parts of the world highlights the 
urgency of addressing economic inequality. Yet it seems 
impossible to argue that contrary interests may never 
impose limits. Where economic issues are concerned, some 
balance must be maintained. The destitute should be 
fed, clothed, housed, educated and provided with health 
care without eliminating incentives for economic success 
and without preventing the accumulation of the capital 
needed for investment and innovation. Different economic 
circumstances at different times and places make it 
impossible to set a formula or establish a standard that 
is universally applicable. How to strike the appropriate 
balance is a matter that should be determined on an 
ongoing basis through the political process – preferably 
a democratic political process – in which competing 
interests may be considered. Indeed, this is probably the 
most important role of the political process in a democratic 
society. The political process is also the arena in which 
societies should determine what balance to strike between 
economic development and protecting the environment; and 
between maintaining security and promoting peace. None 
of these issues can be addressed usefully by asserting 
that only one set of considerations, such as rights, takes 
precedence over all other concerns. Government policies 
that have a substantial impact on issues such as social 
justice, and that involve the significant redistribution of 
resources, derive their legitimacy in a democratic society 
from their thorough consideration in the political process. 
If they were imposed solely on the basis of assertions of 
rights, they could not gain widespread acceptance. 
Trade-offs between social justice and 
other concerns
How to strike the right balance in addressing the question 
of social justice is a matter that has been disputed for 
a long time. It was debated nearly 2500 years ago, in 
Aristotle’s day. In the Nicomachean Ethics, the Greek 
philosopher pointed out that “the cause of strife and 
complaints is either that people who are equal are given 
unequal shares or that people who are not equal are given 
equal shares”. Many of the proponents of social justice 
start from the standpoint that those who are equal are 
given unequal shares. Indeed, where equal treatment is 
denied on the basis of such criteria as race or gender, it is 
appropriate to address such issues on the basis of rights. 
An example would be the absence of municipal services 
such as sanitation or utilities, in a neighbourhood of a city 
populated by members of a racial minority. Yet probably 
few proponents of social justice would carry that argument 
to the extreme of saying that, regardless of whether there 
has been any showing of invidious discrimination, all 
must be given equal shares of all the benefits of society. 
They recognize that there are competing considerations. 
Determining where the balance is appropriate is not 
something that can be done by invoking rights.
To illustrate the argument that promoting social justice 
requires striking a balance, it may be useful to revert to 
the reference to the great achievements of China and India 
in recent years in lifting great numbers of persons out of 
poverty. These achievements were made possible by the 
industrialization that took place in these two countries. 
In turn, that industrialization required the production 
of an immense amount of energy. In both countries, 
but especially in China, a great deal of the energy was 
produced by the burning of coal. Yet, this has also had 
certain costs. Air pollution became an immense problem 
in both countries and, of course, there have been severe 
health consequences. The number of persons affected by 
heart diseases and pulmonary diseases has increased 
greatly, particularly in a region such as Northern China 
where the air pollution and water pollution are much more 
severe than in the Southern part of the country.
Again, from the standpoint of social justice, lifting 
hundreds of millions of persons out of poverty is a great 
achievement. On the other hand, causing severe damage 
to the health of large numbers of persons is a blow to 
social justice. It does little good to improve their ability to 
afford health care by means that do severe damage to their 
health. If one limits oneself to a concern that everybody 
is entitled to a level of income which will ensure that they 
are fed and housed adequately, can afford health care and 
obtain a measure of income security, what was done in 
China and India seems wholly admirable. By contrast, if 
one were to focus solely on the right to health, the effects 
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of industrialization in some parts of China and India are 
disastrous. One might argue, of course, that if China and 
India had industrialized using only renewable sources of 
energy such as solar power and wind power, the health 
consequences would not have been those that resulted from 
the use of fossil fuels. Yet it is apparent that it was only 
the availability of coal that made possible the tremendous 
industrial development that took place in those countries 
during the past quarter of a century. Without burning coal, 
many persons would have been spared deadly diseases, but 
great numbers now enjoying significant economic benefits 
would remain impoverished. 
The experience of China and India demonstrates that it is 
often not possible to deal simultaneously with economic 
security and health from a rights standpoint. Yet both are 
essential components of social justice. What is required 
is striking a balance between these two concerns, each of 
them of crucial significance, by adopting policies that try to 
maximize benefits and minimize harms. It is sound policy 
rather than rights that should be our focus in dealing with 
the components of social justice.
Risks of conflating social justice and 
human rights
One of the concerns of those wanting to keep the protection 
of human rights separate from the promotion of social 
justice is that failure to do this would subject human rights 
issues to the balancing that is required when addressing 
social justice. Where rights are at stake – such as freedom 
of speech or the right not to be tortured – any suggestion 
that a balance should be struck on the basis of competing 
considerations should be rejected. A closely related concern 
is that it should be possible to look to the courts as a 
component of government in which rights can be protected. 
The nature of courts is that they should render judgments 
that uphold the law regardless of political considerations. 
Protecting rights such as freedom of expression or equal 
protection of the laws is often deeply unpopular. As bodies 
that do not or should not consider themselves bound by 
the popular will, they are generally in a better position 
to safeguard rights than the legislative and executive 
branches of government. In a democratic society, the 
members of the legislative branch are expected to reflect 
the will of the constituents they represent. The executive 
branch is expected to be concerned with the well-being of 
the whole society. Accordingly, it may be difficult for them 
to give primacy to the rights of a particular person whose 
views, or whose membership in a despised minority, are 
anathema to most others. Such persons often must look to 
the courts if their rights are to be protected.
On the other hand, courts are poorly situated to deal with 
issues that require political balancing. The parties that 
appear before them generally do not include all those 
whose interests may be at stake. Moreover the questions 
presented in a particular court case may not reflect the 
essential issues that are involved. Judges are not chosen 
for their ability to establish public policy. For all its 
shortcomings in particular circumstances, the best system 
we have devised for public policy making is the democratic 
political process. It should be the means through 
which proponents attempt to promote social justice. 
Alexander Hamilton, one of the founders of the American 
constitutional system, famously wrote in the Federalist 
Papers, that “the executive not only dispenses the honours 
but holds the sword of the community. The legislature 
not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by 
which the duties of every citizen are to be regulated. The 
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of 
the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution 
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor 
WILL but merely judgment.” To this, it could be added 
that the highest calling of the judiciary is to exercise that 
judgment in a manner that upholds rights even while it 
refrains from trying to address questions that involve 
the sword (that is, the war-making power) or the wealth 
(that is, the collection or the distribution of resources) 
of the society. If the judiciary were to get involved in the 
balancing that is needed in distributing society’s wealth as 
a supposed means of protecting rights, it seems likely that 
a balancing approach would carry over to civil and political 
rights. The result, of course, is that civil and political rights 
would suffer great damage.
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Another concern of many of those opposing efforts to link 
the protection of human rights to social justice is that 
states that purport to promote social justice may attempt to 
use this as a means of explaining away their abuses of civil 
and political rights. This is hardly speculative. Long ago, 
in the era of the Soviet Union, Moscow regularly pointed 
to its purported accomplishments with respect to social 
and economic rights as a means to counter criticism of its 
denials of civil liberties. More recently, a similar approach 
was espoused by some countries of Southeast Asia, led 
by the late Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of 
Singapore. In our time, it is an approach followed by the 
current government of China. That country’s success in 
fending off criticism of its violations of civil and political 
rights seems to have inspired other governments in 
different parts of the world to follow in its footsteps. Giving 
credence to such a government’s claim that its economic 
development policies have fostered human rights by lifting 
a significant number of its citizens out of poverty is to do 
a great disservice to many millions of victims of political 
oppression.
Social justice through human rights 
not effective
A contradiction that emerges in the arguments of those 
who want the international human rights movement to 
embrace the cause of social justice is that they point to 
an increasing number of constitutional provisions and 
court decisions embracing economic and social rights, 
and to commitments to the promotion of economic and 
social rights by leading human rights organizations, and 
at the same time they deplore the fact that this has had 
virtually no impact in reducing income inequality or in 
overcoming deprivation. This disjunction should have been 
anticipated. It seems more likely that the way that social 
justice can be promoted is by the adoption of economic 
policies that promote growth, as in China or India, and 
by political mobilization, as took place in the period 
subsequent to World War II in some countries of Western 
Europe. It is difficult to identify situations in which a rights 
approach had a substantial impact in promoting social 
justice. A rights approach has had barely any impact in 
addressing even the most minimal economic and social 
rights. The most significant exception that comes to 
mind is the decision of the South African Constitutional 
Court in 2002 in the Treatment Action Campaign case 
invalidating that government’s failure to provide nevirapine 
in public hospitals to prevent the transmission of HIV from 
mothers to their new-born children. That case became 
the exception that seems to prove the rule because the 
Mbeki government’s policies with respect to prevention 
and treatment of HIV were bizarre, and because the cost of 
nevirapine was not a factor. The treatment was inexpensive 
and the South African government had been offered a five-
year supply of nevirapine free of charge.
Though it seems appropriate to applaud the result in the 
Treatment Action Campaign case, it is difficult to imagine 
that the confluence of such circumstances will occur often. 
Accordingly, the case does not provide a foundation for 
those who expect that dealing with social justice from 
a rights standpoint will bring about significant results. 
With so little to show for the effort that has been made to 
address even minimal economic benefits through a social 
and economic rights approach, it seems preposterous to 
contend that a rights approach to social justice will have 
much impact. Rather, it seems possible that focusing on 
efforts to secure social justice by invoking rights will divert 
attention and energy away from the political mobilization 
that is required in most circumstances to be effective.
Why human rights organizations are 
not suitable for political mobilization
Upholding civil and political rights is especially important 
in circumstances when the victims of abuses are resented 
or looked down upon by the societies in which their 
rights may be violated. It is essential that human rights 
organizations should try to offer protection to minorities 
such as the Roma in Eastern Europe, to the Rohingyas in 
Burma, and to the Pygmies in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Human rights organizations should uphold 
the rights of the migrants crossing the Mediterranean to 
Europe and the rights of the detainees at Guantánamo. 
When challenging the death penalty, human rights 
organizations may be required to try to spare the lives of 
those who are widely hated because they have committed 
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horrendous crimes. Because they should take up such 
unpopular causes, human rights defenders should 
recognize that they are likely to be members of a minority. 
They are not well situated to lead struggles which are likely 
to depend on political mobilization of large constituencies. 
Such mobilization as does occasionally take place on 
human rights issues tends to be effective because of 
the moral clarity of the issues that are addressed. The 
opportunity of human rights advocates to prevail in the 
causes they espouse depends on their adherence to moral 
norms, such as those embodied in the prohibition of torture, 
that are codified in legal precepts that have gained wide 
acceptance. 
Because political mobilization is generally required to 
advance social justice, those individuals and organizations 
leading such a struggle have to be concerned with their 
own capacity to win public support. Their effectiveness in 
political mobilization may be impaired by their identification 
with unpopular causes such as the fairness of legal 
proceedings for terrorism suspects. For this reason, human 
rights organizations that defend the rights of all, including 
even the most marginalized or despised members of society, 
are probably not in a good position to be public advocates 
of social justice. If they were to take on a leadership role in 
such struggles, some organizations might be tempted to 
avoid cases in which defending the rights of the unpopular 
would undercut their effectiveness in political mobilization. 
If that were to happen, of course, the impact on the 
protection of civil and political rights would run counter 
to the rationale for the formation of such organizations. 
On such grounds alone, it seems best to separate the 
effort to protect human rights from the promotion of social 
justice. Combining the two concerns is unlikely to serve the 
interests of social justice and is potentially harmful to the 
protection of human rights.
The dangers of a politicized human 
rights movement
A final reason for maintaining a separation is that some 
governments have engaged in the extensive redistribution 
of resources and, therefore, may make a credible claim 
to be promoting social justice. An example of such a 
government that has held on to power for an extended 
period is Cuba under the Castro brothers. The Cuban 
government has provided its citizens with such benefits 
as education and health care for all and has done much 
better than many other governments in promoting income 
equality. At the same time, however, it has engaged in 
severe abuses of human rights. In the more than a half 
century that the Castro brothers have held power, there 
has been almost complete denial of freedom of expression. 
In the early years of Fidel Castro’s ascendancy, many 
thousands of peaceful dissenters were imprisoned and 
a few thousand were executed. Over time, the number of 
those imprisoned for such reasons declined greatly, but 
mainly because dissent was largely wiped out.
Cuba is just one country that could be cited to illustrate the 
point that the protection of human rights and the promotion 
of social justice do not necessarily go hand in hand. That 
poses a danger that a politicized human rights movement 
– and it would have to be politicized to be effective in 
promoting social justice – could become an apologist for 
governments that engage in gross abuses of human rights.
The fact that some proponents of social justice would like 
to see international human rights organizations take on 
the role of a political movement on behalf of their cause 
suggests that those organizations enjoy public credibility 
that might make them effective in that role. If human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have such credibility, however, it is because, 
by and large, they are seen as defenders of civil and 
political rights. Amnesty International, which was founded 
at a relatively early point during the cold war, and Human 
Rights Watch which was also established during the cold 
war but at a somewhat later point, established their bona 
fides by criticizing the states aligned with the Soviet Union, 
the states aligned with the United States and non-aligned 
states in accordance with the same standards. They 
acquired their reputations by documenting such civil and 
political rights abuses as attacks on dissenters, torture, 
the persecution of ethnic minorities, and the use of rape as 
a weapon of war, and advocating on behalf of the victims. 
Any deviation from political neutrality will be quickly noted 
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and used by the targets of their criticism to detract from 
their legitimacy. Converting them into lobbies focused on 
national budgets, taxes and corporate profits would be a 
distortion of their mission and a disservice to the cause of 
human rights.
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Jacob Mchangama
Against a human rights-based 
approach to social justice 
Human rights activists are increasingly expanding human 
rights advocacy into the realm of social justice. Yet there is 
no evidence that an increased judicialization of economic, 
social and cultural rights delivers better outcomes when it 
comes to health, education and living standards. Moreover, 
a brief survey of Amnesty International’s reporting on a 
number of countries shows an overwhelming focus on 
an abuse-based approach favouring civil and political 
rights. These findings suggest that a human rights-based 
approach to social justice is misguided and that human 
rights activists should resist such a scope creep in their 
mission. 
Introduction
Increasingly the quest for social justice has become 
interwoven with human rights discourse and advocacy. Since 
the mid-nineties, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(and its predecessor the Commission on Human Rights) 
has established a number of thematic special procedure 
mandates related to social justice. These include one on 
extreme poverty and human rights, which states that:
“The elimination of extreme poverty should thus not 
be seen as a question of charity, but as a pressing 
human rights issue. Its persistence in countries that 
can afford to eliminate it amounts to a clear violation 
of fundamental human rights.”1
1  See statement of the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights on the website of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (date 
unknown): http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/
Pages/SRExtremePovertyIndex.aspx 
Amnesty International’s annual report from 2010 
emphasizes that:
“Increased accountability for the denial of basic 
economic, social and cultural rights has become ever 
more important in view of the combined effects of the 
food, energy, and financial crises which are estimated 
to have pushed many million more people into poverty. 
The respect for all human rights, including economic, 
social and cultural rights, must be an integral part of 
all national and international responses to the crises.”2
The pursuit of social justice through human rights fits 
well with one of the central tenets of international human 
rights, namely the ‘Indivisibility’ of all human rights as 
affirmed by the Vienna Declaration at the 1993 World 
Conference on human rights. The concept of indivisibility 
was particularly aimed at improving the standing of 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR), long the poor 
relation of civil and political rights (CPR) despite their 
inclusion in both the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
One of the impediments to indivisibility has been the 
perception that social and economic rights are not 
justiciable, meaning that they cannot be enforced as 
individual rights in the same manner as CPR. This 
perception has been challenged in recent decades as ever 
2  Amnesty International (2010), Amnesty International 
Report 2010: The state of the world’s human rights, London: 
Amnesty International Publications. Available at: https://
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/001/2010/en/
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more states adopted and enforced social and economic 
rights in their constitutions, as has been the case in South 
Africa, Brazil, Colombia and elsewhere.
The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights also includes 
a number of social and economic rights, which can be 
invoked before the European Court of Justice. Several 
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human rights have blurred the lines 
between CPR and social and economic rights.3 The most 
striking development at the international level was the entry 
into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in 2013, 
which allows for individual complaints against ratifying 
states, prompting former UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Navi Pillay to state in 2007 that “an optional 
protocol would help reinforce social justice as a value of the 
international community”.4
Understandably, proponents of indivisibility and social 
justice have trumpeted this development as evidence that 
it is perfectly possible to enforce social and economic 
rights as individual rights, just as is the case with freedom 
of expression, fair trial etc. And while not all sceptics of 
justiciability have been swayed, this development has 
certainly introduced a much less abstract element into the 
ongoing discussion. 
The limited effectiveness of 
judicializing social rights
Yet while social and economic rights are increasingly being 
judicialized, very little research has been dedicated to the 
actual effects of constitutionalizing social rights; in other 
words does the judicialization of social and economic rights 
deliver the goods promised by their wording? Do enforceable 
3  See for instance the European Court of Human rights 
case, Kjartan Ásmundsson v. Iceland, 12 October 2004 
(App. No. 60669/00), and the Inter-American Court of 
Human rights Case, Children’s rehabilitation vs. Paraguay            
2 September 2004, [Ser. C] No. 112.
4  OHCHR (2007) ‘High Commissioner backs work on 
mechanisms to consider complaints of breaches of economic, 
social and cultural rights’, Geneva, 16 July. Available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=6155&LangID=E 
social and economic rights deliver social justice? This is a 
crucial question because despite the heated nature of the 
debate over social rights, the real question is not whether 
health, education and adequate living standards are 
supremely important goods essential for human flourishing, 
but whether these goods are apt to be realized through the 
matrix of (justiciable) human rights. 
Human rights organizations, in other words, when deciding 
on whether to dedicate more of their already scarce 
resources towards the pursuit of social justice, should 
take into account whether their expertise based on the 
framework of human rights is likely to help advance the 
plight of the poor. The absence of robust research prompted 
this author and Danish economist Christian Bjørnskov to 
examine this question in-depth. We did so by surveying the 
constitutions of 188 countries and identifying those states 
that included social rights in their constitutions (75 at 
the time of the survey) as well as those countries in which 
these rights had been made justiciable (37).5
Doing so allowed us to build a unique dataset covering 
the years between 1960 and 2010, where we traced the 
constitutional status of three main social rights: the right 
to health, education and social security (which are also 
protected at the international level in the ICESCR). By 
statistically comparing the evolution of health, education 
and relative income differences across countries that have 
or have not introduced social rights (taking into account a 
wide range of factors such as national income, democracy 
and regime type) our findings suggest that the introduction 
of social and economic rights do not, in general, have 
robustly positive effects on the population’s long-term 
social development. We, for example, find no effects of 
health rights on immunization rates or life expectancy, 
regardless of whether they are justiciable or not. Even more 
surprising, we found that the legalization of economic and 
social rights had a strongly negative medium-term effect 
5  A working paper is available here: http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323539. An updated 
version is forthcoming in The American Journal of Political 
Science.
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on education, as well as a robustly negative medium-term 
increase of inflation and detrimental effects of the right to 
health on child mortality. 
Why does the legalization of economic and social rights 
have negative consequences? Our hypothesis is that the 
introduction of these new rights cause disruptions, most of 
which are borne by those already in the education system, 
and by those least likely to have access to the legal and 
political system, i.e., the poor. Since the rights do not give 
governments or private actors more resources, what is 
likely to occur is simply that governments reallocate scarce 
resources towards those more likely to claim their newly 
given rights, whether they are individuals or identifiable 
groups.6 Of course, one can point to people whose lives 
have been saved by courts ordering expensive treatments, 
as has happened in Colombia, or people escaping abject 
poverty based on a right to a certain level of income. But 
these individual examples obscure our study’s broader, 
macro-level findings. 
One might object to such a seemingly cold and calculated 
‘spreadsheet approach’ to human rights, and insist that 
the individual’s human rights should not be subjected to a 
utilitarian calculus. But in the domain of social rights, one 
can only do this by turning a blind eye to the effects on real 
people that are not immediately apparent from the numbers 
and graphs of our study. The Colombian courts may have 
saved the lives of a few, but we must ask ourselves: how 
many died, or were forced to live with a disease that could 
have been cured, because of resources diverted from them 
to others who were lucky enough to have access to a good 
lawyer?
And what about the people whose access to education, 
housing or social security is affected by the diversion of 
funds to health, or vice versa, depending on the outcome 
of cases that appear before courts in no particular order? 
By definition, resources are scarce, and governments must 
prioritize. This sits uneasily with the notion of human rights 
6  Ibid.
as a ‘trump card’ taking priority over other considerations. 
So while the constitutionalization of social and economic 
rights has been a victory for human rights activists, it is 
not clear that it has done very much for the people who 
were supposed to benefit. These findings are in line with 
studies on the efficacy of international human rights 
conventions that generally find very little relation between 
ratification and improvement (across the whole board of 
rights) and even less so when it comes to social rights 
(Hafner-Burton 2013: 79). 
It is true that the provision of civil and political rights is 
not cost-free and also involves priorities and trade-offs. 
An independent and well-educated judiciary, a civil service 
committed to the rule of impersonal laws rather than 
clientelism and corruption, prisons free from torture and 
a police force protecting the people rather than a regime 
are all goods that require means. But the level of resources 
needed to realize social rights are far higher than those 
needed to ensure a basic system of justice. Moreover, the 
core content of a number of fundamental freedoms, the 
absence of censorship, torture, arbitrary arrests and wilful 
killings, can be achieved by even very poor countries. For 
instance abolishing censorship does not require significant 
resources and in most instances the enjoyment of freedom 
of expression, privacy etc. does not affect other citizens’ 
ability to do the same. 
The Danish case
When looking at the relationship between social rights and 
social justice it is interesting to take the case of Denmark, 
a well-functioning liberal democracy that combines 
universal welfare with a deeply entrenched commitment to 
the rule of law and civil liberties (though a certain erosion 
of civil liberties has been apparent since the turn of the 
millennium). Denmark commits some 57 per cent of its GDP 
to government spending, 32 per cent to social protection, 
but merely 0,9 per cent to its courts, police, prisons and 
prosecution services.7 It is also interesting that with a few 
7  Data retrieved from Statistics Denmark:   
www.statistikbanken.dk/OFF29 and www.statistikbanken.dk/
UDG11. 
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minor exceptions, the Danish constitution does not protect 
social rights. Moreover, both center-right and center-left 
governments have rejected incorporating human rights 
conventions with social and economic rights into national 
law, whereas the European Convention on Human Rights 
has played an ever more important part in Danish law since 
1992, ensuring a stronger protection of, inter alia, press 
freedom, private and family life, and against arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty. During the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, the Danish government explicitly 
rejected ratification thereof:
“Denmark firmly believes that the majority of the rights 
in the ICESCR is insufficiently judiciable and therefore 
less suited to form the basis of an individual complaints 
mechanism. Moreover, due to the vague and broad 
nature of the rights in the covenant, Denmark fears that 
there is a serious risk that the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights will end up both functioning 
as a legislator in the area of economic, social and 
cultural rights and determining the allocation of 
state parties’ resources within this sphere. Denmark 
finds both scenarios unacceptable, as we place great 
importance on the fact that the allocation of resources 
within the economic, social and cultural sphere is 
a national matter, which is the responsibility and 
prerogative of national, democratic institutions with 
direct, popular legitimacy.8”
The Danish position demonstrates that a rejection of 
justiciable social and economic rights does not necessarily 
entail a rejection of the underlying ideal of social justice 
based on a universalist welfare state, and that in fact the 
divisibility of human rights is perfectly compatible with the 
achievement of this ideal. The Danish welfare state has 
been built and maintained by various governments with 
different ideological positions. Some of these governments 
have sometimes felt compelled to adopt reforms such 
as increasing the retirement age, lowering and limiting 
accessibility to certain benefits, slashing spending on 
8  Explanation of Position of Denmark at the 63th session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, 16 September 2008.
vulnerable groups and numerous other pragmatic policies 
that are difficult to square with a human rights-based 
approach to social justice. What has been crucial for the 
development of the welfare state, however, has been the 
ability for civil society and mass movements to mobilize 
public support that would ultimately crystallize into 
political power. 
This struggle for a social welfare state was intimately 
interwoven with the fight for civil and political rights, as 
the founding members of the Danish labour movement 
were frequently arrested, imprisoned, harassed and sent 
into exile in the late 19th century, due to their political 
views which were regarded as seditious (Engberg 1975). 
Accordingly, the first manifesto of the Danish Social 
Democratic Party demanded: “The abolishment of all press 
laws, association- and assembly laws, and all other laws 
whereby a People can be restricted from manifesting its 
thoughts in word and writing”.9 Only when these basic 
freedoms were ensured were its members able to create the 
platform that would catapult that movement into power, 
making the Social Democratic Party the most successful 
party in Danish political history, measured by the number 
of terms in power. 
Limited usefulness of legalizing 
economic and social rights to pursue 
social justice
The difficulties of applying a human rights approach to 
social justice in practice, rather than in mere rhetoric, 
is also demonstrated by an, admittedly, brief and non-
exhaustive, overview of Amnesty’s actual reporting on 
twenty countries from 2005-2015. The overview focuses on 
ten ‘Global Players’ (US, UK, France, Brazil, Russia, China, 
South Africa, Argentina, India and Saudi Arabia) and the 
ten least developed countries in the world (Congo, Niger, 
Mozambique, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Eritrea, Central 
African Republic, Guinea and Burundi).
9  The ’Gimle programme’, paragraph 4 adopted 
on 6-8 June 1976. Available (in Danish) at http://
www.historiefaget.dk/typo3temp/tx_cliopdfprint/
KildeopgaveomSocialdemokratiet_685002_jesp476b.pdf
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The brief overview suggests that Amnesty continues to 
prioritize work on classic civil and political rights: 80 per 
cent of the rights violations identified in Amnesty’s reports 
on what I label ‘Global Players’ related to civil and political 
rights, 12 per cent related to ‘hybrid rights’ (such as rights 
of migrants that include both elements of CPR and social 
and economic rights) and a mere 8 per cent of the rights 
identified were social and economic rights. For the least 
developed states the corresponding numbers were 86, 10 
and 4 per cent respectively. 
Even when the reports focus on social and economic rights, 
the criticism is often aimed at abuses (such as forced 
evictions and discrimination), rather than more general 
criticisms of economic policy or fiscal priorities such as the 
lack of provisions of public goods such as housing, jobs or 
social security. While these findings are only indicative and 
should be followed up by a more comprehensive study, they 
strongly suggest that Amnesty’s country-specific research 
overwhelmingly reflects an ‘abuse-based approach’, that 
naturally favours a predominant, but not exclusive, focus 
on CPR, that protect individuals against such readily 
identifiable abuses by state authorities. 
Global players
Table 1: Rights violations mentioned in Amnesty’s annual 
reports (2005-2015) for US, UK, France, Brazil, Russia, 
China, South Africa, Argentina, India and Saudi Arabia
Least developed countries
Table 2: Rights violations mentioned in Amnesty’s annual 
reports (2005-2015) for Congo, Niger, Mozambique, Chad, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Eritrea, Central African Republic, 
Guinea and Burundi 
Amnesty’s apparent bias towards CPR, it is submitted, 
reflects that when moving from rhetoric to concrete action, 
social justice is an elusive concept that cannot be neatly 
captured by the limited and simplistic language and 
framework of human rights. Questions of social justice are 
infinitely more complicated and complex than instances 
of censorship, torture or arbitrary arrests that can readily 
be identified as human rights abuses. There is no set and 
agreed upon universal formula for alleviating poverty, and 
in democracies political parties and the electorate will have 
legitimate differences of opinion on how to achieve social 
justice and how to resolve the inevitable trade-offs and 
priorities involved in matters of economic and social policy. 
Amnesty’s approach thus seems to prove right veteran 
human rights defender (and contributor to this essay 
volume) Aryeh Neier (2013), who recently argued against 
social justice, insisting instead that: 
“Human rights, in my understanding of the concept, 
are a series of limits on the exercise of power. The 
state and those holding the power of states are 
forbidden to interfere with freedom of inquiry or 
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arbitrarily. They are prohibited from denying each 
person the right to count equally and to obtain the 
equal protection of the laws. They are denied the 
power to inflict cruelty. And they must respect a zone 
of privacy.”
The way forward
The lesson of these findings is not that we should be 
indifferent to the plight of the poor or abandon the quest 
for social justice, but rather that human rights are a 
blunt and ineffective instrument for alleviating poverty, 
or securing access to health and education. Human rights 
can help shine a light on, and remedy, instances of clear 
abuse, including in the economic and social domain such 
as large-scale forced evictions, policies of deliberate 
food deprivation (think North Korea and Ethiopia), or 
discrimination in access to health and education. They 
cannot, however, deal efficiently with the complexities of 
general policies on health, education and poverty. 
However, it would be mistaken to conclude that turning our 
backs on a rights-based approach to health, education and 
poverty also means turning our backs on the sick, illiterate 
and poor. It is not that these goods are any less important 
than free speech or the prohibition against torture. But the 
inherent complexity of these goods makes human rights 
ill-suited to provide them for those in need. 
What the human rights movement has succeeded 
spectacularly in, is to provide the basic framework that 
allow those in civil society who care about poverty, health 
and education to campaign, disseminate ideas, hold 
political leaders accountable and ultimately achieve 
political change. As such, human rights activists help 
provide the platform for social justice activists, who can 
then use their skills and expertise campaigning for their 
vision of the good global society. But by using ‘human 
rights’ to solve other vital policy questions, those who care 
most about the poor may actually be making things worse. 
Against a human rights-based approach to social justice 
59Changing perspectives on human rights
Can human rights bring social justice? Twelve essays Can human rights bring social justice? Twelve essays 
Will human rights help us get social justice? Since the 
world in recent years has been shaken by protests, this 
question is on the minds of activists. But is it on the 
agendas of human rights institutions? This essay looks at 
contradictions between human rights and social justice 
frameworks and offers perspectives on possible synergies.
Introduction
Is the pursuit of human rights an effective way to achieve 
social justice? This important question is on the minds of 
forward-looking activists. After all, in recent years the world 
has been shaken by protests demanding real democracy and 
justice for socioeconomic grievances. Research I have been 
involved with on protests and political participation has 
examined the grievances and demands expressed in almost 
nine hundred protests between 2006-2013 in countries 
representing more than 90 per cent of world population 
and encompassing a wide spectrum of governments, from 
centralized, authoritarian regimes to democracies, both old 
and new (Ortiz et al. 2013, Burke, 2014). Protests against 
antisocial economic policies and for meaningful democracy 
topped the findings (See Fig. 1). These protests came in 
many forms: the violent (riots for safe and affordable food, 
water and fuel), the traditional (campaigns to reform 
public services and pensions, create good jobs and better 
labour conditions, enact progressive taxation and fiscal 
spending, undertake land reform), and the innovative (mass 
occupations of civic spaces demanding regime change and 
the elimination of inequality). 
While a number of protests framed grievances as at least 
partly rights-based, the majority, and especially those 
aimed at changing the economic system and its policies, 
have not pursued their aims in terms of human rights 
mechanisms, but instead with direct demands in the 
streets and on the Internet for better wages, good and 
affordable housing, fuel, transportation, education, health 
care, food, water and other needs. In addition to numerous 
practical demands on the economic system, many of 
these protests also voice overarching grievances against 
that very system, and in particular its production and 
reproduction of debt and inequality. Social movements for 
economic justice have demanded real democracy alongside 
almost every economic demand, recognizing that without 
meaningful political participation they will not have a say 
in the economic decisions that affect their lives. Without 
a system of meaningful political representation, there is 
little incentive for them to undertake the difficult process of 
legal redress because the very governments that carry out 
antisocial economic policies are the same ones entrusted 
with guaranteeing rights, and this would often have to 
be done against the wishes of powerful private interests. 
Consequently, not only those living in poverty, but even the 
middle classes increasingly take direct action for economic 
justice. If we are interested in learning how to achieve 
social justice in everyday life and not only in norms, we 
should grapple with this wave of direct action and what it 
says about the relationship between formal human rights 
and social justice. 
Conditions for social justice
The dominant approaches to human rights from the 
fields of law and political science emphasize formal 
legal mechanisms and norms embodied in the system of 
sovereign states and voluntary institutions of international 
cooperation, beginning with the United Nations and 
including its various agencies, committees and regional 
bodies. Legal experts in these institutions write the human 
Sara Burke
Will human rights help us get social justice?
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rights laws, treaties, charters and conventions and 
diplomats in governments negotiate them. It is then up 
to national states – on the presumption that they are the 
legitimate bodies to mediate and regulate citizen’s affairs 
– to guarantee and enforce them. The problem is, efforts 
to realize specific human rights are frequently propelled by 
social movements in opposition to the very states charged 
with safeguarding rights, often with powerful private 
interests in the background. In such a scenario, social 
justice remains elusive.
The term ‘justice’ appears just once in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, in the preamble, where 
it is deemed – along with freedom and peace – to be 
the foundation of human dignity and equal rights. 
Contemporary debates about global justice begin with John 
Rawls’ A theory of justice, which assumes the existence of 
a market economy and takes as given the possibility for 
stable economic equilibria in a capitalist system (Rawls 
1971). In a critique and extension of Rawls’ theory, Thomas 
Pogge argues that global justice must be understood as 
social justice, meaning it is an assessment of the social 
impact of institutions and rules rather than a judgement of 
individual behaviour (Pogge 2010). To assess the conditions 
and prospects for social justice we need to ask whether the 
system and institutions presently in place are providing – 
or are capable of providing – social justice for the world’s 
people. Pogge claims the current global institutional 
arrangements actually cause harm because they perpetuate 
rules whose foreseeable and avoidable results produce 
poverty and result in the deaths of innocent people (Pogge 
2002). This claim is bolstered by the heterodox economic 
literature – from Epstein and Axtell’s computational, agent-
based “Sugarscape” models to Duménil and Lévy’s analysis 
of the rise of finance within neoliberal arrangements – 
which challenges notions that a deregulated, profit-based 
economic system, embedded in a complex society, can 
reliably produce a stable economic order (Epstein & Axtell 
1996; Duménil & Lévy 2011). Indeed, falling wages and 
shrinking pensions in many countries have led to decades 
of rising inequalities and fewer opportunities for decent 
work and full engagement in society, especially for youth. 
Protests against economic policies in recent years have 
been most numerous in relation to subsidies, especially 
threats to remove food or fuel subsidies, although a great 
number also relate to labour compensation and safety 
regulations in the workplace, to taxes and financial 
regulation, and to fiscal and social security policies (Burke 
2014). Chief among the institutional targets of these 
protests are the International Monetary Fund and European 
Central Bank, widely perceived as the chief architects and 
advocates of fiscal austerity since 2010. Societal targets 
include corporations and elites, including the financial 
sector, whose privilege and influence they widely denounce 
(Ortiz et al. 2013). 
A number of scholars have noted that while the human 
rights framework has near universal acceptance by states, 
those very states – especially powerful ones like the US, 
Russia and China – have poor rates of compliance with 
international law. A political economy of human rights that 
analyses rights violations under economic neoliberalism 
can offer some explanation why this is so. Viewing human 
rights as a dynamic field of social struggle rather than 
a static, legal construct, a critical perspective reveals 
that globalization since the 1970s has produced a deep 
restructuring of the international economic system in line 
with the needs of powerful corporate actors, resulting in 
vastly increased financialization and rising income and 
wealth disparities (Duménil & Lévy 2011; Stiglitz 2012). 
The influence that international economic restructuring 
has had on the field of human rights should not be 
underestimated. In their book, Human rights enterprise, 
critical sociologists Armaline, Glasberg and Purkayastha 
(2015: 72) argue that the process of actually realizing 
human rights is a dialectic between formal mechanisms 
and movements, acting not only against violations by 
the state but also by the private sector: “[H]uman rights 
violations resulting from the Great Recession were not 
simply or even primarily violations by the state … but 
rather violations prompted by private economic actors 
(corporations) alone and in concert with or enabled by the 
state and its policymaking power.” Can human rights be 
effective against such adversaries when their economic 
interests are on the line? Advancing an analysis of the 
political economy against the ideology of economic 
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orthodoxy – with its imperatives that take on the patina of 
natural law: to prioritize growth, deregulate, maintain low 
debt-to-GDP ratios, and uphold the rights of creditors and 
the privileges of private interests in the global and national 
economies. 
The connection between human rights 
and social justice 
Despite the fact that human rights and social justice have 
similar goals, since both advance a critical/aspirational 
vision for a better world based upon peace and justice, 
there are numerous problems with framing the link between 
them as causal, implying that human rights is a language, 
or mechanism, for achieving social justice. First of all, in 
spite of the principle that all human rights are indivisible 
and interdependent, the human rights field does not have a 
unified approach. Progress in civil and political rights, the 
so-called ‘first-generation’ human rights, such as rights to 
assembly, speech and religion, is based upon monitoring 
the presence or absence of negative outcomes like wrongful 
incarceration and censorship (OHCHR 2012). Determining 
whether civil or political rights have been violated is a 
relatively unambiguous process compared to making that 
determination with regard to economic, social and cultural 
rights, the ‘second-generation’ of human rights. Second-
generation rights are seen in the dominant framework as 
following the first in progressive realization over time. In 
the case of economic rights in particular, the indicators of 
progress can be exceedingly technical – the antithesis of 
language used by protesters demanding economic justice – 
and its practitioners, embedded in and therefore inevitably 
prone to blind spots in their analysis of the very institutions, 
policies and practices that make up their work.
The historical roots of this bifurcated vision of human rights 
lie in the cold war. Early on in the development of human 
rights principles and instruments, sharp disagreements 
arose between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The US promoted as human rights the very political 
rights enshrined in the US constitution and by liberal 
democracy, such as the right to vote and freedom of speech 
and religion, whereas the Soviet Union promoted social 
and economic rights central to a socialist organization 
of society, such as the rights to health care, work and 
education (Posner 2014). The historical disagreement over 
the relationship between rights and justice is reflected 
today in the contradictory perspectives on social and 
economic institutions held by the activists for human 
rights and social justice, on the one hand – let’s call them 
participatistas – and the institutional representatives of 
human rights bodies and organizations – institutionalists – 
on the other hand (Heller 2012). 
Unlike institutionalists, participatistas value the ‘expertise’ 
of life-experience over technical mastery, which gives them 
greater legitimacy to voice the grievances and aspirations 
of social movements than institutional representatives, who 
are unable to account for the historical lack of progress in 
achieving universal human rights. Coming from decentralized 
groups of citizens, non-citizens, even whole communities 
with shared grievances, activists operate in a political 
space more liquid than the system of sovereign states 
and international organizations. While they do sometimes 
petition nation states and intergovernmental bodies, they 
also embrace direct action within and across borders and in 
confrontation with non-state actors to attain social justice. 
Recent examples include the Summer of Rights in Brazil 
(2013), Istanbul’s Right to the City movement around Gezi 
Park in Turkey (2013), the Pro-Democracy movement in Hong 
Kong (2014), and Black Lives Matter, opposing structural 
violence against black men in the United States (2014-15). 
Influential human rights groups walk a fine line with regard 
to their ‘street credibility’ among such activists, and their 
perceived legitimacy rises and falls to the degree that these 
actors are predominantly seen supporting activism or being 
fixtures in the apparatus of human rights.
Since 2001, the World Social Forum, the quintessential 
vision of international social movements in action, has 
proclaimed “another world is possible”. But ‘no justice, 
no peace’ has emerged as the means for extracting 
accountability from individual governments, international 
financial institutions, powerful corporations, and even the 
system as a whole. Activists for human rights and social 
justice do not necessarily accept the need for a capitalist 
market economy – although the international system on 
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which human rights is built takes that as a given. Those 
who allow for a market or mixed economy assume it has 
to be regulated and supervised to produce socially just 
outcomes. Since orthodox economics promotes imperatives 
like the need for economic growth, for deep involvement 
of the private sector in development, and for discounting 
the social outcomes of increased financialization, it also 
remains unchallenged in the dominant discourse on human 
rights. It is therefore necessary to take a different approach 
to link with social movements, which have long attributed 
economic injustice to the concentration of corporate power 
and the inequality it generates. Rather than an externality 
or aberration, it is seen as a logical outcome of the way a 
global, capitalist economy works.
Rights + riots: toward synergy?
In November 2014 I had the opportunity to organize 
a workshop with strategists from social and political 
movements, social and political scientists in academia, 
and government representatives and their advisers on 
internal and external conflicts and democratic dialogue. 
All were invited because of their work on protests or protest 
movements; all were appreciated for speaking their minds 
on several occasions in which the discussion became 
heated. The idea we wrestled with in the workshop can be 
summed up in the following question: “Is this phenomenon 
in the streets a protest to express aspirations, grievances 
and demands, or is it conflict to be managed or subdued?” 
Because the agency of the one considering the question 
strongly conditions the answer, we were largely in agreement 
that institutional frameworks for conflict resolution and 
democratic dialogue often answer differently than protesters 
themselves. The framework for institutions presupposed 
external agents – experts – who managed episodes of 
protest in order to achieve a state of security and stability. 
The case for protesters, and those of us in the meeting 
with one foot in an institution and one in the streets, was 
different. We discussed how protesters act as ‘experts’ on 
their own behalf and for the transformation of their own 
reality, even in the case of riots and violent protests, which 
can be understood as expressions of injustice and demands 
for its reversal (Burke 2014).
The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in the UK, along 
with academic and activist partners in India and Africa, 
completed a fascinating report in late 2014 on “Food Riots 
and Food Rights” which Naomi Hossain presented at the 
workshop (Hossain et al. 2014). The two-year study on which 
the report was based started by looking at the year 2007, 
when global food prices began to rise sharply after having 
been low for twenty to thirty years, and ended in 2012, a 
six-year period that produced a number of food-related 
struggles around the world. On average food prices have 
been high ever since 2007, and volatile, provoking riots 
linked to higher food prices in more than thirty countries. 
The IDS research was in part a response to media and 
academic bias in the coverage and analysis of food protests. 
An interesting revelation provided by the political event-
catalogues compiled by the research team from local, 
national and international newspapers was that food riots 
almost always happened somewhere else. In other words, 
the Indian press found food riots in Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and Nepal, but none in India. Or when the international 
press reported food riots in Bangladesh, none were noted 
in the Bangladeshi press, and so on. They found that both 
journalists and researchers tended either to focus in an 
unbalanced way on the violence associated with the riots 
or to vilify the protesters and caricature their demands. 
The problem with this, as the report’s lead author Naomi 
Hossain (2015) put it: “People don’t just go out and riot 
because prices are high and they want the government to 
do something. They do it because they think they have some 
moral justification.” During this time period there was also a 
growing global movement on the right to food, so in addition 
to analysing the different ideas, ideologies, motivations and 
meanings of the riots, researchers wanted to compare the 
two phenomena. Riots are ostensibly spontaneous, violent 
and unruly, while the right to food movement uses legal 
instruments and more polite civil-society discourse, but both 
have an ethical and moral underpinning.
Their findings showed that these episodes of struggle to 
secure basic economic goods – especially food and water 
– are almost always going on around what historians 
call the ‘politics of provision’, but are only visible when 
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there are protests. Protests invoke the ‘moral economy’, 
a common, strongly-felt sense that states are ultimately 
responsible for protecting the right to fundamental needs 
like food, however that ‘right’ is conceived, since it is not 
only in the legal but also in the moral sense that this is 
a shared expectation. The study revealed that during a 
food price spike, people share an understanding that the 
system is unfair and rigged in favour of the biggest market 
participants, so the government must come in to protect 
ordinary people. Because of this, while demands advanced 
in the heat of a food riot may not be sophisticated or 
articulate, they nevertheless communicate the grievance 
well enough to get action from governments. This was one 
of the surprising outcomes of the study: that riots work. But 
if rioting is seen as a way to hold governments accountable 
for a morally charged issue like hunger and food security, 
what role do, can, and should human rights play?
A new agenda for human rights 
institutions?
Since the economic crisis of 2007-2008, social movements 
have significantly shifted the discourse on social justice 
issues: consider the effect the Occupy movement had on the 
public discussion of inequality. Better synergy between the 
institutions of human rights and activists would require a 
deeper shift of discourse, something able to be translated 
into new institutional designs. According to sociologist 
Patrick Heller, who also participated in the workshop on 
protest and conflict, this is what European social democracy 
forged during decades of working-class mobilization, war 
and revolutionary moments, resulting in an institutionalized 
but fairly effective welfare state (Heller 2015). 
Clearly the present situation – especially for developing 
countries – does not mirror the historical/political setting 
of Europe in this era of worker-led struggles, so the process 
to create new and reformed institutions would be different, 
but it would benefit from the cooperation of the institutions 
of human rights and activists in social movements. Heller 
offers a view of how such collaboration might look via the 
experience of the Sanitaristas, a contentious, grassroots 
movement of doctors and nurses in Brazil who set out to 
penetrate state institutions in order to solve the seemingly 
intractable problem of health care delivery in their country. 
Through their participatory process and militancy, they 
were able to establish universal primary health care, a 
goal that still eludes the US (Heller 2013). This experience 
shows that movements can scale up their work and create 
new institutions for the provision of social justice, but to do 
so they need platforms for action and organization, which 
the larger movement for participatory governance in Brazil 
since the end of authoritarian rule in 1985 provided. This is 
also where the human rights movement can play a critical 
role in helping movements to achieve social justice in 
everyday life, by challenging the global human rights regime, 
especially big NGOs and the intergovernmental bodies for 
human rights, to attune their agendas to the issues from the 
streets. Institutional change will require a new era, beyond 
representation for those whose rights are denied, and toward 
the creation of more democratic platforms, in which people 
and communities speak for themselves.
64Changing perspectives on human rights
Can human rights bring social justice? Twelve essays 
Will human rights help us get social justice?
05 0 100 150 200 250 300
Economic justice and austerity







Fuel and energy prices
Food prices
Housing



























                      271
     89
  82
     90
         63
    53
         30
         30
           32
         30
10
        234
    124
            72
               79
      23
           34
 13
      23
    17
                       234
0
         64
             37
     17
 12
7
     190
      55
              41
            36
         27
       23
 12




0     50         100               150    200          250               300
Figure 1: Grievances and demands driving world protests, 2006-2013
Source: Author’s own graph of data from the 2014 research and update to data set conducted by Burke S., M. Berrada, V. Rubio, Y. Cai, 
A. Heisig, originally compiled by Ortiz, I., S. Burke, M. Berrada & H. Cortes (2013) as analysed in ‘World Protests 2006-2013’, Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York.
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How are social justice and human 
rights related? Four traps to avoid
How are social justice and human rights related? I share 
reflections on the cooperation between FIAN International, 
as a human rights organization, and social justice 
movements. I draw attention to four traps, how human 
rights can be misunderstood or misused and then serve 
as obstacles to social justice. Moreover I suggest some 
directions to how human rights organizations can overcome 
such obstacles to pursue social justice. 
The struggle for agrarian reform as a 
struggle for social justice and human 
rights 
A classical social justice issue has been redistributive 
agrarian reform – at least in the world of the peasants 
and landless people. Some of the first cases of FIAN 
International back in 1986, when this human rights 
organization was founded, dealt with landless peasants in 
Brazil struggling for agrarian reform through occupation 
of large vacant estates. Agrarian reform can be seen 
as an emblematic social justice policy: Overcoming an 
unacceptable distribution of productive resources and 
control in the hands of the few – and addressing an 
unsustainable mode of production. How can a human rights 
organization work for agrarian reform – and how can it 
relate to the social movements that are the protagonists in 
the related land struggles? 
In Brazil the Landless Peasants’ Movement – in order 
to speed up the Brazilian government’s agrarian reform 
programme – had developed a method of “ocupar-resistir-
producir”: (i) Identifying an idle estate fulfilling the criteria 
for expropriation in the context of the agrarian reform 
programme, occupying this estate with a large number of 
peasant families, successfully; (ii) resisting attempts of 
the landlords/speculators and their paramilitary forces (or 
sometimes the police) to regain control over the estate; 
and (iii) starting to produce food on the estate. These 
cases raised human rights issues across the board – from 
economic and social rights to civil rights and the right to 
property (see below – Trap 4).
In 1996 La Via Campesina (LVC) and FIAN International 
launched a joint Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform. LVC 
and FIAN have been two rather unequal partners. LVC is 
a coalition of mass-based organizations of peasants and 
other rural people – meanwhile the biggest rural social 
movement in the world. FIAN International is a medium 
size membership based human rights organization – with 
no ambition to organize the affected people as social 
movements do. As a human rights organization, FIAN 
International has been using the concept of human rights 
and – as far as possible – human rights law (and fora) 
to address cases in a large variety of contexts where and 
when the right to adequate food gets violated. Moreover, 
FIAN has been involved in bringing about new instruments 
related to the human right to adequate food (the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, the FAO Right to Food Guidelines, 
the FAO Tenure Guidelines). 
How has FIAN been working with human rights in the 
context of agrarian reform? The answer to this question 
is reflected in a wealth of literature that you will find 
on www.fian.org searching for ‘agrarian reform’. In a 
nutshell: FIAN looked at the human right to adequate 
food always in the sense of the interrelatedness of all 
human rights – holistically. The term ‘right to feed 
oneself’ was coined by FIAN as a combination of the 
rights to adequate food and freedom from hunger (art. 
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11 ICESCR) and the right to earn one’s living by freely 
chosen work (art. 6 ICESCR). Aspects of the right to health 
(art. 12 ICESCR) (with a view to unhealthy industry food) 
was also brought to bear for agrarian reform. So was 
sustainability as non-discrimination of future generations 
(in line with art. 2(2) ICESCR). People’s right to self-
determination was brought in from art. 1 of the ICESCR 
to underline that food dependency undermines peoples’ 
self-determination. FIAN has been emphasizing the rights 
of women – agrarian reform must not mean patriarchal 
forms of traditional European peasant agriculture. FIAN 
drew from the mentioned human rights its analysis of the 
states’ obligations for the cases at hand. FIAN used not only 
international law, but also obligations of Brazil in national 
law along with evidence why agrarian reform measures are 
an obligatory policy for Brazil. 
FIAN did its human rights advocacy mainly in the ‘resistir’ 
part of the movement’s strategy. These were situations 
of conflict where human rights and constitutional rights 
were important both in the political struggles and in the 
negotiations between the peasants and the state. Besides 
defending the civil rights of persecuted peasant activists, 
FIAN provided human rights arguments that allowed 
to judge whether state policies and measures in these 
agrarian reform conflicts were appropriate or not. The fact 
that such analysis of human rights law came from on 
international organization without a direct stake in these 
conflicts added to the strength of these arguments. 
FIAN is not a solidarity organization, but a human rights 
organization. It cooperates with La Via Campesina and 
other movements, because FIAN believes that they address 
key issues from its mandate and are involved in conflicts 
that are relevant for the realization of human rights. I am 
inclined to consider social movements as some sort of 
human rights organizations in a broad sense – at least to 
the extent that these movements base their struggle not 
(alone) on the legitimate interests of their constituencies, 
but on human rights values. Human rights organizations 
in the narrow sense, like FIAN or Habitat International 
Coalition (HIC), for example, are organizations that seek to 
develop and implement human rights law and contribute to 
its enforcement and thereby contribute – in this example 
– to the advancement of the human right to adequate food 
or housing. Social justice movements and human rights 
organizations are complementary. 
FIAN’s basic solidarity with oppressed groups is not put 
in question by the fact that FIAN does not support all their 
demands. The call for the resignation of an agrarian reform 
minister, for example, would be a demand that FIAN would 
not necessarily support. Not because FIAN considers such de-
mands unjustified, but because it may have no human rights 
law argument to support these demands in the case at hand.
The crucial issue with human rights advocacy in social 
justice contexts is to identify states’ obligations in human 
rights that support demands of the social movements at 
this moment. The states’ obligation to reform agrarian 
systems so that they provide an adequate standard of living 
for local populations while at the same time ensuring that 
people can earn their living in dignity, can be derived from 
the ICESCR and supports landless peasants’ demands for 
land and suitable agrarian policies. When demands get 
very specific, however, in a concrete case of land occupation 
or agrarian reform legislation, the problem can be in the 
details. Human rights are no mechanism that can replace 
political discussion, public debate and parliament. States 
do have a considerable ‘level of discretion’, in particular in 
their obligations to fulfil, for example around agrarian reform. 
This level of discretion has its limits. Human rights provide 
a ‘corridor’ for agrarian policies; if agrarian policies imply 
that large parts of the rural population are without land, 
and without work in dignity, such policies breach states’ 
obligations under human rights. 
Human rights organizations in the field of social justice do 
‘advocacy’ with human rights. Like all ‘advocates’ they are 
not meant to be impartial – they are not judges. Human 
rights organizations use human rights and human rights 
law to serve the cause of the oppressed groups and persons 
they cooperate with – and in this manner advance the 
realization of human rights. Investors sometimes also use 
human rights arguments – mostly related to the human 
right to property. 
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human rights documents of the 18th century in France (and 
America). The Preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights retains that: “... it is essential, if man 
is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, 
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that humans 
rights should be protected by the rule of law.” Human 
rights – as criteria for legitimacy of states – are superior 
to states. Therefore state-made law (positive law) – be it 
through constitution, national legislation or international 
treaty – is at best a means to protect human rights, but 
does not generate them. 
Human rights are constitutional for setting up a legitimate 
state – and for replacing a state by a new one, if it turns 
illegitimate. Human rights are meant to ensure that states 
meet the related obligations. This implies that human 
rights obligations are to be enforced, hence they are law.1 
As human rights are law, but not positive law, and they 
are superior to positive law, human rights obligations are 
‘supra-positive law’ with human rights inherent in people. 
The related philosophical, spiritual and religious questions 
are interesting, but beyond the scope of this essay. 
Moreover, we should recall that it was not the philosophers, 
or lawyers for that matter, who were vital for putting 
human rights on the political agenda. It was political 
activists, people like Lafayette, Jefferson, Paine. Economic, 
social and cultural human rights in particular have to re-
enter the political agendas. And for this to occur, human 
rights organizations should move such debates forward. 
Portraying human rights as non-political misses the point, 
both conceptually and historically. This can turn social 
justice movements away from human rights.
1  In a first approximation, law consists of rules that 
should be enforced (while moral duties do not). A legal 
obligation linked to a right should not only be enforced, 
but provide for mechanisms for rights-holders to enforce 
them. Therefore it is already clear from the observation that 
morals are built on duties and that ‘moral rights’ is a self-
contradicting term.
Making an analysis of the related human rights obligations 
of states can be of value for social movements to 
advance their cause – for example when it comes to the 
expropriations of a large estate. Landowners can fight 
such expropriations usually before the courts. Courts have 
to interpret national law with a view to the international 
(and national) human rights obligations of their state – 
where the human right to property of the landowner could 
stand against the human right to an adequate standard of 
living of the landless peasants. If the case makes it to the 
Supreme Court, this can be crucial. This legal background 
has its parallels in the political struggles going on in the 
media and in negotiations. Judges and movements can 
benefit from arguments that clarify the states’ obligations 
linked to the human rights of landless peasants. 
As a social movement, LVC struggles on the basis of its 
own concepts, strategies and demands growing out of 
the experience of its members, its internal political and 
policy debates, and the needs of the hour. The key concept 
developed by LVC is food sovereignty. It includes the human 
right to adequate food, but only as one of several elements. 
Human rights are important for LVC, but not the main plank 
of its struggles. 
Human right advocacy has to shape up in order to improve its 
value for the struggle for social justice. I address a few pro-
blematic developments in the human rights community that 
can hamper the efficiency of human rights and the work of 
human rights organizations. These developments pose traps 
for social movements, and for human rights themselves. 
Trap 1: Depolitization
Human rights legitimize, instruct and limit the powers 
of the state. They are highly political and give rise to 
fundamental questions about society. Human rights 
organizations should be open to such debates as long as 
human rights provide the key terms of reference. What is 
essential about human rights is primarily not the right, but 
the related states’ obligations. If states breach their related 
obligations beyond a certain threshold, they have forgone 
their legitimacy and are ripe for revolution (or secession). 
These were essentially the arguments of the revolutionary 
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Trap 2: Mistaking human rights law for 
human rights
Another reason why social movements may have doubts 
about making human rights the main plank of their 
struggles has to do with the fact that human rights 
organizations and human rights lawyers very often refer 
to positive law – the law made by states. Undernourished 
landless peasants in front of fences that excluded them 
from vast stretches of idle lands in the hands of an 
absentee landlord do not feel they need the state to tell 
them what their human rights are – and whether they have 
a right to land to feed themselves or not. The constant 
reference of human rights organizations and lawyers to 
human rights law (treaties, legislation, mechanisms etc.) 
can create the false impression that human rights were 
granted or agreed by states. In reality the key feature of 
human rights is that they are ‘supra-positive’ law – i.e. law 
that is not made by states, but emanates from the people 
and has to shape the state. Human rights law is positive 
law meant to make states’ human rights obligations (in 
the sense of supra-positive law) enforceable through legal 
mechanisms. In this process a written interpretation of 
human rights (human rights law) can facilitate the work 
of judges, police and administration. These interpretations 
under human rights law can be incomplete, biased or 
misleading. Even parliamentary states can fail to properly 
implement human rights in positive law – and/or to enforce 
the related law. This is a painful experience of many social 
justice movements.
It is not unusual that human rights are identified with 
human rights law. Such identification coincides with an 
ideological position that sees only positive law as law. Legal 
positivism is a deadly threat for human rights themselves. 
As legal positivism claims that there is no law beyond 
positive law, it claims that there is no supra-positive law. 
It therefore claims that there are no human rights – or that 
human rights are only ‘language’ and the related states’ 
obligations only moral. 
Trap 3: Reducing rights to morals
Social justice includes the full realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights. One of the standard attacks 
by privileged elites on these human rights has been to 
avoid taking them seriously as rights, and see them only 
as morally laudable aspirations: The idea that the poor 
landless peasants should have access to ‘excess lands’ is 
shared even by the Brazilian upper landowning class. The 
landlords would certainly agree to some moral duty of the 
state to provide such access. (In fact, one reaction of the 
Brazilian government to the landless peasants’ call for 
land redistribution was to set up colonization programmes 
for them in the Amazone.) The landlords had great difficulty 
understanding that their own land was ‘excess land’ and 
that Brazil had a legal obligation to expropriate and (re)
distribute. The landlords saw ‘their’ right to property as 
law – as something that needs to get enforced. When the 
Brazilian state advanced its agrarian reform policies, the 
landlords organized rural militia to exercise force to protect 
their property, where the state did not exercise it. On the 
contrary, the exercise of force against landlords resisting 
agrarian reform has been very rare, even though such use 
of force would have been legitimate to protect a human 
right. It surely makes a difference whether a state action is 
a moral duty or a legal obligation.
Unfortunately, the human rights community itself 
contributes to the undermining of human rights as rights. 
The term human right is a homonym – one word with 
two meanings. It describes both the object of the human 
right, also called the human rights value (say – access 
to adequate food), and the right itself (the totality of 
all state obligations related to access to adequate food 
and to the mechanisms for the rights-holder to obtain 
remedy in case these obligations are breached). Human 
rights obligations are binding rules for states to avoid 
and prevent harm to human rights values (respect- and 
protect-obligations) and to put an end to deficiencies in 
human rights values (via fulfil-obligations).2 In normal 
language we use human rights both for the human rights 
values and for the right itself. We can go on using human 
rights as a homonym, but we should know what we are 
2  These obligations being rules entails that human rights 
obligations can be breached even if no damage will be 
incurred or maintained in a specific case. 
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doing: When are we talking about a right and when about 
a value?
A violation of a human right is a breach of a human rights 
obligation. A violation is therefore always an act or omis-
sion by a state – not a situation of deficiency in a human 
rights value. Nevertheless a deficient human rights value is 
sometimes called a violation of human rights. Hunger, for 
example, indicates a deficient human rights value (lacking 
freedom from hunger), but is not necessarily a human rights 
violation. Of course, hunger can be the result of violations 
(and very often is), but sometimes even the best governments 
in the world will be unable to prevent hunger. Then there is 
no human rights violation involved here. The identification of 
a violation therefore requires an analysis of state obligations 
and action or inaction in the respective case – a political and 
legal analysis. This, however, is what social justice move-
ments (and human rights organizations) have to do anyways.
As a consequence of using ‘human right’ where ‘human 
rights value’ is meant, ‘violation’ is used, where ‘deficiency’ 
of a human rights value is meant. With this language, 
human rights violations ‘lead to’ violations. This is not only 
confusing, but counterproductive, as it trivializes human 
rights and distracts from the real issue: An analysis of 
states’ breaches of obligations – and how these obligations 
can be enforced by the rights holder. Otherwise we are not 
talking any longer about rights and law, but about morals 
in a ‘rights language’. Human rights, however, are not a 
language to talk about something that could also be talked 
about in different terms (social justice, ‘development’, ethics 
etc.). Reducing rights (in particular the underdeveloped 
economic, social and cultural rights) to a language on 
morals, plays in the hands of socially oppressive elites. 
Trap 4: Misusing the human right to 
property 
Previous sections already touched upon the use – or rather 
misuse – of the human right to property as an obstacle to 
social justice. The right to property does not seem to be 
very prominent as a human right. It was not even included 
in the international human rights covenants of 1966, even 
though it was mentioned in the Universal Declaration. 
Nevertheless, the right to property has become one of the 
best implemented human rights in positive law – at least 
when it comes to the protection of rich people’s formalized 
property. Property is not an absolute value, but receives its 
legitimacy and its limits from its usefulness for the other 
‘absolute’ human rights values such as access to food 
and water, physical integrity, political participation etc. 
Accordingly, property can be dealt with very differently in 
different societies. The capitalist concept of property is just 
one mode of property – and its coherence with absolute 
human rights values remains questionable. 
States are duty-bound by human rights obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil the right to property as long as it 
is coherent with absolute human rights values. What is all 
too often overlooked is the States’ human rights obligation 
to fulfil poor people’s access to property, in particular 
property to feed themselves, to house themselves, to enjoy 
an adequate standard of living, and to participate in the 
political life of their communities. Agrarian reform in Brazil 
could be seen as a fulfilment programme under the right to 
property for landless peasants. 
The human right to property with its biased interpretation 
has been one of the reasons why considerable parts of the 
socialist movement have been remained skeptical about 
human rights and their positive role in promoting social 
justice. 
Conclusion 
Economic, social and cultural human rights provide a 
legal framework for states obligations on social justice 
issues. Social justice needs to get institutionalized and this 
requires properly functioning states and their cooperation, 
based on human rights.
Human rights are of considerable value for social (justice) 
movements: When confronting states’ authorities, they also 
confront their interpretations of law. In such situations it 
helps to point to states’ human rights obligations, codified 
or not, for example concerning the validity or legitimacy 
of certain policy measures or interventions in areas of 
social justice. Using human rights is not ‘legalistic’ – even 
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though human rights are rights in law not in ‘language’. 
Human rights can be an important element to strengthen 
the position of a struggling movement. 
A number of traps, such as depolitization, legal positivism, 
moralization, and a misunderstood right to property can be 
important obstacles for social justice and the effectiveness 
of human rights. Human rights organizations and social 
justice movements should be aware of these traps.
Human rights organizations engaging in social justice 
issues should clearly see their role and limitations.        
They can provide advocacy and advance human rights law 
and the implementation of human rights, but must never 
speak in the name of affected people or social movements. 
Each human rights organization stands for all human 
rights, even if it has – for practical purposes – only 
a limited mandate. The indivisibility of human rights 
translates into the indivisibility of human rights discourses. 
The related political debates should therefore be a matter of 
interest for all human rights organizations.
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Doutje Lettinga and Lars van Troost
Justice over rights?
Over time, Amnesty International has increasingly used 
social justice language and methods in its work on 
social and economic rights. Should social justice, the fair 
distribution of wealth, resources and power, become its 
goal? And what are the potentials and pitfalls of different 
approaches to social justice?
Introduction
In 2009, the then Secretary General of Amnesty International 
wrote: “[b]illions of people are suffering from insecurity, 
injustice and indignity. This is a human rights crisis… The 
world needs a different kind of leadership, a different kind 
of politics as well as economics – something that works 
for all and not just for a favoured few” (Khan 2009a: 5). In 
her essay, the opening contribution to Amnesty’s annual 
report in 2009, Irene Khan disapproved strongly of “the 
collusion between business and state to deprive people of 
their land and natural resources and impoverish them” (ibid: 
8). Although the essay was not particularly clear about the 
nature of the changes Khan was advocating, human rights 
were certainly a central part of them. In a press release rich 
in eschatological language (“the world is sitting on a social, 
political and economic time bomb”) that accompanied 
Amnesty’s annual report, the Secretary General warned that 
“the world needs a new global deal on human rights – not 
paper promises”, after which she called on the US to ratify 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and on China to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Amnesty International 2009). Khan 
might have been convinced of the need for radical changes to 
the economic and political structures of the world, but for the 
moment Amnesty had little that was revolutionary or, for that 
matter, even reformist to offer.
Although Amnesty has been working for more than a 
decade on economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR), 
we believe that Khan’s call for structural political and 
economic changes is a far cry from the minimalistic, 
anti-utopian anti-politics that is characteristic of much 
of the human rights activism since the 1970s (Moyn 
2010). Regardless of whether one supports or disagrees 
with the idea that Amnesty should start tackling the 
root causes of human rights abuse and engaging with 
distributive questions, assuming that social justice 
issues and human rights are one and the same thing 
ignores some of the conceptual and strategic differences 
between both concepts, which are described by other 
authors in this volume (see in particular the essays of 
Sara Burke, Dan Chong, Jacob Mchangama, Samuel Moyn 
and Aryeh Neier).
In this essay, we will show that, over time, Amnesty has 
tended to ‘delegalize’ human rights discourse, seemingly 
preferring a moral and increasingly political understanding 
of human rights over a strictly legal approach. The 
organization has also adopted new methods that focus 
on the empowerment and participation of rights holders, 
a move that correlates with an increasing interest in 
social justice through its work on social and economic 
rights. We will argue that if Amnesty chooses to work 
more progressively on social justice issues, it needs to 
take account of and openly discuss the trade-offs and 
consequences of such a decision – as well as of a decision 
not to do so. We end the essay by sketching four possible 
approaches to social justice, describing in broad outlines 
the potential and pitfalls of each approach. 
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Amnesty and social justice language 
and methods
For a long time, leading international human rights 
organizations prioritized civil and political rights over ESCR. 
Social justice groups and local rights groups have equally 
long pushed them to start working on poverty, economic 
inequality and access to services. During the late 1980s and 
the 1990s, international human rights organizations started 
to respond to these calls by expanding their mandates 
to include ESCR. During the same period, a rights-based 
approach to development became popular within certain 
social justice and humanitarian organizations. Consequently, 
strategies and methods used by social justice and human 
rights groups have merged over time (Bob 2008; Nelson & 
Dorsey 2007). The alter-globalization movement and the 
human rights movement, however, have largely moved in 
parallel circuits and continue to view each other with mutual 
scepticism (Glasius 2012).
More recently, human rights groups have made it their 
priority to forge links with social movements and grassroots 
groups in their work on ESCR. Amnesty International is an 
interesting case in point. Its official vision and mission 
make it an archetypical human rights organization, while 
its stated strategy of grassroots activism, participatory 
processes, and its current ‘move closer to the ground’ 
suggest a resemblance with social justice groups.
In preparation for the 28th International Council Meeting 
(ICM) in 2007, the International Executive Committee of 
Amnesty distributed a circular entitled ‘From adoption 
to agency’.1 The document signals a fundamental 
reorientation of the organization towards rights holders, 
who were no longer ‘adopted’ as ‘victims’ of human rights 
violations but seen as agents shaping their own future. 
Amnesty would not only work for but also with rights 
1  Amnesty International, ‘From adoption to agency. 
Preparing Amnesty to be a healthy 50 year old, 28th 
International Council Meeting Circular 41’. Internal 
document. The International Council, composed of 
representatives of national sections and structures of the 
organization, is the highest decision-making body within 
Amnesty International.
holders in order to keep pace with changes in human rights 
activism and in line with its aspirations to build a greater 
constituency in the Global South and East by moving closer 
to the ground.2
Two years later, in 2009, Amnesty launched its global 
‘Demand Dignity’ campaign. The aim of this campaign 
was to make ESCR a reality. It presented poverty and 
exclusion as human rights issues. Empowerment of the 
poor was considered as being key to break the vicious circle 
of poverty, and therefore Amnesty started emphasizing 
the need to enhance participation of rights holders in its 
strategies. In her book, The unheard truth. Poverty and 
human rights (Khan 2009b), published as part of the 
campaign launch, Secretary General Irene Khan advocated 
using human rights to challenge the system of (social) 
injustice. She promoted the end of ‘voicelessness’. 
Participatory and empowerment approaches are now 
clearly embedded in Amnesty’s activism and campaigning 
strategies.
In preparation of subsequent International Council 
Meetings, it has been suggested within Amnesty to adopt 
social justice as one of the values that the organization 
should work for, alongside other values such as human 
dignity and equality.3 Although up until now Amnesty 
has chosen not to change its mission, the fight against 
socioeconomic inequality and poverty has regularly been 
articulated as being a core human rights concern for the 
organization in both internal and public documents. 
Preceding a UN meeting on the post-2015 Development 
Framework, Amnesty released a joint statement together 
with more than 350 other organizations. In ’Human rights 
2  See: http://www.amnesty.ie/content/moving-closer-
ground. See also blog by AI’s Secretary General Salil Shetty 
(2015), ‘Moving Amnesty closer to the ground is necessary, 
not simple’, openGlobalRights, 20 January. Available at: https://
www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/salil-shetty/
moving-amnesty-closer-to-ground-is-necessary-not-simple
3  As evidenced by internal documents distributed by the 
International Secretariat (IS) to national Amnesty sections 
and structures in preparation of Amnesty’s Strategic Plan 
2010-2016.
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for all post-2015’ it is suggested that a certain measure of 
equality is a condition for human rights. According to the 
signatories of the statement,4 their vision of the preferred 
post-2015 framework is one that: 
“Eliminates all forms of discrimination and diminishes 
inequalities, including socioeconomic inequalities. 
Human rights can only be realized within socio-
economic and environmental boundaries if we also 
reduce inequalities of wealth, power and resources.”
In 2013 a vacancy announcement for posts of directors of 
Amnesty’s new regional offices in Africa and Asia listed 
among the job requirements that the ideal candidate ought 
to be “personally engaged with human rights and social 
justice” [italics DL & LvT].5 
Amnesty International is present at important venues 
where social justice groups gather to confront economic 
globalization, such as the World Social Forum (WSF) 
and the G8 alternative summits. The WSF rejects a 
representative role, and it makes no recommendations or 
formal statements on behalf of participants.6 Nonetheless, 
it does require that participants adopt a general opposition 
to neoliberal globalization and a commitment to nonviolent 
struggle. The first article of the WSF ‘Charter of Principles’ 
specifies the aims of the WSF in the following words: 
“The World Social Forum is an open meeting place 
for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, 
formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences 
and interlinking for effective action, by groups and 
movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-
4  Joint statement (2013), ‘Human rights for all post-2015’, 
10 December, was endorsed by over 350 organizations from 
across the world. Available at: http://www.cesr.org/article.
php?id=1532. 
5  The vacancy was posted at: https://careers.amnesty.org.
6  See the WSF ‘Charter of Principles’ which states that: 
“The meetings of the World Social Forum do not deliberate on 
behalf of the World Social Forum as a body. No-one, therefore, 
will be authorized, on behalf of any of the editions of the 
Forum, to express positions claiming to be those of all its 
participants...” (Article 6)
liberalism and to domination of the world by capital 
and any form of imperialism [italics DL & LvT], and 
are committed to building a planetary society directed 
towards fruitful relationships among Mankind and 
between it and the Earth.”7 
Amnesty International has participated in the WSF 
since 2003, as well as in the World Economic Forum at 
Davos itself. It uses the forums to build partnerships 
and to campaign in collaboration with other grassroots 
organizations on specific human rights issues. Ten years 
later, Amnesty still uses the summits to place human rights 
on the agenda, but now also expresses its concern about 
inequality and related economic policy. In a press release 
issued around Davos 2012,8 Amnesty’s Secretary General 
Salil Shetty was quoted as follows:
“Business and political leaders need to recognize the 
need for a new approach that is fair and inclusive. 
Instead of entrenching the divide between rich and 
poor, they need to adopt growth plans that address 
this divide. They must place people’s rights at the 
heart of any solutions. Otherwise, the recent social 
unrest unfolding in countries across the world could 
only be the beginning.”
In a more recent blog posted at the start of the regional 
World Economic Forum in Mexico in May 2015, Shetty wrote 
that (income) inequality is a source of many human rights 
problems in the Latin American continent, which is “home 
to 10 of the 15 most unequal countries in the world (…). 
Tackling inequality with sustained concrete action is the 
only way for the region to truly move forward.”9
7  ‘The Charter of Principles’, World Social Forum India, 
published in 2006. Available at: http://www.wsfindia.
org/?q=node/3.
8  Amnesty International (2012) ‘Davos: World leaders 
protecting business over rights in economic crisis’, Amnesty 
International news, 24 January. Available at: http://www.
amnesty.org/en/news/davos-world-leaders-protecting-
business-over-rights-economic-crisis-2012-01-24.
9  Shetty, S. (2015) ‘The business of human rights in the 
America’s: no money, no justice’, Amnesty International 
blogs, 6 May. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/
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In their campaigning, staff members of local Amnesty 
sections likewise suggest that the organization strives for 
the reduction of inequality, and for many other values. In a 
speech delivered on the occasion of the 2013 Lough Erne G8 
summit, Patrick Corrigan of Amnesty United Kingdom stated: 
“This is our message – we want a world without war, 
without repression, without environmental degradation. 
We want a world without poverty, without hunger, without 
the inequality which divides us. The G8 leaders say 
they want free trade. We say we want fair trade and 
free speech. The G8 leaders say they want globalization 
of business. We say we want to globalize peace and 
globalize justice. They say they want to tinker with the tax 
havens. We say we want a world where no longer will 800 
million people go to bed hungry every night and where 
every 5 seconds a child dies from extreme poverty.”10
Different approaches to human rights
These examples demonstrate that increasingly Amnesty 
International understands human rights as a tool for 
attaining social justice. This points to a related but hardly 
debated or articulated difference of opinion within the 
human rights community itself. Human rights can be seen 
as an instrument for attaining higher goals, or as a goal 
in and of themselves. In an instrumental view of human 
rights, other goals or values like social justice may take 
priority over these rights. 
In this process, the gap between Amnesty’s statutory 
mission (human rights for all as its end goal) and its 
practices seems to be growing while at the same time its 
understanding of human rights seems to be changing from 
a legal to a moral one, interchangeable with broad notions 
of justice, dignity and equality and more or less detached 
from the international legal standards embedded in 
treaties, laws, and declarations.
latest/news/2015/05/the-business-of-human-rights-in-the-
americas-no-money-no-justice/.
10  Corrigan, P. (2013) ‘G8 must put rights at hearts of 
decisions’, Amnesty International UK blogs, 17 January. 
Available at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/belfast-and-
beyond/g8-must-put-rights-heart-decisions.
The above examples also demonstrate a third possible 
relationship between human rights and social justice, in 
addition to the instrumental and end goal approaches to 
human rights. In this third, conditional understanding of 
human rights, only a certain measure of inequality in the 
distribution of other goods is deemed compatible with the 
realization of human rights. It suggests that human rights 
are only compatible with limited differences in income, 
capital or wealth. 
What the instrumental and conditional approach to human 
rights have in common is an emphasis on the political 
character of human rights. Political in the sense that 
human rights are seen as prescribing a single appropriate 
set of guidelines for political or economic policy, even 
though these find only weak support in international 
human rights law. This all brings Amnesty much closer to 
being an organization or movement that engages in public 
policymaking processes, by advocating for or against 
particular political or economic arrangements to realize 
justice or for the allocation of resources to certain policies 
(e.g. welfare and health) at the expense of others (e.g. 
military and defence). 
Some would argue that Amnesty’s original power was its 
non-partisan character, putting people’s basic rights first, 
whatever the political or economic system under which they 
lived and regardless of the ideology of the perpetrators of 
human rights violations and abuses. They might claim that 
the organization should refrain from providing opinions on 
resource allocation and policy prioritization, because this may 
take it into the terrain of the executive or other public policy 
makers and disregard that states have a considerable “level 
of discretion” in their human rights obligations.
Others would contend that the more Amnesty moves 
into discourses around scarce resource trade-offs and 
distributive justice, the less comfortable a strictly legal 
rights language – framed as politically neutral – becomes. 
They argue that a pursuit for social justice eventually 
requires a more outspoken stance on particular economic 
arrangements and a revision of dominant notions of 
impartiality (see, for instance, Saiz 2009: 287). They 
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might claim that the organization’s work will ultimately be 
ineffective to help realize the enjoyment of rights by the 
most marginalized and deprived if it does not get engaged 
in economic, political and cultural debates and offer 
system-oriented solutions.
Trade-offs and choices for Amnesty 
International
What are the potential and pitfalls of adopting a broad, 
moral understanding of human rights or seeing them 
as political instruments to promote social justice for an 
organization like Amnesty International? 
Adopting social justice language allows groups to 
circumvent the indeterminacies in international human 
rights law on issues of distributive justice (see Chong 
2010). It will help draw attention to the structural and 
historical causes and processes underlying inequality 
and injustice, including relationships of power. It opens 
up possibilities to come up with solutions not dictated by 
international law, including localized interventions that, 
according to some, will have more concrete results for 
individuals and groups. 
It also allows Amnesty to get (more) involved in political 
debates about resource redistribution, and to overcome 
frustrations that the specialized debates of human rights 
practitioners about the interpretation of legal texts obscure 
the larger moral and ideological issues at stake. This can 
enhance its role in developing an effective response to the 
challenge of social and economic inequality within and 
between states and the impact of fiscal and economic 
policy on human rights enjoyment.
From a strategic point of view, social justice language has  
the potential to resonate among large segments of the po-
pulation, particularly poor and marginalized groups (see Sara 
Burke’s essay in this volume). Social justice language is less 
technical, more accessible and more politically malleable than 
human rights language. This offers potential to organizations 
like Amnesty International to rally new activists, supporters 
and members, find new donors and build new partnerships 
and alliances with deprived groups and individuals. 
There are also potential pitfalls when human rights are 
equated with or instrumentalized for social justice, or 
when the realization of human rights is regarded as being 
conditional on a just distribution of goods, wealth and 
power. By detaching human rights from the international 
legal instruments in which they are anchored, there will 
be a much wider range of possible interpretations of 
what they mean, what their corresponding duties are and 
who the duty-bearers are. Because values like human 
dignity or social justice are broad and vague, they can be 
interpreted in many different and possibly contradictory 
ways. The analytical rigour and discipline of the dominant 
legal approach will get lost, and with it a specific kind of 
authority that the ostensible objectivity and authority of law 
brings with it. 
Engaging with social justice can also create tension 
between Amnesty’s emphasis on impartiality on the one 
hand and the pressure to take a stance on the alleged 
underlying causes of human rights violations on the 
other. Amnesty may no longer be considered independent 
or impartial if it starts denouncing certain political or 
economic systems or commits to anti-neoliberal agendas. 
This may undermine its credibility and legitimacy, 
particularly among the political elites that it aims to 
influence and among some of its donors. 
Finally, moving too close to the ground may result in 
Amnesty associating itself with agendas that are not 
necessarily aimed at furthering human rights. Amnesty’s 
emphasis on empowering marginal groups presumes 
that they will use their power to defend human rights. 
But the values and aspirations of local grassroots groups 
and movements may actually be different from those of 
Amnesty, and their preferred methods to challenge the 
system perceived as unjust may be more radical, even 
violent, than Amnesty can afford. 
Four approaches to social justice
We want to conclude by briefly sketching four theoretical, 
broad and partly overlapping approaches to social justice, 
each of which has different implications for Amnesty’s 
strategies. For the sake of argument we chose clear, short 
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and provocative names for these approaches: ‘Justice over 
rights’; ‘Justice through rights’; ‘Rights over justice’; and 
‘Justice for rights’.
Justice over rights
In this approach, Amnesty International adopts social 
justice as at least part of its mission and develops a 
position on what this entails in terms of policies and 
campaigning. Amnesty will probably strive for a more 
ambitious egalitarian agenda than its current economic 
and social rights agenda, and consequently will, if 
legalistic strategies do not suffice, develop non-rights-
based policies and strategies to attain social justice. 
In this approach, realizing human rights for all is not 
the (only) end goal of the organization. Human rights are 
instruments for reaching a different, possibly higher goal, 
notably distributional or even substantive equality, and not 
merely goals in and of themselves.
In the Justice over rights approach, Amnesty will probably 
work with a (broad) moral concept of human rights to 
circumvent the limitations and indeterminacies of law, but 
also with other values such as dignity, justice and equality. 
The flexibility that this might entail will be beneficial for its 
work with rights-holders and with other movements and 
activists. Social justice issues might thereby invigorate 
Amnesty’s campaigning and mobilization capacities. 
A Justice over rights approach might be less beneficial for 
the consistency and coherence of policies and practices. 
Due to its more politically outspoken and confrontational 
nature, it may also alienate some supporters in those parts 
of the world where Amnesty traditionally has a strong 
presence, who have found Amnesty’s profile attractive 
because of its ostensibly non-political or non-partisan 
character.
Justice through rights
In this approach, Amnesty International contributes to 
attaining social justice insofar as realizing human rights 
contributes to it. Its campaigning for social justice is limited 
by widely shared interpretations of legal human rights 
obligations and duties. It monitors compliance of states 
with their international legal obligations in relation to ESCR 
and develops the appropriate methods for doing so.
In this approach, human rights are the legal framework 
within which other values, such as social justice or 
dignity, are promoted. Amnesty views human rights law 
as a framework that guides the design of economic and 
social policy(making) and narrows the range of policy 
options a state may pursue. However, when realizing 
human rights does not suffice to attain other values, 
Amnesty is silent.
This approach would imply continuity in Amnesty’s mission 
in at least those parts of the world where the organization 
traditionally has a strong presence, and hence ensures its 
activism and income base. It also signals a development 
in Amnesty’s thinking and practices related to inequality 
and poverty which might attract new audiences.
At the same time, in using social justice language 
for what is, in the end, a more limited rights agenda, 
Amnesty risks disappointing activists seeking radical 
systemic changes to reduce the gap between the rich and 
poor. It might paralyse rather than stimulate Amnesty’s 
campaigning when the organization tries to cater to both 
revolutionary activists and moderate supporters with 
divergent expectations.
Rights over justice
In a Rights over justice approach, Amnesty also works 
from a legal notion of human rights but only aims for the 
realization of human rights for all, not for other values 
such as social justice or dignity. It monitors states’ 
compliance with their international legal human rights 
obligations and conceptualizes equality in a procedural 
sense, notably: people deserve equal protection under the 
law and equal protection against discrimination in their 
access to services.
Amnesty tends to avoid debates about the creation and 
distribution of wealth necessary to fulfil rights, believing 
that these involve choices that belong more to the political 
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community rather than to the realm of law. However, 
Amnesty will emphasize people’s rights to participation 
and information to ensure transparency in public decision-
making and the inclusion of affected groups in social and 
economic policy deliberations. 
In this approach, Amnesty risks being viewed as typically 
‘Western’ and thus harming its perception of impartiality 
in the Global South and East. This approach will not 
resonate with, and probably disappoint, marginalized or 
needy rights-holders and groups aimed at transforming the 
economic and political system.
However, by continuing to fulfil its watchdog function, 
Amnesty can remain an important protector for social 
justice activists. It can continue to advocate for their 
rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly or 
access to justice and remedy, and to monitor human rights 
compliance by law enforcement agencies in demonstrations 
by social justice activists. Amnesty’s critical distance 
from these movements’ redistributive claims ensures an 
independence and neutrality that enhances its credibility 
among the policy elites it engages and its recognizability 
among traditional constituencies. 
Justice for rights
A Justice for rights approach emphasizes that realizing 
human rights, which continues to be the end goal, 
presupposes a certain measure of social justice. In this 
approach, large differences in income, wealth and primary 
goods are considered to be incompatible with the full 
realization of human rights, hence Amnesty would not only 
plead for a minimal floor of basic rights, but also adhere to 
the idea that there is a maximum ceiling of inequality that 
the realization of human rights can afford.
Making a meaningful contribution to this debate might 
presuppose that Amnesty formulates how much inequality 
is compatible with realizing human rights or that Amnesty 
has at least an internally agreed and externally convincing 
method or standard to decide this issue, whether in general 
or in specific situations. 
Conclusion
This essay illustrates that there are indications that 
preferences and tendencies exist within Amnesty 
International to expand its mission to include social justice 
as a goal, just as there is probably a broad movement 
that opposes this move. While not taking a position in 
this debate, we have discussed some challenges that 
the organization needs to confront and openly discuss 
when it does change its mission according to these lines. 
We’ve described four theoretical ideal-type approaches to 
social justice that the organization could follow. In reality, 
Amnesty is internally heterogeneous and already moves 
back and forth between these different approaches with one 
being dominant over others at different times or different 
places. Considering the internal and external pressure on 
Amnesty to engage with persistent inequality and related 
political and economic system flaws, it might be time to 
bring these internal contestations to the fore and choose a 
direction the movement can agree on.
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A legal approach to economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESCR) not only allows, but in fact requires significant 
changes in the distribution of rights and resources within 
and between societies. Amnesty’s work on ESCR has thus far 
addressed only some of the necessary changes. This was a 
transitional step and Amnesty’s ESCR work is steadily moving 
in the direction of applying human rights law to grapple with 
issues of resource distribution. This essay discusses what 
Amnesty will need to do to succeed in this area and why it 
may not be able to fully satisfy all social justice advocates. 
Introduction
As with all of its human rights work, in its work on economic, 
social and cultural rights (ESCR), Amnesty has focused on 
ensuring accountability for both state and non-state actors 
based on the relevant international human rights frameworks. 
It has called for new standards where necessary to achieve 
the objectives set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and international human rights treaties. This 
framework guides and limits the extent to which Amnesty 
can advance social justice claims and in this respect it is not 
surprising that the words ‘social justice’ did not feature when 
Amnesty elaborated its aims for engaging on ESCR.2  The
Amnesty framework also requires strict adherence to 
impartiality rather than seeking, or (perhaps more crucially) 
1 This essay represents the personal views of the authors 
and does not necessarily represent the views of all colleagues 
at Amnesty. We thank Avner Gidron, Meghna Abraham and 
Maggie Maloney for input on Amnesty’s early engagement 
with ESCR.
2  The working definition of social justice is ‘the relative 
distribution of rights, opportunities and resources within a 
given society, and whether it deserves to be regarded as fair 
and just’ (Cramme & Diamond 2009), as used by the editors 
of this volume in the introduction.
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being perceived to advance, a particular political or 
economic agenda, or both. 
Amnesty’s approach aligns with that of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which has stated 
that: “[I]n terms of political and economic systems the 
Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] is 
neutral and its principles cannot accurately be described 
as being predicated exclusively upon the need for, or the 
desirability of a socialist or a capitalist system, or a mixed, 
centrally planned, or laisser-faire economy, or upon any 
other particular approach.”3 This is not to say, however, 
that a government has carte blanche in regard to the 
covenant’s interpretation, only that it may have to adjust 
policies and practices to meet its duties under the treaty, 
rather than their ideological underpinning. 
In this essay, we not are addressing how Amnesty would 
work on social justice per se, but rather how its work on 
ESCR can help achieve many, although not all, aspects of 
social justice. For example, Amnesty calls for provision of 
essential services for all to realize rights such as those 
to education and health, and for continually improving 
them over time. Such provision normally requires a net 
redistribution of resources from upper-income groups to 
lower-income groups through taxation and, in regard to 
low-income countries, through changes to national and 
international regulation, taxation and, in regard to low-
income countries, through international assistance. In 
3  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) (1990) General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 
December, E/1991/23.
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our view, the rights and obligations in the UDHR and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and other international human rights 
treaties necessarily require states to carry out major 
political, social and economic changes in societies in order 
to fulfil their human rights duties. These would achieve 
significant elements of social justice, as described below. 
Article 28 of the UDHR is particularly strong in this 
respect, stating that: “Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” The rights in 
the UDHR are so far-ranging that they require significant 
structural changes to national and international rules, if one 
takes this commitment seriously. Unfortunately, many do not. 
Article 2.1 of the ICESCR, similarly, requires states to take 
all feasible steps, to the maximum of available resources, to 
realize ESCR and – and this part of it is often forgotten – to 
continuously improve living conditions. In many situations, 
this language is dismissed as being too vague or offering 
governments an opt-out, reflecting either cynicism on the 
part of progressive thinkers or a conservative approach which 
holds that governments alone determine what is feasible to 
implement their ICESCR commitment, rather than being held 
to an objective standard. Yet, a correct legal approach, based 
on proper treaty interpretation, reads the words of a treaty 
in light of its object and purpose, which is to realize ESCR 
for all. The flexible nature of Article 2.1 does not weaken the 
government’s obligation, but rather it makes clear that the 
government must do everything it takes to ensure ESCR. This 
includes ensuring that it mobilizes sufficient resources, uses 
them effectively for the realization of rights, and targets them 
effectively on the most disadvantaged. 
However, much lies in interpretation. Many governments, 
legal experts and even people in human rights NGOs 
narrowly interpret human rights law to apply only those 
parts of it that explicitly set out precise and clear duties 
on government. However, law should be interpreted in good 
faith, in accordance with its object and purpose, and if this 
is done, then it is clear that human rights law is – or at 
least can be – a powerful tool for advancing social justice. 
A radical shift but not far enough?
Amnesty International has been working on ESCR for 
nearly fifteen years. During this time it has issued over two 
hundred major outputs on ESCR violations across more 
than forty countries in every region. It has carried out global 
and regional campaigns on housing, health, corporate 
accountability and legal enforcement of ESCR and worked 
in partnerships with communities in slums and informal 
settlements to prevent and challenge forced evictions 
and obtain better access to services. It has played a key 
role in helping a new dedicated international complaints 
mechanism – the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR – come 
into force and made vital contributions to standard setting 
in areas such as extra-territorial obligations and the rights 
to water and sanitation.
In sum, ESCR have become a core part of Amnesty’s work. 
However, it took nearly forty years before the organization 
decided in 2001 that it wanted to commit to this work, 
and inside and outside the movement, the extension of 
Amnesty’s mandate beyond civil and political rights remains 
problematic for some (although increasingly less so).4 Prior to 
that, Amnesty would not address ESCR violations, although 
some of its work on civil and political rights contained in its 
mandate in effect addressed violations of both sets of rights, 
for example punitive house demolitions or state failure to 
take steps to prevent female genital mutilation. 
In this respect, Amnesty’s late arrival to ESCR was part 
of the problem – many people continued to identify 
human rights with those civil and political rights that 
the organisation had traditionally worked on such as the 
prohibition of torture, and the rights to life (the death 
penalty), a fair trial and freedom of expression. This 
is despite the fact that for the vast majority of people 
on the planet, denials of ESCR are the human rights 
violations that most directly face them in their daily lives. 
Consequently, by the millennium it became increasingly 
4  For example, Cohen, N. (2012), ‘Is Amnesty still fit to fight 
on anyone’s behalf’, The Guardian, 11 November. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/11/
nick-cohen-is-amnesty-fit-fight.
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clear that Amnesty could no longer ignore ESCR and the 
need to give true meaning to the principle of indivisibility as 
affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Amnesty began work on ESCR after 2001, documenting and 
responding to violations mainly concerning the rights to 
housing, food and health, as well as carrying out advocacy 
for the development of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.5 
Its Operational Plans for 2004-2010 aimed to promote 
ESCR as enforceable human rights, focusing on excluded or 
marginalized people who suffer systematic or grave abuses 
of these rights. However, it was not until 2009 that Amnesty 
devoted a major campaign (the ‘Demand Dignity’ campaign) 
to ESCR. The Campaign included work on four broad areas: 
slums; maternal health and sexual and reproductive rights; 
corporate accountability; and legal enforcement of rights. 
Most work focused on state obligations to respect ESCR 
(particularly in the case of forced evictions) and to protect 
them (regulating corporate actors) rather than fulfil. That 
being said, a small but significant portion of Amnesty’s ESCR 
output did grapple with issues of fulfilment of ESCR, in par-
ticular research that called on the state to provide maternal 
health services to women.6 In Burkina Faso, our research 
pointed to the imposition of irregular charges for health ser-
vices, creating a barrier to access to low-income households. 
One of Amnesty’s first outputs focused on state interferences 
with the right to food in North Korea, but also called on the 
international community to provide food assistance.7 
Amnesty has often called on states to provide international 
assistance where required to fulfil ESCR, for example for 
slum upgrading and to assist states such as Lebanon to 
5  Amnesty International (2004) An overview of work at 
the International Secretariat on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ESCR), 3 March (on file with authors). 
6  Amnesty International (2009) Sierra Leone: Out of Reach: 
The cost of maternal health in Sierra Leone, 22 September, Index 
Number: AFR 51/005/2009; Amnesty International (2009) 
Burkina Faso: Giving life, risking death: Maternal mortality in 
Burkina Faso, 31 December, Index Number: AFR 60/001/2009.
7  Amnesty International (2004) Starved of Rights: Human 
Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (North Korea), 17 January, Index Number: ASA 
24/003/2004.
provide basic services to refugees from Syria. Amnesty’s 
work on slums focused not only on forced evictions and 
security of tenure, but also equal access to services, calling 
on states to provide services to a consistently marginalized 
group. This work addressed one of the largest social justice 
issues in developing countries: the gaps in access to goods 
and services (and by implication rights enjoyment) between 
those living in the formal and informal sectors. 
Why has Amnesty done comparatively less work on fulfilment 
of rights, outside of the area of non-discrimination? It is 
certainly not as a result of any high-level strategic decision 
being taken to block work in this area: indeed, Amnesty’s 
Strategic Plan for 2010-2016 stated that one of its change 
objectives at the local, national and international level was 
to secure: “Investment of human and financial resources 
in the rights to health, housing, decent livelihood and 
education.”8 It is important to note that decisions on the 
particular type of research projects that are carried out are 
distributed across the organization in that each programme 
or team normally decides on the type of issues it takes up, as 
long as it falls within the parameters of Amnesty’s Strategic 
Plan. However, three factors appear to have led to a tendency 
across Amnesty to focus on respect and protect aspects of 
ESCR. These point to the work that Amnesty will need to do to 
meet its aspiration to increase focus on fulfilment of ESCR.
The first is the immediacy of such violations. For example, 
when a community is threatened by a forced eviction, their 
priority and that of human rights groups is to carry out 
‘firefighting’ rather than work for longer-term realisation 
of rights. Furthermore, because Amnesty focused on the 
most marginalized groups, overt discrimination is and 
was often the greatest contributing factor to the denial 
of rights of that group. It was therefore logical to focus 
on discrimination first rather than a broad failure by the 
government to ensure adequate services for all. 
8  Amnesty International (2010), Amnesty International’s 
Integrated Strategic Plan 2010 to 2016, Index Number: 
POL/50/002/2010, C1.
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The second is the difficulty of the investing of time and 
expertise required to document and advocate for changes 
with significant resource and policy implications, and to 
develop methodologies for doing so. In work on fulfilment 
of ESCR, it is insufficient to simply show a lack of exercise 
of the rights. It has to be shown that the state has clearly 
failed to take the necessary steps within its power. This 
requires at least an analysis of government policies and 
practise, which can take a significant amount of time, 
particularly where the researcher is not familiar with the 
particular sector. In contrast, work on ‘respect and protect 
violations’ drew on Amnesty’s strengths in legal analysis 
and casework, and did not require detailed expertise in, for 
example, economic analysis or urban planning. In addition, 
given the concerns expressed by many that Amnesty was 
‘aping’ or duplicating the work of development NGOs, 
it made sense to self-consciously focus on the type of 
research and campaigning that such organizations were not 
known for, in particular work to document harms affecting 
particular individuals.
The third is the work on respecting and protection of rights 
aligned with Amnesty’s strengths in campaigning on cases 
where states and other actors were directly interfering 
with people’s civil and political rights. Amnesty’s civil and 
political rights work predominantly focuses on negative 
obligations rather than on positive obligations such as 
levels and quality of training of public security officials or 
the efficacy of justice systems. Thus, to build on Amnesty’s 
‘comfort level’ of campaigning and mobilization, it made 
sense to focus on negative obligations, particularly at the 
commencement of work on ESCR. 
Speaking out on issues of resource 
distribution while retaining 
impartiality
One concern often expressed in the internal debates within 
Amnesty was that the organization would end up becoming 
(or at least being seen to be) an organization identified with 
the leftist end of the political spectrum. Such a concern is 
only valid to the extent that it addresses the danger that 
the organization’s approach departs from one that analyses 
and explains its recommendations in terms of human rights 
law. To put it another way, Amnesty would certainly not shy 
away from calling for dissidents in undemocratic countries 
to be accorded, for example, their civil and political rights. 
However, it would be careful to demand only what is due 
to them from a human rights point of view – for example, 
if dissidents are detained on suspicion of spying for a 
foreign power, our call would be for due process rather than 
unconditional release (unless the suspicion was manifestly 
unfounded). Nevertheless, the impartiality concern weighed 
in favour of moving slowly in regard to issues of resource 
distribution outside clear-cut cases of discrimination 
to ensure that Amnesty can make a solid case for its 
recommendations. 
In calling upon states to treat ESCR as legally enforceable 
rights and to remove barriers to remedy, one of the 
arguments Amnesty made was that public interest 
litigation can lead to changes in government policy that 
lead to significant improvements in the fulfilment of rights. 
Amnesty referred to litigation by other NGOs that has led 
to significant redistribution of resources within society. Its 
materials highlight two cases. First, right to food litigation 
in India, which, together with associated mobilization, led 
to an expansion and improvement in the provision of school 
meals in some parts of the country. In those states where the 
school meals programme was implemented, enrolment rates 
among girls in the first year increased by 10 per cent with 
an increased 350,000 girls a year entering school. Second, 
litigation in South Africa which led to the establishment and 
provision of drugs to prevent mother to child transmission of 
HIV (Amnesty International 2010: 13).9 
Amnesty recognized that many legal systems have a range 
of barriers to effective remedy. One of these is that some 
legal systems do not adequately provide remedies that 
address systemic government failings. For example, Brazil’s 
courts are often willing to require the state to provide 
9  The figures cited from India are drawn from Brinks & 
Gauri (2008): 327-8. These cases were also featured in a 
campaign digest: Amnesty International (2010) Make Our 
Rights Law: Enforce Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Index Number: ACT 35/002/2010. 
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health care to individuals who have been denied it and who 
seek remedy before them, but, in contrast to South Africa, 
collective litigation to address systemic government failings 
to ensure the right to health has been far less successful.10 
In such cases, Amnesty therefore can, depending on 
capacity, carry out campaigning and advocacy both for 
changes to guarantee the substantive right at issue as well 
as for reforms to the justice system to remove barriers to 
remedy. 
Thus, it is important to make clear that Amnesty had no 
principled objection to grappling with issues of resource 
allocation. During the authors’ time in the ESCR team, it is 
difficult to recall any instance where it has held back from 
making any references to resources or allocation of power in 
society as a matter of principle. Rather, the factor holding 
back strong recommendations, for example in regard to 
the austerity crisis in parts of Europe, has been the lack 
of research projects to document the specific impact on 
human rights of government fiscal policies and budgetary 
allocations. Hence Amnesty has typically been able to make 
only general calls that reiterate government’s commitments 
set out in international law.11 That being said, Amnesty’s 
Strategic Plans for 2016 onwards aim to devote more 
time to engaging with issues of resource distribution, as 
described below in under the heading ‘Looking forward’.
It would be a mistake to assume that Amnesty’s ESCR 
work began with a focus on low-hanging fruit. Although 
its work commenced on conceptually easier and more 
familiar approaches, Amnesty took on some incredibly 
challenging goals in terms of political and cultural 
change. It has concentrated its resources on some of the 
most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
10  Amnesty International (2010) Make Our Rights Law: 
Enforce Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Index number: 
ACT 35/002/2010: 7. 
11 One exception was a report by Amnesty International 
Spain, Evicted Rights: Right to housing and mortgage evictions 
in Spain (June 2015). The report pointed to the government’s 
failure to explore the possibility of using the more than 3 
million houses left empty in the private market and in the 
hands of the State’s asset management company in order to 
meet housing needs.
communities. Amnesty’s work has involved challenging, 
among other things: deep-seated racism against the 
Roma in Europe and Indigenous Peoples globally; denials 
of sexual and reproductive rights due to underlying 
and systemic gender discrimination and (in regard to 
contraception and access to abortion), deep-seated 
religious and cultural beliefs as well as disdain for the 
rights of people in informal settlements, often derided 
as ‘illegal’ people who should have stayed in their rural 
birthplace if they could not afford to secure legal housing. 
These are some of the most significant social justice 
challenges of our times. 
However, bearing in mind the guiding principles for 
Amnesty’s work – impartiality and focusing on legal 
standards rather than advancing a particular economic 
or political agenda – can we still point to achievements in 
Amnesty’s work where it has shifted the social justice needle, 
and in so doing accommodated it and human rights? 
Have we shifted the needle?
As with all its activities, Amnesty is spending an 
increasing amount of resources assessing the impact of its 
ESCR work. The results indicate some significant results 
both in terms of securing better human rights protection 
and enjoyment whilst also indirectly advancing and 
promoting social justice.
 
By focusing on some of the most marginalized and 
disadvantaged people, we continue to set ourselves major 
challenges in advancing their human rights, let alone 
social justice. Those who are economically and socially 
excluded tend to be those who are also the most politically 
disenfranchised, finding it often impossible to participate 
in decision-making which affects their lives, and to seek 
justice for the wrongs perpetrated against them.
Yet Amnesty has made some progress. In housing, it 
has worked with communities in slums and informal 
settlements, in some cases for a number of years, helping 
to prevent forced evictions, build capacity and enhance 
their ability to hold state actors (especially at the local 
level) accountable. Successes include the establishment 
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and strengthening of community-based organizations 
among residents of Nairobi’s informal settlements who carry 
out ongoing work to oppose forced evictions. In Slovenia, 
some Roma communities were able to secure access to 
publicly provided water services. One of the main planks 
of the work has involved advancing the right to a remedy 
not only to address wrongs for past violations and support 
accountability, but also to act as a deterrent against future 
abuses. Some of the key achievements have included 
securing unprecedented Race Equality Directive infringement 
proceedings against the Czech Republic and Slovakia for 
discrimination suffered by Roma school children, and the 
implementation of the Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay Inter-
American Court of Human Rights decision which restored to 
an Indigenous People their ancestral lands.12 
It may be noted that most of these successes relate to 
‘traditional’ areas of obligations to respect rights and non-
discrimination. This reflects the fact that, as explained 
above, Amnesty’s campaigning and sustained advocacy 
has hitherto mostly focused on these areas, rather than in 
regard to obligations to fulfil rights. 
Conversely some of the main external obstacles we face are 
those that frequently confront us across all our work: the 
lack of political will or technical capacity by state actors 
at the national and local level, or both; vested political and 
economic interests; and cultural and societal conservatism. 
To comprehensively address these adverse forces would 
often require fundamental political and economic reform 
combined with a cultural shift in society. This is regardless 
of whether Amnesty was wedded to the international legal 
framework or not. Amnesty can and does call for such 
reforms on the basis of international human rights law, 
even if some of them may be unpopular in society. How 
one ensures such changes can happen is an ongoing 
discussion. One of the key factors in shifting the needle is 
12  Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2006), Case of 
the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, March 
29. The latter occurred due to sustained lobbying by the 
Sawhoyamaxa people with the assistance over a decade of a 
local organization Tierra Vida and Amnesty International.
the fact that the organization, unlike many other NGOs, 
has deep roots in many societies around the world and can 
mobilize potentially millions of members worldwide.
However, the obstacles to change are also compounded 
by internal constraints. When Amnesty took up ESCR as 
a new issue, it added these rights to many other areas of 
ongoing work and therefore could not allocate extensive new 
resources. In addition, project cycles do not neatly conform to 
the long-term commitment required to delivering meaningful 
change, and there is insufficient technical expertise across 
the whole organization on the issue of ESCR. 
These constraints might raise the question of whether 
Amnesty should seriously expand its focus to issues of 
fulfilment of rights, given the difficulties it has faced 
in regard to conceptually easier cases. To this loaded 
question, one response might be: how much more difficult 
could it get? It would seem that Amnesty has focused on 
conceptually simple but politically difficult challenges. For 
example it can be argued that demanding greater levels of 
state spending on Roma communities is no more politically 
challenging than demanding their rights to be educated 
within mainstream and non-segregated education. 
Looking forward… what will we do?
Amnesty’s Strategic Plans for 2016 onwards aim to 
devote more attention to issues of resource distribution, 
in particular fulfilment of rights. One area is in regard to 
barriers to access to essential services, such as lack of 
affordable housing, lack of free access to essential sexual 
and reproductive health services including post-rape 
health care and emergency contraception, and the impact 
of privatization of public services. 
Amnesty’s future work on ESCR aims to examine the role of 
international financial institutions and the corporate sector 
in influencing state policy to the detriment of rights.13 
13  In the context of the preparatory negotiations for the 
UN Conference on Financing for Development, Amnesty 
contacted several key governments to request information 
on the extent to which their positions had been influenced 
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Amnesty will also extend its engagement on the issue 
of climate change, calling upon states, as it has in the 
past, to take all feasible steps to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases and to ensure the protection of affected 
people, within and outside their borders. Climate change 
has a particularly negative impact on disadvantaged 
groups in societies, even though they are generally the least 
responsible for the problem. 
When Amnesty engages with issues relating to the 
distribution of resources, what would be the basis for it to 
do so? We suggest a few situations where Amnesty could 
carry out such analysis to distinguish between real lack of 
resources and gaps in political will to realize rights. First, 
it could identify situations where a government has clearly 
failed to address the needs of disadvantaged groups in 
its plans and in practice, for example, failure to address 
palliative care for those suffering untreatable conditions.14 
Second, it could expose a distribution of services that show 
a failure to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged groups, 
such as provision of a disproportionately high amount of 
public funds to wealthier areas within in a city (Amnesty 
International is currently preparing to intervene as an 
amicus curiae in an ongoing court case on this issue). 
A variant of this form of analysis is to analyse pricing 
structures to examine whether they take affordability into 
account. For example, tariffs for water and sanitation 
are often regressive, providing subsidies only to those 
connected to water systems (i.e. excluding the poorest). 
Third, it could assess whether a government has set out 
a plan to progressively realize ESCR, to cost them and to 
demonstrate an analysis of possible sources of funding. 
by lobbying of corporate actors. Amnesty will also examine 
situations in which funding by international financial 
institutions is coupled with conditions, or softer forms 
of pressure, requiring a state to privatize public services 
(without adequate human rights safeguards) and weaken 
regulation of natural resource exploitation.
14  See, for instance, Human Rights Watch (2009) “Please, 
do not make us suffer any more…”: Access to Pain Treatment as 
a Human Right. 
Fourth, Amnesty could ask the government to show that 
regressions or failure to provide minimum core obligations 
are unavoidable and that it has fully used and tried to 
mobilize available resources, in other words, relying on 
the CESCR’s statement that in such circumstances, the 
state is held to have infringed its obligations under the 
ICESCR unless it can demonstrate that its resources were 
inadequate and that it had prioritized those resources 
available to it for essential levels of ESCR.15 In this respect, 
Amnesty also plans to commence work on tax justice, 
addressing situations in which foreign corporations evade 
the payment of taxes, thus negatively impacting on the 
ability of the state to maximize revenue to pay for services 
for those in most need (Gaughran 2015). Such work would 
point to the need for governments to fix loopholes in their 
taxation rules that facilitate tax evasion and aggressive tax 
avoidance either domestically or in other countries. 
Fifth, and linked to the fourth point, Amnesty could query 
the government’s conduct by examining whether it has 
taken the steps that would be reasonable to take in light 
of the rights deficits in question. For example, has the 
government allocated public land for low-cost housing and 
where they exist, are such allocations respected? Has the 
government sought international assistance to meet these 
rights? Has the government taken adequate steps to curb 
tax evasion? Are mining concession offers and tenders for 
public services advertised in a transparent way?
Sixth, Amnesty could assess whether a country has 
adequately mobilized resources for public services by 
comparing it to its peers. For example, it could assess how 
much of a country’s Gross Domestic Product is taxed and 
what is the per capita expenditure on public services in 
comparison to peer states. This type of analysis, routinely 
used by the Centre for Economic and Social Rights,16 
does not, on its own, prove a human rights violation, but 
does put the onus on a government to demonstrate why it 
allocates much less resources than its peer countries. 
15  CESCR (1990) General Comment No. 3, paras. 9 and 10. 
16  See for example, Centre for Economic and Social Rights 
(2012), Visualising Rights: Fact Sheet No. 12: Spain: 6-7. 
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The above six analytical methods can, with some 
adaptation, also be applied to assess steps a state 
takes to fulfil rights extraterritorially, not only through 
international development assistance, but also in other 
domains such as trade.17
The methods discussed above would therefore focus on 
concrete, specific changes, justified by the realization of 
specific rights rather than ideology, and which in principle 
are consistent with both leftist and right (or at least centre-
right) ends of the political spectrum. Nor would this work 
require Amnesty to necessarily advocate for the realization 
of one right over others in the abstract, or for the realization 
of ESCR at the expense of other public goods (e.g. protection 
of the environment, legitimate public security). Rather, it 
involves a call for redistribution of services and resources 
from privileged groups to disadvantaged groups or for 
change in the manner such services are provided in order 
to meet the needs of disadvantaged groups, in line with the 
obligations set in international human rights law. 
In order to carry out this kind of work, Amnesty will need a 
couple of ingredients. One key one is the investment of time 
both by its policy experts as well as regional country teams 
to carry out detailed law and policy analysis, to be able to 
critically assess government reforms and – crucially – to 
take up a seat at the policy-making table if it is offered. 
One method to expand our capacity may be partnerships 
with specialized NGOs.18 
17  These are set out in detail in Khalfan, A. (2013): 324-28.
18  A good example is the ground-breaking report by 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) and Instituto 
Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) (2009) which 
examined Guatemala’s failure to raise sufficient taxation to 
fund ESCR programmes. That report was the subject of a well-
received presentation at Amnesty’s International Secretariat 
by CESR’s Executive Director, Ignacio Saiz (a former Director 
of Policy at Amnesty International). Amnesty and CESR have 
discussed the possibility of joint research in this domain in 
the future.
Accepting that you cannot please 
everybody…
Some traditional constituencies may be disappointed at 
Amnesty’s focus on social justice – this will be a function 
of the extent to which Amnesty’s work on ESCR makes solid 
arguments based on law. This requires responsibility from 
all parts of the movement to ensure that campaigns clearly 
refer to human rights terms and analysis, and to use political 
terminology in a cautious manner. For example, it makes a 
difference whether we refer to people whose concrete rights 
are being violated rather than to ‘the dispossessed’.
Can Amnesty satisfy a broader constituency of social justice 
activists? We consider two groups who may appreciate 
Amnesty’s focus on the disadvantaged, but who may not 
consider Amnesty to be addressing their most deeply felt 
concerns. 
The first are those focusing on broader forms of inequality 
within society – the distribution of wealth within society. 
Amnesty would oppose such forms of inequality only when 
it involves discrimination or where it is clear that such 
inequality leads to denial of ESCR, including when the 
state is failing to adequately fund public services and 
social welfare through taxation, and there is a failure to 
progressively increase the levels of enjoyment of ESCR. 
In addition, Amnesty would generally focus on the most 
marginalized sectors of society, rather than addressing the 
distribution of resources between the upper and middle 
classes or issues of equity between countries. Perhaps 
the latter types of concern are best dealt with by other 
organizations than Amnesty. 
The first would be those fundamentally opposed to greater 
involvement of the private sector in economic life. Amnesty, 
like the UN Committee on ESCR,19 would not take a principled 
position against privatization, but would rather oppose it 
only in cases when independent regulatory processes were 
19  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2003), General Comment, The Right to Water (Art. 15, para 
24, of the Covenant), 20 January, E/C.12/2002/11.
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not in place, including mechanisms to ensure public control 
of terms of service and to guarantee access to information 
(thus precluding any denial of information to the public on 
the grounds of commercial confidentiality). 
Human rights groups will also tend to react slower than 
other groups to new and emerging issues as they need 
to develop sufficient evidence to sustain their claims. 
However, as they become better at such work, they will be 
better placed to respond to new challenges, such as a newly 
announced austerity measure or a new taxation policy, on 
the basis of evidence in other situations. 
The two constituencies mentioned above would generally 
find that Amnesty’s objectives fall within part of their 
agenda, and this could lead to useful and significant 
collaboration. For example, groups opposing privatization 
of water services, such as the Council of Canadians, have 
together with Amnesty been at the forefront of advocacy for 
recognition of the right to water, even though Amnesty has 
not engaged with them in anti-privatization struggles. 
Conclusions 
This essay has shown that Amnesty’s existing work 
on ESCR has addressed social justice concerns to a 
significant degree, albeit on issues that relate to the 
respect and protection of rights and on non-discrimination. 
Amnesty’s relatively limited engagement on broader issues 
of fulfilment of rights reflects an initial preference for 
ESCR work in areas where legal obligations of states were 
relatively clear-cut, the need to react to reversal of rights, 
such as forced evictions, and the relatively limited level 
of expertise and time required to carry out an analysis 
of relevant social and economic policies and practice. 
The essay has shown that the time is ripe for Amnesty to 
deepen its engagement in social justice issues, building 
on its existing work. However, Amnesty’s work has focused 
and will generally focus on the most marginalized sectors 
of society, rather than address the distribution of resources 
between the upper and middle classes or issues of equity 
between countries. In that sense, Amnesty may be able to 
appeal to some but not all of the constituencies aiming at 
social justice. 
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Even a narrow view of human rights would necessarily 
overlap to at least some degree with social justice concerns 
that, erroneously, are too often viewed as only being related 
to economic and social rights. 
Introduction
Should human rights NGOs work on social justice issues? 
Can human rights principles redress socioeconomic 
inequalities? Can human rights activists work with the 
global social justice movement? 
The contributions to this volume of essays grapple with 
these and related questions, showing various degrees of 
enthusiasm, or none at all, for the proposition that human 
rights principles can advance social justice goals. At one 
end of the spectrum, there is the insistence that human 
rights advocates must tackle problems of global wealth 
inequalities, and at the other the warning that to do so 
will fatally weaken and compromise their core task of 
defending civil and political rights. In the middle ground, 
several contributors sketch out the prospects for using 
human rights advocacy to improve the lot of the poor and 
marginalized. Standing somewhat apart, Samuel Moyn 
makes an eloquent case that gross wealth inequalities do 
not offend human rights principles, provided that core, 
minimum needs are met and basic freedoms respected. 
This, he suggests, may spell waning interest in human 
rights as the downtrodden seek a more substantive justice 
in other forms of struggle. 
Yet fundamentally, although many of the papers provide 
a stimulating read, one is left feeling that none grapple 
successfully with a core definitional problem. To contrast 
‘human rights’ or ‘human rights advocacy’ or the ‘human 
David Petrasek 
Human rights and social justice – 
a false dichotomy?
rights movement’, to ‘social justice’ or ‘social justice 
activism’ or the ‘global social justice movement’ is to 
presuppose these are definable categories; or at least 
definable in ways that garner broad agreement. 
But they are not. Indeed, the range of perspectives taken 
on these terms by even the small group of authors in this 
volume is proof of that. For some, speaking of human rights 
necessarily includes all those rights found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), thus including the 
right to an adequate standard of living, to education and 
health. To others, these economic and social rights (ESR) 
are not human rights, or if they are, they should not be the 
subjects of human rights advocacy (and that term itself is 
interpreted differently). 
Similarly, for some of the authors, the discussion of social 
justice focuses on the fulfillment of basic human rights 
including ESR, and/or removing inequities in access to 
basic rights (Khalfan & Byrne). Others define social justice 
more broadly as “… the relative distribution of rights, 
opportunities and resources within a given society and 
whether it deserves to be regarded as fair and just” (Lettinga 
& Van Troost). And for others, it means a fundamental re-
ordering and democratizing of the global order, to remove 
not just inequities but gross wealth inequalities (Moyn). 
Also in dispute is whether such a re-ordering is in fact a 
pre-condition for the full realization of ESR. 
Simply put, it is hard to follow a debate when there is 
little clarity concerning the terms on which it is being 
waged. Indeed, several contributors focus on the question 
of the justiciability of ESR or the relative priority these 
rights deserve vis-à-vis civil and political rights. Their 
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assumption seems to be that the success of human rights 
activism in achieving social justice will depend almost 
entirely on ESR advocacy. But that, as we will see, is itself 
a debatable point. 
This short article aims to make three points. First the 
content of human rights and of social justice is not fixed; 
opinions will vary. Therefore, the degree of overlap between 
these two concepts is bound to vary as well. Second, both 
civil and political and economic and social rights might be 
relevant in struggles for social justice. And third, human 
rights advocacy is as varied as the aims of those who 
practice it – there is nothing inherently difficult about 
pursuing at least some social justice goals in the language 
of human rights.
Overlapping concerns
Can human rights principles advance demands for social 
justice? The answer is deceptively simple. Demands for 
human rights and demands for social justice are distinct 
but overlapping. The degree to which they overlap will 
depend on the definitional limits given to both concepts; 
and this in turn will depend on who is defining these 
concepts. Consider the following table:
 
Human rights Social justice demands
Right to political participation Real democracy (“We are the 99%”); democratize and make 
accountable global financial institutions
Right to information Restrict corporate power; eliminate corruption; tax justice
Equality and non-discrimination guarantees Women, caste, and class emancipation; abolish anti-poor 
laws; land redistribution
Freedom of association and assembly Democratize the workplace 
Freedom of expression Break-up media monopolies 
Right to privacy, and property No seed monopolies; protect local bio-heritage against outside 
ownership
Right to food, water and an adequate standard of living Living wage; no water privatization; climate justice
Right to education and health Abolish school and tuition fees; equal access to medications
Right to self-determination No foreign ownership of farmland; restrict foreign TNCs
Indigenous rights Stop dams; indigenous veto on development 
Right to peace End militarism and the arms race
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The table lists a set of human rights in the left hand 
column, each of which finds support in the UDHR or other 
UN human rights standards. In the right-hand column 
there is a set of demands that are commonly put forward 
by those said to be pursuing social justice or “global social 
justice”.1 The alignment of the social justice demand to the 
corresponding human right is simply meant to indicate that 
the human right in question provides some (even if limited) 
degree of support to the social justice demand. Further, 
social justice movements making such demands have 
sometimes cited that particular right in support. 
Thus, for those who would include in the idea of social 
justice that there must be an end to corporate and elite 
control of democratic institutions, the right to political 
participation in the UDHR (and related rights to freedom 
of association, to information and to equality) provides 
a principled basis for such a demand (and the extent to 
which the right supports the demand in full will depend 
on a variety of factors). Similarly, equality and non-
discrimination guarantees in the UDHR and other standards 
provide a principled basis for many social justice demands 
regarding the emancipation of women, downtrodden castes 
or for ending discrimination against the poor qua poor. 
The rights listed in the table begin at the top with 
classic civil and political rights but as one moves down 
include ESR and then more controversial collective and 
solidarity rights. But, to be clear, each of the rights listed 
is supported in one or more UN standards. It follows that 
if one agrees that all of the rights listed are properly 
considered human rights – and are properly the subject of 
human rights advocacy – then one will see a fair degree 
of overlap between the human rights canon and social 
justice demands. If, on the other hand, one would consider 
only the first five or six rights as properly within the scope 
of human rights advocacy, then there will be much less 
overlap between the human rights canon and social justice 
demands. But, and this cannot be stressed enough, even 
1  Many of these claims can be found in Figure 1 
“Grievances and demands driving world protests, 2006-
2013”, in the paper by Sara Burke in this volume.
for those who choose to take a very limited approach to 
defining the content of human rights (for example, Aryeh 
Neier’s contribution to this volume), there will still be some 
overlap with social justice demands. 
This brings us to the issue of the indivisible nature of 
rights. The demands formulated by oppressed peoples 
may not divide neatly into cold war categories of rights. 
Persistent and severe malnutrition among a marginalized 
ethnic group may be conceived of as a right to life issue 
or an issue of equality and non-discrimination; it might 
also be framed as a right to food or right to health issue. 
Most likely, it touches on all these rights. Thus, the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of ESR, or ESR advocacy efforts, 
tells us little about whether human rights principles and 
advocacy can support social justice claims. 
Consider what might be achieved for ‘social justice’ if 
we only sought to apply the rights in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It’s explicit 
promises of equality, non-discrimination, protection of 
minority rights, and freedom of association (including 
for workers), alongside its implicit rights to information, 
to equal access to government services and to full 
participation in political life – if fully respected and 
protected – provide a useful set of tools for any movement 
fighting for greater socioeconomic equality, or challenging 
economic and social marginalization. 
This would result even before one applied a more progressive 
reading of the ICCPR; for example, one that would interpret 
its right to life and security of the person guarantees 
as extending to a concern for government policies that 
failed to avert famine or persistent hunger, or to exercise 
due diligence to tackle preventable disease, or to prevent 
dangerously unhealthy work environments. Indeed, a 
progressive reading of the ICCPR’s prohibitions on servitude 
might extend to prohibiting grossly underpaid work or the 
exploitation of migrant and temporary labour. Similarly, 
what might be achieved for global social justice if key 
ICCPR rights were held to create extra-territorial obligations 
on states, whereby the impact of their foreign trade, aid, 
security, and investment policies on the enjoyment of these 
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rights in other countries was assessed? Controversial, to 
be sure, yet this is an interpretation that is already being 
advanced in some instances by the UN’s expert bodies. 
In short, there is necessarily some overlap between 
the content of human rights and that of social justice, 
and the degree of overlap will very much depend on the 
relative breadth one gives to these terms. The authors in 
this volume disagree about the relative priority or weight 
given to ESR, or the usefulness of this category of rights 
in tackling social justice issues. Certainly, the fact that 
ESR as guaranteed in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are subject 
to temporal and resource limitations (they can be achieved 
progressively and within the bounds of available resources) 
poses unique difficulties. So too the question of determining 
how much resources ought to be spent to fulfill these rights 
– not always easy to answer without appearing to abandon 
principle for preference. But the fact is that these rights 
are being used by thousands of advocates and in diverse 
settings (well beyond the one or two ‘exceptional’ cases 
cited by Aryeh Neier in this volume), and not just in courts. 
In any event, as the argument above makes clear, the ESR 
issue is not determinative on the question before us – since 
many civil and political rights principles might be used to 
support social justice demands. 
Shared activism 
For some of the authors, the fact that there might be some 
overlap in content between social justice and human 
rights (however broadly or narrowly defined) is not the real 
problem; rather, as they see it the problem is in adapting 
human rights methodology or forms of advocacy to social 
justice demands. Some papers argue it cannot or should 
not be done, others that there are risks in doing so, and 
still others that human rights advocacy should adapt to be 
successful in pursuing social justice goals. 
But again, underlying these arguments is the assumption 
that there is already a specific human rights methodology or 
form of advocacy. In fact, a wide variety of techniques are 
used. Several of the authors accept uncritically, for example, 
that ‘traditional’ human rights advocacy is grounded in 
legal standards and that it privileges advancing reform 
through legal or at least formal institutions. Chong for 
example argues that “… [t]he major international human 
rights organizations, predominantly staffed by legal experts, 
have often hoped that the technical language of the law 
and the routinized processes of judicial systems would 
allow them to advance human rights in a non-ideological 
manner”. Although he’s correct that major INGOs aim to be 
non-partisan, he overstates the role of the law and ‘legal 
experts’ in these organizations. Amnesty International 
(AI), for example, has relatively few lawyers on staff and it 
would be a mistake to consider that their opinions alone 
shape campaigning or advocacy. All the complaints one 
might imagine against campaigns based on the “technical 
language of the law” are very much a part of the internal 
debate within large INGOs like Amnesty. 
Similarly, Lettinga and Van Troost argue that the tendency 
of AI in recent years to make broad, sweeping critiques 
of an unjust global order suggests that “… [Amnesty 
International’s] understanding of human rights seems to 
be changing from a legal to a moral one, interchangeable 
with broad notions of justice, dignity and equality and more 
or less detached from the international legal standards 
embedded in treaties, laws, and declarations”. 
While it’s a fair point as regards AI’s changing discourse, 
they might more correctly have said the organization is 
changing back to articulating a moral understanding of 
rights. The embedding of AI’s demands in international 
legal standards was far from central to its work in the 
organization’s formative years. Although basing its work 
in the UDHR, in its first decade Amnesty saw itself as 
making a moral claim – an appeal to conscience. Where 
international treaties were supportive they would be used, 
but AI would not be constrained by them. Indeed, when 
AI adopted its campaign against the death penalty, the 
punishment was expressly permitted in the ICCPR and no 
international treaty prohibited it. The organization only set 
up a legal office halfway into its second decade. 
But crucially, as regards the supposed continuity of 
international legal standards and the positions taken by 
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human rights NGOs, many of these groups take policy 
and advocacy positions that are only weakly supported in 
international law (though they might claim otherwise). For 
example, demanding that no forms of conditional amnesties 
can be given to war criminals, even if it means a failure to 
do so will obstruct a peace negotiation; that sex work be 
legalized; that hate speech be permitted; or that women may 
wear the burkha in public spaces in deeply secular countries. 
The notion that international law provides clear answers in 
the area of civil and political rights, thus making advocacy 
in this area less ‘political’, and less indeterminate, in itself 
betrays an ideological positioning; one that privileges the law 
and those who interpret it. 
In this context, Burke’s argument that “…[d]etermining 
whether civil and political rights have been violated is a 
relatively unambiguous process compared to making that 
determination with regard to economic, social and cultural 
rights”, is illustrative. Clearly misinformed (consider only 
the difficulty of judging the limits of free expression, or 
religious practice), it in any case speaks only to a certain 
style of advocacy, namely that practiced by groups like 
Amnesty and Human Rights Watch who routinely make 
authoritative pronouncements on what international 
standards do and do not protect. But this is only one form 
of human rights advocacy; there are a myriad of others, 
some of which use the law very sparingly, or not at all. 
Perhaps to illustrate the dangers of assuming a certain 
form for human rights advocacy in contrast to social justice 
activism, consider two of the great, defining struggles for 
justice of past decades: the anti-apartheid movement and 
the civil rights campaign in the US. 
Was the campaign against apartheid in South Africa a 
human rights struggle, a battle for social justice or both? 
Bear in mind that some of the grievances which led to key 
turning points in that struggle were matters of economic and 
social justice – the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, over pass 
laws restricting residence and employment, and the Soweto 
Uprising in 1976, protesting controls on education. Similarly, 
the ‘civil rights’ struggle in the US – is this a human rights 
campaign or a fight for social justice or both? Human rights 
principles – and litigation – were certainly at the core of the 
campaign, yet at the same time many of the rights African-
Americans were fighting for were matters of socioeconomic 
justice (desegregated schools, improved housing, fair 
employment standards, equal access to and use of public 
services, etc). It would be odd if the human rights aspect 
of either campaign were limited to being a description of 
litigation in the courts, or the publication of UN reports. Why 
wouldn’t human rights activism include civil disobedience, 
strikes, sanctions, disinvestment, political organizing and so 
many other tactics used in these struggles? 
Burke argues that orthodox economics, including the 
growth imperative, private sector-driven development, 
and blindness to the “social outcomes of increased 
financialization” is “unchallenged in the dominant discourse 
on human rights”. But again, this ignores the actual work 
of many self-described human rights groups who work 
on precisely these issues. Moreover, although “dominant” 
is itself ambiguous, one would hardly call the UN Human 
Rights Council marginal. Yet it has appointed rapporteurs 
on all key economic and social rights, many of whom have 
written prominent reports, widely debated, on the impact 
of privatization, austerity, or market fundamentalism 
on the effort to fulfill ESR. Moreover, the Council has 
appointed experts to study and report on “the promotion of 
a democratic and equitable international order”; on “extreme 
poverty and human rights”; on the “effects of foreign debt 
on the fulfilment of human rights”; “on human rights and 
international solidarity” and others. The issue of subjecting 
transnational corporations to greater human rights scrutiny 
has been prominent on the Council’s agenda for over a 
decade. The Council also convened in special, emergency 
session to debate the impact of the 2008-09 financial crisis 
on human rights. Whether any of this activity has much 
impact is a fair question, but it’s not as if human rights 
actors – even mainstream ones – are ignoring the perverse 
effects of market fundamentalism. 
It is true, to a Western audience at least, a dominant – or 
more visible – form of human rights advocacy is focused 
on invoking international legal standards and seeking 
legal reform and accountability. Similarly, where those 
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standards prescribe a clear course of action, simply 
demanding that government’s follow it does insulate (at 
least somewhat) that advocacy from the charge of political 
bias or preference. But as many of the articles point out, 
many ESR claims can be advanced strictly within the 
framework of obligations established in international law – 
there should be no debate on the issue of free, universally 
accessible primary education. And, as argued above, some 
positions on civil and political rights are weakly supported 
in international law. If serious, the claim that a move 
away from law will ‘politicize’ rights claims would need 
to account for the fact that many organizations have for 
decades championed positions that are not firmly grounded 
in international law, but rather amount to very progressive 
interpretations of that law, or in fact are claims that new 
legal standards are needed. In other words, the supposed 
tension between law and politics is neither unique to ESR, 
nor is it a particular problem for tackling many social 
justice questions. For example, even human rights NGOs 
who feel most comfortable grounding all their work in 
international law, and using traditional advocacy methods, 
could engage meaningfully in campaigns for tax justice, or 
indigenous land rights.
Great expectations
In concluding, one might say that those debating human 
rights and social justice tend to expect either too much or too 
little of human rights principles. It borders on delusional to 
imagine a complaints mechanism to the UN’s Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights, or even greater ESR litigation 
in national courts, will do much to disturb the existing and 
grossly inequitable global economic order. As several authors, 
including Burke, Chong, and Khalfan and Byrne point out, 
there are clear limits to what human rights principles will 
support. They will not easily be used to endorse one form 
of economic system over another, or to rule out absolutely 
some policy choices like privatization or permitting foreign 
investment. As the table above shows, social justice 
demands tend to be broader than the more narrow human 
rights principles. Yet, at the same time, it is clearly the case 
that these principles can and are being invoked to aid in 
social justice struggles, and increasingly so in debates about 
the inequalities inherent in the global economic order.
This apparent confusion about what human rights can 
deliver is evident in Moyn’s article. He playfully posits 
“Croesus’s world” where a benevolent overlord ensures 
basic freedoms are respected and basic needs are meet. 
Although in this world there are glaring inequalities, a 
“floor of protection” is set. According to Moyn, “… we 
could live in a situation of absolute hierarchy like Croesus’s 
world, with human rights norms as they have been 
canonically formulated perfectly respected”. He wants to 
make the point that human rights norms on their own do 
not fundamentally challenge glaring wealth inequalities. 
On that point, he’s right – but who imagined they would? 
Even so, this hardly makes them irrelevant. For as Moyn 
appears to overlook, the UDHR and many subsequent UN 
standards promise that “… the will of the people shall 
be the basis of the authority of government”; and that 
this should be expressed through free, fair, and periodic 
elections grounded in equal suffrage. The benevolent 
dictatorship we are asked to imagine is itself, prima facie, 
inconsistent with even a narrow understanding of human 
rights. If Croesus presides over a grossly unequal world, 
and all can equally have a say in electing him, it’s likely to 
be a short reign. 
Finally, pondering the relationship of social justice to 
human rights calls to mind the remarks of the great 
American satirist, HL Mencken, who when asked if he 
believed in baptism replied, “Believe in it? I’ve seen it 
done!” There can be little doubt that the global human 
rights framework as it exists today – its international 
norms and institutions – is ill-equipped on its own to 
challenge, never mind reverse, growing global wealth 
inequalities. Nor will human rights litigation halt climate 
change. Yet insisting on the inadequacy of human rights 
tools, or on the inappropriateness of applying them to 
these issues, seems pointless in the face of the fact that 
so many people do place an emphasis on human rights in 
campaigns for social justice. Given the scale of the misery 
they confront, who are we to say that they’ve chosen the 
wrong language in which to do so? 
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